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‘El respecto al derecho ajeno es la paz 
Respect for the rights of another, that is peace’ 
(A Mexican American Proverb)
 vi
INTRODUCTION 
 
In current dominant research, the analysis and interpretation of conflicts has become 
a somehow dangerously simplistic exercise. Looking mainly from the distance and 
from a western, developed and relatively comfortable socio-economic perspective, 
one’s capacity to fully understand and explain conflict in the so-called Third World 
can be appallingly limited and perverse.  In fact, it seems much easier to look at such 
conflicts as inevitable barbarian struggles between peoples who cannot coexist due to 
their ancestral and primordial ethnic, religious or cultural differences. Furthermore, 
such an interpretation can be a comfortable one also, since it gives us the idea that 
there is not much we can do to prevent or solve them, or at least that our capacity to 
get involved should be a very limited one. Furthermore, all actions from external 
actors tend to simply artificially contain tensions that, sooner or later, will give place 
to violence and conflict.  
Our analysis, however, departs from a very different positioning and calls for a 
significantly different approach to conflict prevention and/or resolution in divided 
societies. In fact, even if a great number of contemporary conflicts is characterised 
by important ethnic, religious and cultural dimensions, it must also be acknowledged 
that they incorporate indisputable underlying political, economic and social causes. 
At the same time, such complex conflicts, especially internal ones, have always been 
an important source of poverty and underdevelopment in the so-called low income 
countries under stress (LICUS). 
 The progressive perception of the threat to regional and international security and 
stability posed by these conflicts situated especially in many African countries, led 
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the developed world to some awareness of how important it was to help contain and 
solve internal violence abroad. In fact, since the end of the Cold-War, there was an 
important push towards various forms of international intervention in conflict 
scenarios, especially in the so-called third world, increasingly – or at least more 
visibly- characterised by violent and enduring internal conflict. This ‘new 
interventionism’ was basically characterised by a new and very simplistic and 
perverse representation of the periphery of the world system as a sort of failure of the 
modernity project. According to this view, the result has been the multiplication of 
the so-called failed states which create the conditions for the emergence of ‘new 
wars’, mainly internal and characterised by new actors and forms of violence. The 
external diagnosis of these new wars gave way to an also inevitably external 
therapeutic, aimed at containing instability and violence in that same periphery. This 
in turn led to an increasing consensus on the need for a wide and comprehensive 
range of conflict prevention strategies, namely at the level of most international and 
regional organisations such as the United Nations, the European Union, the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe or even the African Union. The 
definition and implementation of models and strategies for conflict prevention and 
peace building has thus been a feature ever since the 1990s but it has also undergone 
significant change and developments, according to the needs and priorities of the 
main external actors.  
Despite recognising the importance of these developments in response to violent and 
long-lasting internal conflicts, this thesis presents a critical analysis and evaluation of 
such approaches to conflict and peace and which have often been characterised by 
rushing post-conflict societies towards liberal democracy and market economy and 
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thus resulting in a very limited strategy for preventing a return to violence in 
countries that experienced protracted internal conflict (Dodson, 2006:245) In fact, in 
the dominant literature and practice of conflict prevention and peace building, for 
example, the effective consideration of the role of socio-economic inequalities and, 
consequently, of the fundamental character of economic and social rights, is 
frequently undermined and it usually results in an almost exclusive emphasis on the 
democratisation approach based on civil and political rights and/or on 
counterproductive economic conditionality imposed by external actors. 
Contrary to some approaches that question if the root causes of internal conflict truly 
matter in the efforts to prevent or resolve conflicts, we here underline the importance 
of such causes. By presenting the dominant prevention and peace building 
approaches as limited and insufficient both in identifying the deeper causes of 
conflict and underdevelopment in divided countries and in tackling the deeper needs 
of the population, this thesis thus departs from the assumption that to better and most 
effectively prevent conflicts and build sustainable peace in such contexts it is crucial 
to make a rigorous diagnosis of a conflicts’ multiple and complex causes. In such 
contexts, this includes, among other things, a thorough assessment of the economic 
and social rights situation of the population in general and of certain rights in 
particular. 
More specifically, the aim of this thesis is twofold: first, to identify and discuss the 
dominant explanations on the origins of violent armed conflict; secondly, to critically 
analyse the changes and evolution in the traditional and dominant models to resolve 
conflicts and build peace, by stressing their limited agenda and priorities and the way 
in which they tend to obscure much more complex inequalities and dynamics that 
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sustain and reproduce conflict. With this analysis, we aim to argue that effective and 
sustainable strategies imply recognising and addressing the more complex 
inequalities at stake, suggesting the need for deconstructing simplistic views of 
ethnicity, religion and of the multiple actors involved in conflict. 
For this purpose, we focus on the long lasting North-South conflict in Sudan – which 
opposed the Muslim government of Khartoum and the Christian rebels in the South 
(Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army- SPLM/A)- and where the traditional 
narratives evolved from a simplistic interpretation of conflict based on religious 
differences between a Muslim North and a Christian South to one that added the 
importance of more structural and visible inequalities of the Southern population and 
where resolution efforts culminated with the signing of a Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in 2005. According to our analysis, however, these strategies are still 
based on general and flawed assumptions that end up reproducing and perpetuating 
more invisible and complex group inequalities in the South and that render peace in 
Southern Sudan extremely fragile. The analysis of the case-study will first attempt to 
contribute to a broader and deeper understanding of the multiple origins of this 
country’s recurring civil wars, by focusing on the underlying variables and factors 
that are not usually addressed, such as socio-economic inequality and marginalisation 
among different groups, and which may undermine the achievement of a definitive 
and lasting peace in the country. Secondly, and more importantly, from a rigorous 
analysis of the dynamics of a long and complex peace process between the North and 
the South, we’ll also try to understand if and how economic and social rights have 
been effectively included and implemented as a part of the agreements and 
considered as crucial for the success of the peace agreement. With the case study of 
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Sudan, a country which fits well in the profile of an ethnically and religiously 
divided society in conflict, we will try to answer several questions, namely how do 
internal and external actors involved in the peace process view the causes and 
processes of the Sudanese conflict and how are their different views reflected or not 
in the final peace agreement as a result of a social and political process? How 
engaged were external actors and what consideration was given to economic and 
social rights and needs in the CPA? 
The expected outcome of the research is thus to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of the intersections between complex social, economic, political and 
cultural processes and dynamics of violent conflict in divided societies, as well as to 
acquire both comprehensive and critical knowledge of the theoretical approaches and 
debates regarding contemporary forms of violent conflict and conflict 
transformation, and skill to engage with their multiple causes and consequences at 
local, national and global levels. 
Therefore, and having as its underlying thematic the relevant, if not crucial, role of 
economic, social and cultural rights in conflict prevention and post conflict 
reconstruction strategies, this analysis will thus attempt to answer the following 
question: 
‘Have the peace efforts, namely the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, been 
in-depth enough to effectively resolve conflict and build a sustainable peace in 
Southern Sudan?’ 
Drawing from the case-study of Sudan, and more specifically from the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the North and the South, we intend to 
demonstrate that dominant prevention and peace building strategies in contexts 
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experiencing such variable and complex dynamics can only be effective and 
successful in achieving sustainable peace if they incorporate the respect and 
fulfilment of economic and social rights as fundamental and intrinsically linked to 
their civil and political counterparts.  
 
 
Structure of the research and theoretical justification 
 
One of the main justifications for this research lies in the lack of systematic research 
on adequate strategies for dealing peacefully with conflicts which include not only 
religious and ethnic dimensions, but also and above all deep socio-economic 
fractures. The role of these dimensions in conflict is, at the same time, often 
misunderstood, leading to largely ineffective responses based on distorted 
assumptions. In fact, although the literature on the underlying causes and factors of 
internal conflicts in ethnically and/or religiously divided societies is relatively well-
developed, the majority of the analysis of current conflicts taking place in such 
contexts tends to focus mainly on the primordial role that existing ethnic or religious 
divisions play in the eruption and perpetuation of such conflicts.  Since many groups 
of people fight together perceiving themselves as belonging to a common culture 
(ethnic or religious) there is a tendency to attribute wars to ‘primordial’ ethnic 
passions, which makes them seem intractable. However, this is a flawed view of such 
conflicts, attempting to divert attention from crucial underlying economic, social and 
political causes (Stewart, 2002:342). Consequently, dominant prevention and 
reconstruction models and strategies tend to focus on responses that privilege the 
civil and political inclusion and participation of specific groups in society and 
government, and thus undermining the importance of structures for full economic 
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and social participation. These strategies are also often marked by a tendency to 
ignore or obscure more invisible forms of inequality and that may become potential 
sources of violent conflict. 
In order to achieve the above mentioned goals, the thesis will be structured in two 
main parts. The first consists of the theoretical debates that will frame and guide our 
arguments and hypotheses. In chapter one, and departing from a theoretical debate 
that opposes the various possible interpretations in what concerns the role of ethnic 
and religious cleavages play as causes of conflicts, we aim to overcome and 
deconstruct the views that consider primordial loyalties as exclusive variables to 
interpret and justify conflicts. By making this debate clear, we expect to provide a 
basis for a more accurate and complete theoretical and empirical analysis of conflict 
with such characteristics, which will also allow for an alternative approach to conflict 
prevention and peace building in which the role played by continued forms of 
exclusion and socio-economic marginalisation of specific groups is taken into due 
account. Focus will be given to both instrumentalist and constructivist visions 
according to which, ethnic, religious or cultural factors are viewed as important 
variables, but mainly because they are either instrumentalised or constructed in order 
to be used for the perpetuation and maintenance of inequalities between different 
groups and to hide the deeper causes of these conflicts, namely the socio-economic 
inequalities. The underlying assumption here is that the increasing politicisation of 
religious, ethnic or cultural traditions and the radicalisation of several specific 
communities are especially linked to moments of economic degradation and social 
disintegration. In such contexts, marginalised or threatened groups tend to focus and 
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concentrate on their specific traditions and specificities in search for an alternative 
political order that satisfies their well-being, recognition and security needs.  
This first theoretical debate will then be applied to the case study of Sudan, where 
the long-lasting conflict opposing Muslim and Christian groups has been frequently 
interpreted simply according to the primordialist thesis. We will then try to 
deconstruct the common view that has contributed to an interpretation of the 
Sudanese conflict as struggles between different groups that cannot coexist due to 
their different ethnic or religious nature and, therefore, as endemic and unavoidable. 
As a consequence, attempts to bring the conflict to an end have often failed to go 
beyond such arguments and address the deep socio-economic inequalities and which 
reinforces ethnic or religious dividing lines. We will also present and develop the 
main theoretical framework for our analysis, which will focus on Edward Azar’s 
theory of protracted social conflict. This will be presented as a most appropriate 
analytical framework to understand the dynamics and processes of conflict in divided 
societies. This theory identifies some of the most important pre-conditions for 
conflict in divided contexts: the communal content (existence of different 
ethnic/religious groups) of the society, deprivation of human needs (economic 
neglect, social and political exclusion), type of governance and the role of state, and 
international linkages. These pre-conditions - which in isolation do not necessarily 
lead to conflict - are then linked and associated to some triggering factors and 
processes and which are grouped in three clusters of variables: group actions and 
strategies, state actions and strategies and built-in mechanisms of conflict.  
According to this theory, protracted social conflicts occur when certain groups and 
communities are deprived of satisfaction of their basic economic, social and cultural 
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needs by the government on the basis of their communal identity, a process that 
results from a complex causal chain involving the role of the state and the pattern of 
international linkages (Azar, 1990: 12). This theory will also be complemented with 
other theoretical approaches such as Galtung’s theory of structural peace or John 
Burton’s theory of human needs, which emphasise the structural and deeper socio-
economic dimensions of peace and conflict. This inclusion of these theoretical views 
is considered important since they help clarifying the crucial importance of equal and 
just socio-economic structures in societies where inequality, exclusion and disrespect 
for people’s rights and needs may create the conditions for violent conflict to 
emerge. This analytical framework will thus provide the basis for our main argument 
which assumes that paying due attention to the social and economic rights and needs 
of the population in conflict-prone societies is crucial for preventing the 
(re)emergence of conflict and achieving sustainable peace. 
In chapter two we will analyse and evaluate if and how the pre-conditions and 
processes suggested in the previous chapter are actually understood and incorporated 
in dominant approaches to conflict prevention and peace building. This chapter aims 
basically to make a general overview of such models and strategies of conflict 
prevention and peace building and to identify some of what we consider to be their 
main gaps and limitations when applied to divided societies undergoing or emerging 
from violent conflict, namely their general tendency to universalise a very limited 
approach to human rights which emphasises the civil and political dimension of 
rights and undermines the so-called second generation rights (economic, social and 
cultural)-, as well as their implementation in divided societies. 
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Finally, and after having critically analysed some of the main dynamics and 
conditions for conflict and also having pointed out the main shortcomings and gaps 
in dominant strategies and models traditionally applied to end violence and building 
peace in such conflict and post-conflict scenarios, chapter three will elaborate a little 
bit more on the argument that social and economic rights and needs must therefore 
be fully incorporated as a crucial and determinant factor for the effectiveness and 
success of peace efforts, especially in conflict-prone divided societies. It will be 
argued that more effective conflict resolution processes and models need to include 
as fundamental a reinforcement of economic, social and cultural rights, while at the 
same time assuming and expressing the indivisibility of all human rights as a central 
element for their success, especially in deeply divided societies. The 
acknowledgment and recognition of the existence of various types of underlying 
factors, of a more material and structural nature, which are as important to fully 
understand the emergence or perpetuation of conflicts in these societies, such as 
political and socio-economic inequalities, then become fundamental elements for the 
definition of alternative strategies to prevent or resolve conflicts of such complex 
nature. 
This alternative approach will be explained and justified within the framework of a 
multidimensional and comprehensive approach to peace and conflict and illustrated 
with specific examples of good and bad practices in this area. 
The second part of the thesis will consist of the application on the theoretical 
framework and arguments to the specific case of Sudan. First of all, chapter four will 
provide a more clear and deeper understanding of the long-lasting conflict between 
the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, the main Southern rebel group. By 
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identifying the main actors, ingredients and the deeper dynamics behind the conflict 
we will then attempt to underline the crucial role played in conflict by the 
governments’ strategy of continued social exclusion and economic deprivation 
(denial of economic and social rights) of the Southern population. Moreover, 
throughout this analysis, and in order to reinforce the main questions and hypotheses 
and consolidate both the theoretical framework and the case study, several other sub- 
questions will also be addressed. More specifically, we will assess what is the history 
of relations between groups, if there is there a pattern of systematic discrimination or 
have relations been relatively peaceful and inclusive; if there are other factors, for 
example political exclusion or economic inequality, reinforcing ethnic divisions 
(even within the South); if there are large socio-economic disparities reinforcing 
other lines of division, such as ethnicity or religion; if elites face an economic or 
political incentive to mobilise violence along ethnic or religious lines; if government 
policies favour one group over another and if government services are provided 
equally across different ethnic or religious groups, are exclusive language policies in 
place; or civil and political freedoms and other basic human rights respected?  The 
answers to these questions will be very useful to test the argument and hypotheses 
presented in the conceptual framework. 
In chapter five, we will present an analysis of the dynamics and evolution of the 
peace process and the type of solution applied to solve conflict and build peace. 
More specifically, we will try to understand to what extent the strategies of social 
exclusion and economic deprivation of the Southern population have been tackled 
and addressed effectively as a crucial element for sustainable peace throughout the 
long peace process. A critical analysis of the provisions and implementation of the 
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Comprehensive Peace Agreement from an economic and social rights perspective 
will also attempt to provide an answer to our main research question. In chapter six, 
by critically emphasising the limitations and shortcomings of dominant peace 
strategies when it comes to building sustainable peace, we will prove our main 
argument and hypothesis as well as the validity of the suggested approach to more 
effective conflict prevention and peace building based on the effective address of the 
invisible forms of inequality and on the implementation of economic and social 
rights and needs of all Southern population. 
Finally, the conclusive part of the thesis will sum up the main arguments and 
hypothesis developed throughout the analysis as applied to the specific case-study of 
Sudan. Furthermore, the last part will also serve the purpose of drawing some more 
general conclusions and suggesting some recommendations for an alternative 
approach to conflict prevention and peace building that can be applicable to similar 
conflicting scenarios.  
Methodology 
 
With the aim of conducting the analysis and addressing the specific research 
questions mentioned above and in order to identify key debates, be familiarised with 
the discourse and present a conceptual framework, the first step will be to review the 
existing secondary source literature on the subject of conflict resolution and conflict 
prevention. Exploratory interviews are also meant to gain insight in this frame of 
reference and complete hard information, as well as develop an essential part of 
networking. Moreover, the need to conduct a more focused research and to make 
operational the concepts determined the subsequent methodological strategy – the 
use of a case study. 
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Methodologically, this research will thus include several techniques considered 
fundamental to achieve the specified objectives and overcome the difficulties 
inherent to this thematic, namely research, collection and interpretation of data based 
on written reports, documents and other forms of secondary bibliography on the 
subject, in order to better understand both the theoretical debate and the elements of 
the conflicts in Sudan; interviews to experts and researchers specialised on the 
thematic, in an exploratory stage. The aim of these interviews is mainly to have a 
more rigorous understanding of the historic causes and nature of the conflict, 
different actors and interests involved which are necessary steps to formulate more 
accurate hypotheses and arguments both general and specific to the case-study; 
research and interpretation of Sudan’s official documents such as legislation, 
government’s programmes, Constitution, peace agreements, rebel group’s plans of 
action and demands, among others; analysis of international organisation’s and 
NGO’s reports and documents.  
In addition, and while deepening the defined topics, as well as exploring further 
issues rose by the set of interviews, field research will prove essential and add crucial 
value to the study, and will include interviews and contacts with active and relevant 
actors, local, national and international, such as political leaders, local and 
international workers (UN, EU, ICG, etc), political analysts, economists and human 
rights activists, civil society organisations. The main aim of the field work will be to 
gather as much relevant information and data as possible, which will after be 
analysed according to the established theoretical framework. The field research will 
not constitute an end in itself but rather a crucial step in order to prove the relevance 
and viability of the above-mentioned hypothesis and arguments. 
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‘Who cares where national borders lie, who cares whose laws you’re 
governed by, who cares what name you call a town, who cares when 
you’re six feet beneath the ground?’  
(Excerpt of the song Sunrise, by The Divine Comedy, in Fin de Siècle). 
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1. UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT BEYOND ETHNICITY AND RELIGION: A REVIEW OF 
THE MAIN APPROACHES 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Understanding armed conflicts has never been an easy task mainly due to their 
inherent violence and complexity. But it becomes particularly difficult in the case of 
internal conflicts, where simplistic interpretations can easily render solutions and 
prevention an almost impossible mission.  
In such circumstances, undertaking a thorough assessment and understanding of why 
some different cultural, ethnic or religious groups sharing and living in the same 
national territory engage in conflict and violent confrontation whereas in others that 
does not happen should be one of the first steps in the study of contemporary 
conflicts.  
The acknowledgement of a re-emergence of religious and ethnic traditions 
worldwide and the argument put forward that the political resurgence of religious 
communities is often by violent way of clashes in and between nations (Hasenclever 
and Rittberger, 2000: 641) has marked the beginning of a particularly interesting and 
rich debate in the field of International Relations and Political Science.1  It has been 
suggested, for example, that the colonial period in Africa, although often establishing 
a territorial division without great correlation with ethnic frontiers, has encouraged 
                                                 
1 Samuel Huntington’s claim (1996) about the cultural fragmentation of the world somehow initiated 
this debate. Huntington proposed a model to interpret the new reality of the world, based on the fact 
that the explanatory factors are not ideological but cultural. Following this argument, religions play a 
fundamental role in world politics. As Marta Reynal- Querol points out:  
 
People belonging to different religions have different versions of many relations among 
individuals and authorities. Following Huntington, one of the most important causes of future 
conflict among civilisations is that their characteristics and differences are less mutable and, 
therefore, more difficult to reach agreements and solve than political and economic 
differences. (Reynal-Querol, 2002:31) 
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an ethnic classification of the populations and used some ethnic groups to fulfil 
special roles in the prevailing colonial policy. In the post colonial period, the 
centralised control of the State by one social group has conducted to an ethnicisation 
of State power which in some countries has resulted in a suppression of ethnic 
movements through its marginalisation or cooptation, but in others has represented a 
factor of increased tensions (Osaghae, 1994: 24). 
Furthermore, since during independence most African States did not actually have a 
coherent and functional unity, there was a first phase in which the national 
construction imperative lead many leaders to reject and ignore the multi-ethnic 
character of their societies, even facing ethnicity as an anachronism that should 
disappear with progress, modernisation and economic growth (Ferreira, 2005b: 47). 
Since ethnic diversity was viewed as inherently conflictual, the origins and stability 
of a national State depended on the denial of partial identities and on incentives to 
the creation of alternative forms of alliances, loyalties and consciences. The most 
common answer to diversity was the adoption of policies that aimed at the 
homogenisation and unity of heterogeneous populations through the limitation of 
expressions of groups’ differences (Ferreira, 2005b: 48). 
As we shall see at a later stage, the conflicts in Southern Sudan, in Darfur and the 
latent and increased violence in the eastern regions of Sudan, for example, seem to 
be all part of a same trend, shared by the several rebel movements, in which the 
‘enemy’ is identified with a specific and limited Muslim-Arab elite, who has been 
controlling and dominating the political and economic life of the country ever since 
independence in 1956, thus continuously and increasingly marginalizing and 
repressing a significant part of the Sudanese population. But is it really so?  
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Despite some relative consensus among scholars and academics on the importance of 
ethnic and religious factors, there are, however, divergences in what concerns a 
direct relation between such diversity and the emergence of violent conflict among 
groups within the same country. In order to accurately clarify these issues, it 
becomes important to review the main theories and concepts of ethnicity and how 
these are used and constructed in relation with conflict.2  
 
1 .2- Ethnicity: Concepts, Theories and Perspectives 
 
There are several theories and views on ethnicity and ethnic identities which tend to 
differ (although not always sharply) in the ways they envisage both concepts and 
processes of ethnicity and ethnic identity3 formation. These different theories and 
perspectives have been especially well-developed in, and associated with the 
academic fields of anthropology, sociology and also (although more recently) 
political science. But despite some notorious differences in approaches and 
definitions, there are also some similarities or at least some points in common, as we 
shall try to demonstrate. These perspectives are especially important for an accurate 
and more rigorous analysis of social processes and evolution in societies, which are 
divided across ethnic and/or religious lines and where violent conflict can emerge. 
                                                 
2 The concept of ethnicity used throughout this analysis will be a broad one including elements of 
religion, race and language and religion. 
3 Identity is seen as a function of how people identify themselves and are identified by others in terms 
of race, ethnicity, culture, language, and religion. The identity question relates to how such concepts 
determine or influence participation and distribution in the political, economic, social, and cultural life 
of the country (Deng, 1995:14). 
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In this debate, the concept of ethnic group is seen as the most comprehensive of all 
the others to which it is usually related – race, nation, minority-, since none of these 
solely seems to be adequate to encompass the enormous range of the inter-group 
relations among cultural groups now so prominent within societies throughout the 
world (Yinger, 1994). 
In Christian Scherrer’s words, for example, ethnic communities can be defined as 
 
Historically generated or (in some cases) re-discovered communities 
of people that largely reproduce themselves. An ethnic or communal 
group has a distinct name, which often simply signifies ‘person’ or 
‘people’ in the ethnic community’s language, a specific 
heterogeneous culture, including, particularly, a distinct language, 
and a collective memory or historical remembrance, including 
community myths. This is producing a degree of solidarity between 
members, generating a feeling of belonging. (Scherrer, 1999: 57) 
 
while ethnicity is presented as a term used to 
 
describe a variety of forms of mobilization which ultimately relate to 
the autonomous existence of specifically ethnic forms of socialization. 
No clear-cut distinction can, however, be made between struggles by 
social classes and struggles by ethnic groups. (Scherrer, 1999: 57) 
 
In Max Weber’s perspective, ‘ethnic groups’ are those human groups that entertain a 
subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or 
of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization or migration; this belief 
is important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter 
whether or not an objective blood relationship exists (Weber, 1998: 21). There is a 
very specific and often extremely powerful sense of ethnic identity, which is 
determined by several factors: shared political membership or persistent ties with the 
old cult, or the strengthening of kinship or other groups (Weber, 1998: 22). Ethnicity 
may thus be defined as an affiliation or identification with an ethnic group. On the 
 24
one hand, ethnicity is subjective since it is the product of the human mind and human 
sentiments and a sense of belonging to a particular ethnic group. On the other hand, 
ethnicity is objective because it must be based on some objective characteristics and 
is constructed by social forces and power relations (Yang, 2000: 40). In such a 
complex debate, which raises so many questions and confronts us with some many 
perspectives, it becomes crucial to understand why and how the study of race and 
ethnicity has changed in a range of disciplines and how these changes relate to new 
research agendas and social and political transformations in contemporary societies 
(Bulmer and Solomos, 1998:3) and especially in the study of contemporary internal 
conflicts. 
But perhaps one of the most important scholars and thinkers of ethnicity was Fredrik 
Barth. In his Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (1969), Barth departs from the 
recognition of the importance of analysing the constitution of ethnic groups and the 
nature of the boundaries between them (Barth, 1969:9). For him, there are two basic 
ideas related to ethnic boundaries: first, these boundaries persist despite a flow of 
personnel across them, i.e., ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of 
mobility, contact and information, but do entail social processes of exclusion and 
incorporation; secondly, stable and persisting social relations are maintained across 
such boundaries (Barth, 1969:10). This means that interaction does not lead to 
acculturation or liquidation of ethnic identities; cultural differences can persist 
despite inter-ethnic contact and interdependence (Barth, 1969:10). Still according to 
Barth, an ethnic group is generally understood in anthropological literature as a 
population, which is largely biologically self-perpetuating, sharing fundamental 
cultural values, making up a field of communication and interaction. But for him this 
 25
is a limited definition because it prevents us from understanding the phenomenon of 
ethnic groups and their place in human society and culture. And we could also argue 
that such definition does not help understanding the actual relation between ethnicity 
and conflict in a given society. In Barth’s approach, ethnic groups are seen as 
categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves, and thus have the 
characteristic of organising interaction between people (Barth, 1969:10-11). The 
emphasis on ascription as the critical feature of ethnic groups implies that the nature 
of continuity of ethnic units clearly depends on the maintenance of a boundary and 
that socially relevant factors become diagnostic for membership (Barth, 1969: 14-
15). 
In this sense, ethnic categories provide some sort of ‘organisational vessel’ that may 
be given varying amounts and forms of content in different socio-cultural systems. 
The critical focus of investigation from this point of view then becomes the ethnic 
boundary that defines the group, not the cultural content that it encloses (Barth, 
1969:15). Ethnicity is then created and recreated as various groups and interests put 
forth competing visions of the ethnic composition of society and argue over which 
rewards or sanctions should be attached to which ethnicities (Nagel, 1998: 239). 
Ethnic grouping is seen as a mutable process in which individuals and small groups, 
because of specific economic or political circumstances may change their locality, 
their political allegiance and form, or their household membership (Barth, 1969:24). 
The incentives to a change in identity are thus inherent in the change in 
circumstances. Different circumstances obviously favour different performances.4
                                                 
4 According to Barth, stable inter-ethnic relations presuppose such a structuring of interaction: a set of 
prescriptions governing situations of contact, and allowing for articulation in some sectors, and a set 
of proscriptions on social situations preventing inter-ethnic interaction in other sectors, and thus 
insulating parts of the cultures from confrontation and modification (Barth, 1969:16).In other words, 
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In the same line of Barth’s theorisation, Joane Nagel refers to a model that 
emphasises the socially ‘constructed’ aspects of ethnicity, meaning the ways in 
which ethnic boundaries, identities and cultures are negotiated, defined and produced 
through social interaction inside and outside ethnic communities (Nagel, 1998: 237). 
According to this view, the origin, content and form of ethnicity reflect the creative 
choices of individuals and groups as they define themselves and others in ethnic 
ways. Ethnicity is then constructed out of the material of language, religion, culture, 
appearance, ancestry or regionality (Nagel, 1998: 237). Nagel, however, leaves it 
clear that this does not mean denying the historical basis of ethnic conflict and 
mobilisation. 
In this context, informal ethnic meanings are important in shaping ethnic identities, 
but formal ethnic labels and policies are even more powerful sources of identity and 
social experience. These official ethnic categories and meanings are usually political. 
As the State has become the dominant institution in society, political policies 
regulating ethnicity increasingly shape ethnic boundaries and influence patterns of 
ethnic identification. These processes in which ethnic boundaries, identities and 
cultures are negotiated, defined or produced by political policies and institutions can 
occur through several ways: a) immigration policies, b) ethnically-linked resource 
policies; and c) by politics defined along ethnic lines (Nagel, 1998: 243). [These two 
last ones are especially interesting and present in conflict prone societies where 
                                                                                                                                          
ethnic identity is super-ordinated to most other statuses, and defines the permissible constellations of 
statuses, or social personalities which an individual with that identity is allowed to assume. In this 
respect, ethnic identity is similar to sex and rank in that it constraints the incumbent in all his 
activities, not only in some defined social situations (Barth, 1969:17). 
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5ethnic and religious divisions are present, like in Sudan.]  As Barth already 
mentioned, there is an important link between ethnic boundaries and resource niches. 
Where separate niches are exploited by separate ethnic group’s tranquillity prevails, 
but if different ethnic groups compete for resources instability and conflict may 
occur.  
In sum, this view emphasises the interplay between ethnic group actions and the 
larger social structures with which they interact. Just as ethnic identity result both 
from the choices of individuals and from the ascriptions of others, ethnic boundaries 
and meaning are also constructed through the intervention of both internal and 
external forces of different nature.6 Jenkins also tries to analyse and understand what 
anthropologists mean when they talk about ethnicity (Jenkins, 1998: 87). Also 
drawing from Barth’s constructivist perspective, it looks at ethnicity as the ‘social 
organisation of cultural difference’. It means that culture is a changing variable and 
contingent property of interpersonal relations, rather than an entity ‘above’ the fray 
of daily life (Jenkins, 1998: 88). 
                                                 
5 Ethnic stratification, for example, is defined as the institutionalised inequality among ethnic groups 
in a society. It is a system of ethnic relations and social rules that determines the unequal distribution 
of resources across different groups. This inequality is not random, since it follows a pattern and 
shows relative constancy and stability, and it is legitimised and justified (Yang, 2000: 61). 
6 Nagel refers to several culture construction techniques that serve two important collective ends: aids 
in the construction of community and serves as mechanisms of collective mobilisation, because they 
serve as basis for group solidarity and help setting agendas for collective action (Nagel, 1998: 252). In 
constructing culture, the past is a resource used by groups in the collective quest for meaning and 
community (Cohen, 1985: 99 apud Nagel, 1998: 253). But cultural construction can also be used for 
ethnic mobilisation, since cultural renewal and transformation are important aspects of ethnic 
movements. 
There are several theories on this: for instance, Snow and his associates argue that social movement 
organisers and activists use existing culture to make movements goals and tactics seem reasonable, 
just and feasible to participants and political officials (Snow et al, 1986); Gamson documented the 
ideational shifts and strategies used by movements, policymakers and opposition groups to shape 
debates, define issues and to paint portraits of each sides’ claims and objectives (Gamson, 1988, 
1992).] (Nagel, 1998:257). 
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According to Jenkins, the ‘basic model’ of ethnicity can be summarised in the 
following aspects: ethnicity is about cultural differentiation; it is rooted in, and the 
outcome of, social interaction; ethnicity is no more fixed or unchanging than the 
culture of which it is a component; ethnicity is then a social identity, both collective 
and individual (Jenkins, 1998:88). Therefore, and common to many other scholars in 
this area, what we can conclude is that the extent to which ethnicity can be freely 
constructed by individuals or groups is quite narrow when compulsory ethnic 
identities are imposed by others. Therefore, externally enforced ethnic boundaries 
can be powerful determinants of both the content and meaning of particular 
ethnicities (Nagel, 1998: 243).  
Whereas in general, political scientists argue that national identities can be based on 
several defining principles of collective belonging - ethnicity, religion, ideology and 
especially territory, Kakar argues that territory may not always be the defining 
principle, since in many contexts religion or ethnicity play an even more important 
role in this (Kakar, 1996: 39). Departing from the idea of an apparent rise and revival 
of religious and/or ethnic fundamentalist feelings, Kakar argues however, that if we 
look closely at individual cases around the world, we will find that this revival is less 
of religiosity than of cultural identities based on religious affiliation. Group identity 
is presented as an extended part of the individual self-experience, although it 
intensity tens do vary across individuals and with time (Kakar, 1996: ix). By ‘cultural 
identity’ the author means a group’s basic way of organizing experience through its 
myths, memories, symbols, rituals and ideals. It is socially produced, subject to 
historical change and therefore not static (Kakar, 1996: 143). 
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Therefore, where the resurgence tends to be most visible is in the organization of 
collective identities around religion, in the formation and strengthening of 
communities of believers. These groups share not only religious beliefs, but also 
social, economic, and political interests that may conflict with the corresponding 
interests of another community sharing the same geographical space (Kakar, 1996: 
186). He argues further that identity is not an achievement but a process constantly 
threatened with rupture by forces from within and from without (Kakar, 1996: 158). 
 
1.3- The theoretical debate: primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism 
What all these authors and scholars have in common in their analysis and research is 
a concern for more clarity in understanding how ethnicity and ethnic identity is 
formed, experienced and how it evolves. It is basically a concern not only for its 
content but also for its true meaning and the way this relates to individuals and 
groups’ inclusion or exclusion in a broader social system. In order to pursue these 
goals and understand the deeper impact of ethnicity and ethnic sense of belonging of 
individuals and groups, researchers (both in anthropology, sociology and political 
science) all turn to the somehow perennial debate about the nature of ethnic identity 
which confronts and compares primordialist, instrumentalist and constructivist 
perspectives.  
Drawing from Jenkins, the main questions here thus are 
is ethnicity a fundamental, primordial aspect of human existence and 
self-consciousness, essentially unchanging and unchangeable in the 
bonds it creates between the individual and the group?, or is it defined 
strategically, tactically manipulated, and capable of change at both the 
individual and collective levels?. (Jenkins, 1998: 89) 
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Primordialist theories answer these questions by arguing that ethnicity must be seen 
as a static identity, mainly inherited from one’s ancestors, where the boundaries 
demarcating who is a member of an ethnic group and who is not, are fixed and 
immutable. Primordialism also considers common ancestry as determining ethnicity 
(i.e., people belong to an ethnic group because members of that group all share 
common biological and cultural origins). As Geertz suggested, it is those primordial 
bonds (lineage and cultural ties) that give rise to and sustain ethnicity (Geertz, 1973 
apud Yang, 2000: 42). The primordialist perspective has two variants: a 
sociobiological view which sees ethnicity as an extension of kinship; and a culturalist 
view which underscores the importance of a common culture in the determination of 
ethnic group membership. According to this view, a common culture (language, 
religion) determines the genesis and tenacity of ethnic identity even in the absence of 
common ancestors (Geertz, 1973 apud Yang, 2000: 43). 
The primordialist view thus considers ethnicity to be a fundamental component of 
human nature and its self-consciousness as something constant and unchangeable. By 
emphasising this fixed, natural and immutable character of ethnicity and/or religious 
identities, primordialists see individuals as being closed in an essential category that 
is permanent and to which are associated specific ways of thinking and acting 
(Ferreira, 2005: 82). But primordialism also contains several limitations. By 
naturalising and fixating ethnic identities, it does not really explain why ethnic 
memberships or identities of individuals and groups tend to change and disappear or 
why new identities emerge among biologically and culturally diverse groups. As 
Yang puts it, it tends to overlook the larger historical and structural conditions that 
construct/deconstruct and reinforce/undermine ethnic loyalties; it neglects the 
 31
economic and political interests closely associated with ethnic sentiment and practice 
(Yang, 2000: 43). 
A second perspective on ethnicity that is important for this debate is instrumentalism, 
which emphasises the plasticity of ethnicity and the fact that people can shift and 
alter their ethnic ascriptions in the light of circumstances (Jenkins, 1998: 89) thus 
comparing ethnic groups to other interest groups. Unlike primordialism, 
instrumentalism sees ethnicity as an instrument or strategic tool for gaining 
resources. According to this view, people become ethnic and remain ethnic when 
their ethnicity yields significant returns to them. Ethnicity exists and persists because 
it is useful, and it can result in political, economic or social advantages (Yang, 2000: 
46). Ethnic or religious identities are then socially defined and used in a given 
situation, flexible and negotiable, strategically manipulated and capable of changing 
both at the individual as well as the group level. In this sense, ethnic (and religious) 
groups constitute fluid, unstable and provisory entities, and their use by social actors 
is also socially and historically contingent (Ferreira, 2005b: 82). The most extreme 
version of instrumentalism attributes the acquisition and retention of ethnic 
membership or identity solely to the motivation of wanting to obtain comparative 
advantage. Hence, interests are the sole determinant of ethnic identity, and ethnic 
affiliation tends to be transient and situational as the benefits of ethnicity shift (Yang, 
2000: 46). 
Another recent formulation of instrumentalism links it to rational choice theory, 
assuming that people act to promote their socio-economic positions by minimising 
the costs of, and maximising the potential benefits of, their actions. Applied to ethnic 
identities, the rational choice theory suggests that some people favour an ethnic 
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identity because it may be beneficial, while others hide or deny it because it will 
bring disadvantages (Yang, 2000: 47). Again this view must be considered with 
caution, since it can easily be exaggerated and associated to a merely rational and 
materialistic view of ethnicity that underscores the symbolic importance of ethnic 
belonging for some groups and individuals.  
Finally, the constructivist school answers quite differently to these questions. 
According to constructivists, the social world is a world of human consciousness, 
constructed and shared: of thoughts and beliefs, of ideas and concepts, of languages 
and discourses and understandings among human beings, especially groups of human 
beings, such as States and nations. The social world is an inter-subjective domain: it 
is meaningful to the people who made it and live in it, and who understand it 
precisely because they made it and they are the home of it (Jackson and SØrensen, 
2003: 254). In this sense, and as applied to this specific subject, constructivism is 
usually based on three major arguments: ethnicity is a socially constructed identity, 
something that is created; ethnicity is dynamic and ethnic boundaries are flexible, 
changeable; ethnic affiliation or identification is determined or constructed by 
society7 (Yang, 2000: 44).  
Challenging the assumption that ethnicity is an irrational form of cultural attachment, 
it explicitly emphasises the social construction of ethnicity and race. In fact, and as 
mentioned before, both Barth (1969) and Nagel (1998) had already noted that 
ethnicity should be seen as socially constructed and reconstructed by internal forces 
                                                 
7 Within constructivism in this specific debate there are various perspectives, such as ‘emergent 
ethnicity’ which views ethnicity as an ‘emergent phenomenon’ created by structural conditions 
(William Yancey et al, 1976); or the ‘theory of ethnicisation’, suggesting that ethnicity is created by 
two conditions: ascription (assignment of individuals to particular ethnic groups by outsiders such as 
government, churches, schools, media and other immigrants) and adversity (includes prejudice, 
discrimination, hostility and hardship) (Yang, 2000: 45).  
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and external forces (social, economic or political processes and outsiders), and as a 
dynamic identity. In sum, constructivism underlines the centrality of social 
construction in ethnic formation at the same time it highlights historical and 
structural forces that create and sustain ethnicity. As for its limitations, scholars 
usually sustain that it tends to ignore the ancestral basis of ethnicity (which must be 
considered and acknowledged as having a relatively important influence in this 
processes) and de-emphasise the limitations of social construction. At the same time, 
and like primordialism, it does not pay enough attention to the role of political and 
economic interest in the construction of ethnicity (Yang, 2000: 46). 
Having said this, however, one must be aware that this is not a clear-cut debate and 
that the differences are somehow made more flexible by some common aspects: 
primordialists also recognise that ethnic features vary from society to society and 
from time to time; and some instrumentalists tend to accept some power relations and 
stability of ethnic identifications (Jenkins, 1998: 89). It remains, nevertheless, a 
crucial debate for a deeper and clearer understanding of ethnicity and it is 
particularly useful in finding a balance between them through an integrated 
approach. Yang, for example, departs from this debate to argue that ethnicity is 
socially constructed partly on the basis of ancestry or presumed ancestry and more 
importantly by society, that the interests of ethnic groups also partly determine ethnic 
affiliation, and that ethnic boundaries are relatively stable but undergo changes from 
time to time (Yang, 2000: 48). This means basically that the majority of people do 
not get to choose their identity, because they are largely born into it according to a 
set of rules defined by society; at the same time, these are also largely subject to 
some change. In sum, what can be drawn from this important debate is that ethnic 
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identity and boundaries are permanently constructed and reconstructed by 
individuals, ethnic groups, other groups and society as a whole, a process in which 
ancestry, symbolism, and larger economic, political and social structures are linked, 
and contribute, to the social construction of ethnicity.  
 
1.4- Identity and conflict 
According to some authors, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic contexts are 
characterized by stronger feelings of threats to a given groups’ survival and 
existence. The nature of such threats differs, of course, according to one’s position 
and perspective. For some, the main cause of conflict between groups in all these 
instances has been generally identified as a clash of economic interests, an 
explanation that embraces some version of a class struggle between the poor and the 
rich. For others, the identity-threat may also arise due to perceived discrimination by 
the State, through disregard by the political authorities of a group’s interests or 
disrespect for its cultural symbols (Kakar, 1996: 187).  
Here, again, we can apply the previous theoretical debate on the relation between 
identity and conflict and use it as a first and basic framework in our attempts to grasp 
the ways in which this relation can influence, both positively and negatively, conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding strategies traditionally implemented in war-prone 
societies. 
As we have discussed above, the primordialist view considers ethnicity to be a 
fundamental component of human nature and its self-consciousness as something 
constant and unchangeable. By emphasising this fixed, natural and immutable 
character of ethnicity and/or religious identities, primordialists see individuals as 
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being closed in a permanent essential category, and to which specific ways of 
thinking and acting are associated (Ferreira, 2005b: 82). They also assume that ethnic 
and religious hatred are the most important factors explaining violent conflicts in the 
post-Cold War era, thus holding that conflict between ethnic or religious groups is 
inevitable because of deep-seated cultural practices and antipathies (USAID, 2005: 
15). Primordialists thus argue that differences in religious traditions should be 
viewed as one of the most important independent variables to explain violent 
interactions in and between nations, since collective actors at the national as well as 
the international level tend to form alliances around common cosmologies, and 
tensions arise and escalate primarily between alliances with different cosmologies 
(Rittberger and Hasenclever, 2000: 641). 
In this sense, religious or ethnic differences are considered to be more important than 
language differences as a social cleavage that can develop into a conflict. According 
to this theoretical point of view, there are two basic reasons why religious differences 
can generate more violence than other social cleavages. First, there is no doubt of the 
excludability of religion. One can speak two or more languages, but you can only 
have one religion. Second, religious differences, which constitute the basic 
differences among civilisations, imply different ways of understanding the world, 
social relationships and so on (Reynal-Querol, 2002: 32)8. Multi-religious societies 
                                                 
8 As Marta Reynal-Querol also argues 
 
[…] in the modern world, religion is a central and, in many situations, primary force 
that motivates and moves humans. In such situations, what counts is not political 
ideology or economic interests. Faith, family, blood and beliefs are the aspects with 
which people identify themselves, the characteristics for which they fight and die. 
More than ethnicity, religion discriminates and differentiates humans in a sharp and 
exclusive way, even more than belonging to a country would do. A person can be 
half French and half Saudi Arabian and, at the same time be a citizen of both 
countries. However, it is difficult to be half Christian and half Muslim. (Reynal-
Querol, 2002:31) 
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will inevitably experience conflict due to existing irreconcilable understandings of 
the sacred between groups. In this line of thought, identity conflicts are seen as 
inevitable expressions of ancient rivalries and in its extreme sense, primordialism 
may provide a rational justification for ethnic cleansing (Ferreira, 2005b: 82). In the 
end, these societies either will fall apart, or one community will inevitably gain 
dominance and suppress the others (Hasenclever and Rittberger, 2000: 644). For 
example, despite some important divergences in what concerns the existence of a 
direct relation between ethnic and/or religious diversity and the emergence of violent 
conflicts among groups within the same State, the multiple conflicts in Sudan have 
been often interpreted as an example of the primordialist view, according to which 
such differences must be seen as the most independent variable to explain conflicts. 
However, this approach does not explain how this consciousness varies through time, 
why it differs in intensity between members of a same group or the fact that 
individuals often build and defend social bonds that go beyond ethnic or religious 
boundaries (Ferreira, 2005b: 82). Another common criticism of primordialism is the 
failure to account for variation in the level of conflict over time and place. It does not 
explain why ethnic groups change over time nor does it explain why some 
multiethnic and/or multi-religious countries live in peace, whereas elsewhere 
violence erupts ( Østy, 2003: 25). 
Instrumentalists, on the other hand, recognise the importance of existing religious 
and ethnic differences as well as their impact on conflict behaviour, but refuse to see 
them as the main and primordial causes of conflict. In fact, this view admits that 
conflicts may be aggravated by divergent religious creeds, but they insist that they 
are rarely if ever caused by them (Hasenclever and Rittberger, 2000: 642). In its 
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attempt to understand conflict in divided societies, instrumentalism underlines the 
importance of the context in which this ethnic feeling emerges in order to mobilise 
and/or to be politically manipulated and instrumentalised (Ferreira, 2005b: 83). 
According to this view, ethnic or religious identities have little independent standing 
outside the political process in which collective ends are sought and they are 
primarily a set of symbolic ties that may be used for political and economic 
advantage (Østy, 2003: 26). These identities may thus be polarised and lead to 
conflict, mainly if and when specific elites use these factors to explain group 
inequality and discrimination and then justify violence in an attempt to gain, 
maintain or increase their hold on political or economic power. As Hasenclever and 
Rittberger refer, the existence of cultural, ethnic and religious markers floating in 
each nation can be called upon by self-interested leaders for the purpose of forming 
group identities and mobilising their members into collective action. However, this 
type of endeavour requires some pre-existing raw materials such as common myths, 
common languages and common religious traditions that can be found in contexts 
characterised by serious political and economic cleavages exist. These may allow 
political entrepreneurs to give meaning to these cleavages in terms of cultural, ethnic 
or religious discrimination. As they note, “the observed relationship between religion 
and violence then amounts to a spurious correlation” (Hasenclever and Rittberger, 
2000: 646). 
In sum, what most instrumentalists tend to conclude is that the existence of severe 
and clear economic, social and also political disparities within a nation which overlap 
with religious or ethnic dividing lines, makes it easier for political leaders to give 
them a sense of cultural, ethnic or religious discrimination, contributing to the 
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emergence or perpetuation of such type of conflicts. Consequently, it is also a central 
argument of the instrumentalist approach that the current political renaissance of 
religion (and ethnicity) and its consequent use to justify conflict within societies is 
the result of a worldwide economic and developmental crisis They thus conclude that 
in order to minimise the attraction of religious communities for desperate acts of 
violence, the underlying economic crisis must be addressed. If done successfully, the 
likelihood of religious convictions being used for the mobilisation of the rank and 
file will diminish. As the distributional conflict in a society becomes less severe, the 
violent forms of protest will thus tend to lose much of their appeal (Hasenclever and 
Rittberger, 2000: 664). In this context, elites play a fundamental role, since they 
frequently use these differentiating factors to explain group inequality and 
discrimination and, ultimately, to justify the use of violence in order to gain, 
maintain or increase political and/or economic power. From this point of view, again, 
the governing Muslim-Arab Sudanese elite has been perpetuating a similar process 
often using such arguments that refer to religious and/or ethnic differences as factors 
of inclusion and exclusion in the Sudanese society, and thus feeding a war that has 
lasted for more than twenty years. Critics of the instrumentalist view, however, 
defend that ethnicity, for example, is not something that can be decided upon by 
individuals at will, like other political affiliations, but that is rooted in the larger 
society. They focus on the inherently social nature of ethnic identity, and argue that 
this can only be understood within a relational framework (Østy, 2003: 26). 
Finally, for constructivists conflict is understood not as a collision between forces or 
entities, but rather as disagreement or dispute or misunderstanding or lack of 
communication or some other intellectual discord or dissonance between conscious 
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agents. Conflict is always a conflict of minds and wills of the parties involved and to 
correctly understand such conflicts it is necessary to make an inquiry of the various 
discourses at play in the event. That would disclose the sources and depth of the 
dispute and its intellectual obstacles and possibilities of resolution (Jackson and 
Sorensen, 2003: 257). 
For our analysis, the constructivist thesis can thus be seen as bridging the other two 
perspectives, defending that ethnicity or religious identities are not an individual 
attribute, but a social phenomenon, since a person’s culture is partly inherited, but 
also constructed and chosen, with many people having multiple identities ( Østy, 
2003: 26). This view suggests that there is nothing inherently conflictual about 
ethnicity or religion, but rather, under certain conditions, identity can turn from a 
relatively neutral organising principle into a powerful tool for mobilising mass 
violence (USAID, 2005: 15). According to this approach, it is the social system that 
breeds conflict rather than individuals themselves. Social conflicts are seen as 
intimately linked to cognitive structures such as ideology, nationalism, ethnicity or 
religion. These are structures that give the social actors value-added conceptions of 
themselves and, consequently, affect their behaviour and coping strategies within 
society (Hasenclever and Rittberger, 2000: 647). In this sense, constructivists do not 
share the instrumentalists’ argument that most contemporary conflicts are simply 
conflicts about power and wealth and not about religion. But despite this important 
distinction there are, however, two major areas of agreement between constructivists 
and instrumentalists. First of all, in both approaches power and interests play a 
crucial role in explaining politics within a given society. As mentioned before, what 
is peculiar of the constructivist’s position is that power and interests are embedded in 
 40
cognitive structures that give meaning to them. Secondly, both instrumentalists and 
constructivists acknowledge that conflicts do not occur spontaneously and 
consequently attach an important role to political leaders in explaining the outbreak 
of conflicts (Hasenclever and Rittberger, 2000: 648).9
Despite the general and apparent consensus on this issue, constructivism adopts a 
slightly different view in what concerns the specific relation between existing ethnic 
and religious variables and the role leaders are able to play by using them. While 
instrumentalists suggest that, ultimately, determined leaders can actually manipulate 
religious traditions at will and that the justification of violence is at best a rhetorical, 
but not a substantial problem, constructivists insist that religious traditions are 
intersubjective structures that have a life of their own. These structures thus depend 
on social practices and discourses, and are inseparable from the reasons and self-
understandings that agents bring to their actions. Therefore, the rhetorical power of 
political entrepreneurs is far from unlimited. Constructivists, therefore, propose to 
view religion as an intervening variable, i.e., as a causal factor intervening between a 
given conflict and the choice of conflict behaviour, but one that may have an 
ambiguous impact: it can either make violence more likely or reduce this risk 
significantly (Hasenclever and Rittberger, 2000: 649). 
Reconstructing and understanding the specific processes of creation and expression 
of group identities, polarised either in terms of class, gender, ethnicity or religion, 
means mainly avoiding an essentialist or primordialist perception of reality (Ferreira, 
                                                 
9 The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict has put it as follows 
 
Mass violence results when leaders see it as the only way to achieve their political 
objectives, and they are able to mobilise groups to carry out their strategy. Without 
determined leaders, groups may riot but they do not start systematic, sustained 
campaigns of violence to achieve their goals; and without mobilised groups, leaders 
are unable to organise a fight”. (Hasenclever and Rittberger, 2000: 649) 
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2005b: 72). In sum, since conflicts tend to occur when multiple factors come together 
and reinforce each other, it is necessary to pay careful attention to interaction effects 
between the different variables present in a given context (USAID, 2005: 28). As 
Johnston and Cox remind us, “the influence of religious communities on politics and 
policies- real as it is- must not be overestimated” (apud Hasenclever and Rittberger, 
2000: 673). 
10These three  perspectives seem also particularly interesting as a framework for the 
analysis of Sudan and its conflicts, as we shall analyse at a later stage, since these are 
usually associated with a primordialist view of ethnic and religious differences 
within Sudanese society. In fact, the different conflicts in Southern Sudan (as well as 
in Darfur and in the latent and increased violence in the Eastern regions), for 
example, seem to be all part of a same trend, shared by the several rebel movements, 
in which the ‘enemy’ is identified with a specific and limited Muslim-Arab elite, 
who has been controlling and dominating the political and economic life of the 
country ever since independence in 1956, thus continuously and increasingly 
marginalising and repressing a significant part of the Sudanese population. Despite 
some important divergences in what concerns the existence of a direct relation 
between ethnic and/or religious diversity and the emergence of violent conflicts 
among groups within the same State, the multiple conflicts in Sudan have been often 
                                                 
10 Besides these three theoretical perspectives on the causes of internal ethnic conflict, there are others 
that will not be directly developed in this research but must at least be mentioned. For example, the 
clash of cultures (or civilisations) theory suggests that irreconcilable differences due to cultural gaps 
cause fear and conflict that beget violence. As Sambanis refers 
 
[…] fear is also at the heart of the theory of the ethnic security dilemma, which 
suggests that territorial intermingling and mutual vulnerability exacerbate assurance 
problems that may lead to preventive wars by ethnic minorities who want to secede 
to increase their security. Modernisation may also cause conflict as economic and 
social change can accelerate and intensify group competition for scarce resources. 
This explanation may be particularly relevant when class cleavages and ethnic 
groups overlap. (Sambanis, 2001: 263) 
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interpreted as an example of the primordialist view, according to which such 
differences must be seen as the most independent variable to explain conflicts. 
But if we take instrumentalism, for example, elites do play a fundamental role, since 
they frequently use these differentiating factors to explain group inequality and 
discrimination and, ultimately, to justify the use of violence in order to gain, 
maintain or increase political and/or economic power. From this point of view, again, 
the governing Muslim-Arab Sudanese elite has been perpetuating a similar process 
often using such arguments that refer to religious and/or ethnic differences as factors 
of inclusion and exclusion in the Sudanese society, and thus feeding a war that has 
lasted for more than twenty years. But this explanation is simultaneously limited in 
that it takes a purely materialistic stance and does not take into due account the social 
and symbolic importance of ethnic and religious identity in Sudan. In fact, the core 
grievances that gave rise to the conflict in the South are generally shared by 
marginalised groups across the country.  
Four our research purposes, the crucial factor here are the discriminatory economic 
systems and structures that discriminate certain groups, running the high risk of 
creating resentment and frustration among discriminated groups. Inequalities at the 
level of access to employment, resources and sharp differences in terms of socio-
economic living conditions, especially if these are long-lasting and promoted and 
reinforced both by the Northern and Southern elites, can cause a high feeling of 
unfairness and thus contribute to the eruption of violent reactions and behaviours. In 
our perspective, however, and as shall be argued at a later stage, the way out would 
not simply be a turn to economic development, but rather an attempt to create the 
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necessary conditions for equal enjoyment of economic profit and social conditions 
for all groups and communities especially in the South. 
 
1.5- Beyond ethnicity and religion: Edward Azar’s theory of protracted social 
conflict 
Despite identifiable progress towards putting aside simplistic interpretations based on 
the primordial role of religion or ethnicity, and towards a need to understand and 
focus on the various underlying factors or conditions that make some places more 
prone to conflict than others, the literature and practice on internal conflicts remains 
weak when it comes to identifying and tackling the way in which these interplay and 
lead to conflict (Brown, 1997:4) and which should be the most appropriate ways to 
deal with it. Traditionally, international relations and strategic studies analysts have 
paid relatively little attention to the international implications of ethnic and other 
forms of communal conflict. Nevertheless, some scholars in the peace and conflict 
research field have attempted to uncover the sources of what were variously termed 
‘deep- rooted conflicts’, ‘intractable conflicts’ or ‘protracted social conflicts’ 
(Ramsbotham, 2005a: 110). 
In this context, Edward Azar’s theory of protracted social conflict is one that can be 
useful for our purposes of better understanding conflict dynamics and one that, 
despite being considered outdated - it was written in the early 1990s - it still offers 
useful pointers for an understanding of the sources of major armed conflict in the 
post-Cold War era (Ramsbothan, 2005a: 109). In fact, Edward Azar was a conflict 
research pioneer, who drew on John Burton’s approach to the centrality of ‘basic 
human needs’ in conflict theory, considering that basic needs such as distributive 
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justice, security and communal recognition are fundamental to a peaceful and stable 
society (Porto, 2008: 61). 
In The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Practice (1990), Azar 
contrasts three aspects of what up until then had been a prevailing orthodoxy in war 
studies with his own approach. First, there had been a tendency “to understand 
conflicts through a rather rigid dichotomy of internal and external dimensions” with 
sociologists, anthropologists concerned with civil wars, revolts, revolutions, and 
international relations scholars with the interstate wars, crises and invasions. Second, 
prevailing frameworks of analysis had often been based on the functional 
differentiation of conflict aspects into sub-categories of conflict (military, social, 
economic) and into different levels of analysis. Third, he identitified a tendency to 
focus on overt and violent conflict while ignoring covert, latent or non-violent 
conflict, and on an approach to conflict dynamics in terms of conflict cycles in which 
the “termination of violent acts is often equated with the state of peace”. In contrast, 
a study of protracted social conflicts suggested that 
 
many conflicts currently active in the underdeveloped parts of the 
world are characterised by a blurred demarcation between internal and 
external sources and actors. Moreover, there are multiple causal 
factors and dynamics, reflected in changing goals, actors and targets. 
Finally, these conflicts do not show clear starting and terminating 
points. (Azar, 1990: 6) 
 
 
For Azar, the critical factor in protracted social conflicts, such as the ones that 
persisted in Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Ethiopia or Sudan was 
[…] the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for 
such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access 
to political institutions and economic participation. (Ramsbotham, 
2005a: 113) 
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According to him, traditional preoccupation with relations between States was seen 
to have obscured a proper understanding of these conflict dynamics thus 
undermining and limiting the real capacity to solve and overcome them. 
By defining conflict as a generic social phenomenon involving individuals, societies, 
States and their collectivities, Azar defines a model that identifies a set of conditions 
that are responsible for the transformation of non-conflict situations into conflict 
ones, by tracing the pattern of causal relations among these conditions which then 
may give rise to a specific protracted social conflict (Azar, 1990: 7). 
In this sense, the term protracted social conflict emphasises that the sources of such 
conflicts lay predominantly within and across rather than exclusively between States, 
with four clusters of variables identified as preconditions for their transformation to 
high levels of intensity (Ramsbotham, 2005a: 114). 
The first pre-condition identified by Azar is the communal content of a given society, 
which points to the importance of identity groups –racial, ethnic or religious in 
relation to conflict. According to this view, if a society is characterised by multi-
communal composition, protracted social conflicts are more likely to occur. The 
interplay between this characteristic and the colonial legacy11 of the country, as well 
as with the historical pattern of rivalry and contest among different groups renders 
groups more political active and this countries more prone to internal instability 
(Azar, 1990:7). 
                                                 
11 According to Azar, the application of the principle ‘divide and rule’ by colonialists tends to produce 
a unique political landscape where a State artificially incorporated a multitude of communal groups or 
a nation became divided into two or more zones (Azar, 1990:7). 
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12Secondly, and drawing from John Burton’s theory of unmet human needs , Azar 
considers that individual or communal survival is contingent upon the satisfaction of 
material needs (Azar, 1990:7); therefore, the deprivation of human needs becomes a 
crucial underlying source of protracted social conflict. Unlike interests, needs are 
ontological and non-negotiable, (Ramsbotham: 2005a:115) but are not always evenly 
or justly met. As a consequence, grievances resulting from need deprivation may be, 
as they usually are, expressed collectively. Due to unequal distribution of resources 
and development, many groups are marginalized and in such circumstances, these 
groups create a menu of responses designed to redress their grievances, which may 
include, and it often does, resort to violence.  
In this context, social and economic factors are also crucial for the understanding of 
conflict. As Miall et al. point out 
 
in the economic sphere once again would dispute Azar’s contention 
that protracted social conflict tends to be associated with patterns of 
underdevelopment or uneven development. (Miall et al., 1999 apud 
Porto, 2008: 65) 
 
Rapid transitions amid poverty and social exclusion, high unemployment (…) all 
increase vulnerability to armed violent conflict. As Michael Brown refers 
“unemployment, inflation and resource competitions, especially for land, contribute 
to societal frustrations and tensions, and can provide the breeding ground for 
conflict” (Brown, 1996: 19). 
 
                                                 
12 According to the conflict scholar John Burton, humans need a number of essentials to survive, 
which go beyond just food, water, and shelter. They include both physical and non-physical elements 
needed for human growth and development, as well as all those things humans are innately driven to 
attain. Human needs theorists argue that one of the primary causes of protracted or intractable conflict 
is people's unyielding drive to meet their unmet needs on the individual, group, and societal level 
(Burton, s/d). 
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By emphasizing security, development, political access and identity as the most 
fundamental types of needs, he here also calls for a broader understanding of 
security, development and political access 
 
Reducing conflict requires reduction in levels of underdevelopment. 
Groups which seek to satisfy their identity and security needs through 
conflict are in effect seeking change in the structure of the society. 
Conflict resolution can truly occur and last if satisfactory amelioration 
of underdevelopment occurs as well. Studying protracted social 
conflicts leads one to conclude that peace is development in the 
broadest sense of the term. (Azar, 1985: 69) 
 
 
Azar does stress that deprivation of basic material needs per se does not directly give 
birth to conflicts (Azar, 1990: 9), but failure to redress these grievances by the 
authority cultivates a niche for a protracted social conflict. In this sense, negotiation, 
mediation and resolution techniques were important to achieve short-term 
breakthroughs, but addressing fundamental causes of conflict required long-term 
development (Ramsbotham, 2005a: 120). 
The third pre-condition is governance and the role of State, the political authority 
responsible, in the modern world, for the satisfaction or deprivation of such needs.  
In this sense, a fair and just mode of governance would be to satisfy all human needs 
regardless of communal or identity cleavages, promoting development and stability 
(Azar, 1990: 10). This is rare, however. In relation to the role of State as a critical 
factor in the satisfaction or frustration of individual and identity group needs, Azar 
stresses the tendency of countries that experience protracted social conflicts to be 
ruled by incompetent, parochial and authoritarian governments, who do not fulfil 
their responsibilities and ultimately fail to satisfy basic human needs of their 
population.  
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As a result, in most conflicts of this nature, political capacity is limited by rigid or 
fragile authority structure, which, willingly or unwillingly, prevents the State from 
responding to, and meeting, the needs of various constituents (Ramsbotham, 2005a: 
116). Furthermore, in these contexts, political authority tends to be monopolised by a 
dominant identity group or a coalition of hegemonic groups. These groups tend to 
use the State as an instrument for maximising their interests at the expense of others. 
As a result, the means to satisfy basic needs are unevenly shared and the potential for 
protracted social conflict increases (Azar, 1990: 10). 
Since it is acknowledged that the role of the State in engendering or preventing 
protracted social conflicts by depriving or satisfying basic needs is not determined 
solely by endogenous factors, the fourth and final pre-condition identified by Azar as 
important in identifying and understanding protracted social conflicts are the 
international linkages. These are here defined as political-economic relations of 
dependency with the international economic system, and/or political-military 
relations through regional or global patterns of clientage (Ramsbotham, 2005a: 116), 
which often exacerbate the denial of needs of certain groups, distorting domestic 
political and economic systems through the realignment of subtle coalitions of 
international capital, domestic capital and the State (Azar, 1990: 11). 
These are then the major clusters of preconditions for protracted social conflict 
pointed and developed by Azar. He nevertheless underlines that overt and enduring 
protracted social conflict will only occur depending on more contingent actions or 
process dynamic, which he further groups in three types of determinants that act as a 
sort of triggering factors: groups actions and strategies (type of reactions by the 
communal groups to a situation of neglect and marginalisation and which can 
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13involve different types of mobilisation ); State’s actions and strategies (range from 
political accommodation to coercive repression, depending on the level of inter-
group relations); and also built-in mechanisms of conflict (related to the history of 
experience in conflict and the nature of the communication among hostile contestants 
and that also becomes responsible for the shaping of the behavioural properties of 
protracted social conflicts14) (Ramsbotham, 2005a: 117). 
In sum, protracted social conflict occurs when communities are deprived of 
satisfaction of their basic needs on the basis of their communal identity and as a 
result of the interplay with other internal and external factors. In fact, the deprivation 
is the result of a complex causal chain involving the role of the State and the pattern 
of international linkages. Initial conditions, such as colonial legacy, domestic 
historical setting, and the multi-communal nature of a society play important roles in 
shaping the genesis of protracted social conflicts (Azar, 1990: 12). 
The outcome scenario of these conflicts is usually a very pessimistic one. First of all, 
it causes the gradual deterioration of physical security and the institutionalisation of 
underdevelopment through the destruction of physical and social infrastructures, 
which deprives not only the victimised communities, but also the dominant groups, 
of the economic resources for satisfying basic needs. Secondly, it contributes to 
institutional deformity and to the degeneration of socio-economic and political 
                                                 
13 When organisational and communications systems break down within an environment of mutual 
distrust between groups, protracted social conflict can begin to escalate. An initial trigger may be, but 
need not be, a trivial event, which tends to become a turning point at which the individual 
victimisation is collectively recognised, leading to collective protest in the form of civil disobedience, 
guerrilla warfare or secessionist movements which are usually met by some degree of repression or 
suppression (Azar, 1990: 13). 
14Conflicts associated with communal identities and fear of marginalisation, tend to involve an 
enduring antagonistic set of perceptions and interaction between and among the groups and the State. 
Conflict is then institutionalised and it becomes important to understand and analyse the perceptions 
and cognitive processes generated through conflictual interaction (Azar, 1990: 15).  
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institutions, making the satisfaction of human basic needs very difficult or even 
impossible (Azar, 1990: 16). 
Given this complex and multiple dynamics, these entrenched conflicts tend to pose 
the most severe challenge to those concerned with conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding. The apparent intractability of these conflicts suggests that 
conventional approaches attempting to interpret and solve them are usually too 
narrowly conceived, failing to address the underlying dynamics that drive and sustain 
conflicts.  
 
1.6. Chapter conclusions 
Identity-based violent conflicts are widely viewed as being particularly difficult to 
manage, especially when such identity is defined along ethnic and religious lines. In 
his seminal Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985), for example, Donald Horowitz 
identified several methods of conflict management, but dismissed others:  
 
Between the naïveté of those who would abolish ethnic differences in 
short order through ‘nation-building’, the cynicism of those who 
would simply suppress those differences, and the pessimism of those 
who would counsel costly and disruptive partition as the only way out 
– between these goals, there lurk passages that are at once last 
dramatic, less visionary, and more realistic. (Horowitz, 1985 apud 
Simonsen, 2005: 304) 
 
 The main purpose of this chapter was to draw attention to the various theoretical 
approaches to the relation between ethnicity, religion and conflict and to need to go 
beyond simplistic arguments, attempting to provide more complete understandings of 
such complex conflicts so that conflict resolution and peacebuilding can effectively 
contribute to sustainable peace. We have mainly tried to argue against the general 
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and long-lasting assumption that a greater degree of ethnic or religious heterogeneity 
in a given country is, by itself, a factor of increased risk of conflict due to ancient and 
natural tensions and antagonisms these usually entail. 
By doing this, we do not intend, however, to make tabula rasa of the potential 
influence of a diverse ethnic or religious fabric in a given society’s stability or 
instability, but rather to stress that it does not work as an exclusive variable. By 
doing this we wish to open the debate in search for deeper analysis and 
understandings of complex conflicts such as those occurring in certain societies and 
of the necessary comprehensive and sustainable preventive strategies. 
Therefore, one of the fundamental lessons that can be drawn from these theoretical 
debates is that the causes of conflicts are often highly complex, with processes in 
which religious or ethnic factors, although present, tend to assume a more 
subordinated role as sources of conflict (Hasenclever and Rittberger, 2000: 673). The 
competition for scarce resources between social groups, the need to fulfil needs that 
the State cannot guarantee, the conditions of poverty and social collapse and 
asymmetries of power, all contribute to the reinforcement of the division between 
ethnic and religious groups (Ferreira, 2005b: 69).  
Since ethnic and religious identities are dynamic both in their salience and in their 
character, even when social violence and armed conflict have deepened divisions 
between groups, important opportunities for peacebuilding may be lost if one fails to 
acknowledge this dynamic nature of group identities (ethnic, religious) and opt for 
policies that institutionalise and eventually aggravate and deepen those same 
differences. The focus here should be instead on the design of political, social and 
economic institutions and structures, and the way in which they may encourage elites 
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to transcend identity boundaries even in a context of deep ethnic or religious 
divisions. But it is also a matter of perceptions of the ‘other’. As long as different 
groups’ existence is seen, referred to and manipulated, as being a threat to another 
group’s existence and survival simply because they are perceived as belonging to a 
different image of community, violence will always be an easy path and ethnicity or 
religion a useful and handy excuse.  
The contribution of alternative interpretations and approaches, such as the ones 
advanced by Edward Azar, John Burton or Johan Galtung, based on a more structural 
interpretation of the causes and factors that can lead to conflict is thus of 
fundamental importance to overcome simplistic and dangerous assumptions that 
relate the ethnic or religious diversity of a country to an inevitable tendency for 
violent conflict. As it has been mentioned in this chapter, reality is much more 
complex and calls for a much more rigorous and serious analysis. Being able to 
understand that identities are flexible, mutable and adaptable and that there may well 
be an inherent potential for peaceful coexistence in all of them is thus one of the 
main challenges ahead. 
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‘Just as the signing of a peace accord does not equal ‘peace’, pledges 
of aid do not equal delivery aid.’ 
 (Labonte, 2003: 269) 
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2.  RESPONDING TO CONFLICT AND BUILDING PEACE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: A 
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTION OF DOMINANT STRATEGIES 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
One of the conclusions than can be drawn from the previous chapter, where we shed 
some light on the debate concerning the role of multiple and more structural causes 
that can feed protracted social conflicts in certain societies, is that understanding and 
preventing armed conflicts has never been an easy task, mainly due to their inherent 
complexity. But this task becomes particularly difficult in the case of internal 
conflicts in societies where visible, and often instrumentalised, ethnic and religions 
divisions, give place to simplistic interpretations that can easily render solutions and 
prevention an almost impossible mission.  
After the end of the Cold War, preventing and resolving conflicts, as well as 
restoring and building peace in complex scenarios, became a sort of new ‘mission 
civilisatrice’15 (Paris, 2002) in the hands of the international community, with many 
peripheral regions of the world undergoing violent internal conflict and requiring 
various forms of curative interventions. In practice, this meant that international 
actors began pursuing a broadly common strategy for dealing with states 
experiencing civil violence based on the principles of the liberal peace idea. The 
particularity of this strategy was that it was defined on the assumption that 
liberalization was the key to promote internal peace and stability in such contexts 
(Paris, 2001: 766) and that liberal forms of government, as well as a radical 
                                                 
15 According to Roland Paris, the contemporary practice of peacebuilding can be considered a modern, 
updated version of the colonial-era belief that the European imperial powers had a duty to ‘civilise’ 
dependent ‘barbarian’ populations. Although this archaic language has been abandoned and the 
project is far less mercenary and extreme in its objectives, the idea is still one that assumes that the 
model of liberal market democracy is superior to all others and must be applied abroad to rule the 
territories of the periphery (Paris: 2002). 
 55
development discourse, should be part of a hybridised response to conflict 
(Richmond, 2007: 56). The aim of the liberal peace project is thus to transform 
‘dysfunctional’ and war-torn countries situated on the borderlands of the 
international system into cooperative, representative and stable states (Duffield, 
2001: 11).  Therefore, a particular vision of how states should organise themselves 
internally was put forward, mainly based on the principles of liberal democracy and 
market-oriented economics. Politically this meant democratisation, whereas 
economically the strategy was one of creating the conditions for a clearly market-
oriented economic structure. Reconstructing these states in accordance with this 
vision basically meant that external actors had effectively passed standards of 
appropriate behaviour from the Western-liberal core of the international system to 
the failed states of the periphery (Paris, 2002; Duffield, 2001). Still according to 
Duffield, the current concern of global governance is to establish a liberal peace on 
its troubled borders: to resolve conflicts, reconstruct societies and establish 
functioning market economies as a way to avoid future wars (Duffield, 2008). 
However, despite efforts in designing several instruments and policies to resolve and 
prevent such conflicts, results have not always been successful (Nkundabagenzi, 
1999: 280), especially at the light of most commonly established goals, such as 
conflict resolution, prevention of violence or peaceful and sustainable reconstruction. 
In fact, and looking back to specific case-studies such as Somalia, Rwanda or Bosnia 
these goals have not been successfully achieved. One can of course question the 
types of intervention and strategies applied, but they certainly show an attempt of the 
international community to get involved in resolving conflict, not necessarily with 
the best and most effective tools and strategies. 
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In fact, and although helping create awareness for the multiple and more complex 
causes of conflict, these strategies and models ended up crystallising a very 
unbalanced and limited agenda of priorities, clearly favouring civil and political 
rights and institutions and neglecting economic, social and cultural guarantees. As a 
result, the application of such models and strategies in developing countries 
experiencing violent and enduring conflict has had mixed results and became under 
intense criticism due to their apparent ineffectiveness in achieving sustainable peace. 
This happened, in part, because the idea and goal of resolving conflicts and building 
peace often carried a sense of hegemony of the dominant powers who dictated what 
would be a preventable conflict, when prevention should occur and what should be 
the most appropriate tools (John, 2005: 1) to do so, without paying due attention to 
the real causes and needs. However, the idea that rapid political liberalization and 
marketisation- on which peacebuilding and conflict prevention strategies and 
ideologies are based-, will always have pacifying effects on states that have 
experienced violent conflict is, in essence, based on wrong and faulty assumptions 
(Paris, 2001: 766). In most contexts, instead of elections and market economies, the 
aftermath of civil conflict requires political and economic stability and institutional 
structures to guide an equal and sustainable reconstruction of the whole society 
(Paris, 2001: 767). 
Bearing this in mind, the aim of this chapter is to critically analyse and evaluate the 
changes and evolution in the traditional and dominant models to resolve conflicts and 
build peace, by shedding light on their limited agenda and priorities and the way in 
which this liberal peace project tends to obscure much more complex - and often 
invisible - forms of inequality and dynamics that sustain and reproduce conflict. 
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2.2. The peacebuilding consensus?: Origins, gains and losses 
Ever since its creation in 1945, the United Nations has been involved, among other 
activities, in conflict prevention and peacekeeping missions. However, the end of the 
Cold War brought with it an increase in the number of armed conflicts worldwide, 
sharing as a common feature their internal and often protracted nature16. According 
to Wallensteen and Sollenberg 
 
A total of 111 armed conflicts have been recorded for the years 1989-
2000. Of these, 33 were active in 2000. This represents a decrease 
from 1999 and 1998, and it is the lowest number of armed conflicts 
recorded in the post-Cold War period. Seven interstate armed conflicts 
were recorded for the whole period, of which two were still active in 
2000. The decrease in the number of armed conflicts is not sufficient 
to conclude that there will be a further decline. Conflicts have become 
increasingly complex in terms of number of actors and regional 
connections between those actors. There is a larger proportion of new 
and minor armed conflicts being resolved than long-running and 
complex 17major armed conflicts. (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 2001)
 
With this increased visibility and complexity of internal armed conflicts, there has 
also been a recognition in academic and policy circles that it was essential to define a 
more proactive response, rather than the reactive one being advocated (John, 2005: 
1) and traditionally used to respond to crisis. Progressively, an apparently new type 
of concern emerged within the international community in general, and within the 
United Nations in particular, related to the need and obligation to participate in, and 
                                                 
16 According to Wallensteen and Sollenberg, from 1989 to 2000, there were 111armed conflicts in the 
world, of which 104 were intrastate conflicts (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 2001). 
17 According to another study made by Eriksson and Wallensteen, the global number of armed 
conflicts continued to decline in 2003. A total of 29 conflicts in 22 countries were active in 2003, as 
against 31 conflicts in 23 countries in 2002. This is the lowest level of armed conflict since the early 
1970s. The probability  that any particular country was involved in a conflict has never been lower 
since the early 1950s. Five of the conflicts active in 2003 reached the level of war. A total of 229 
armed conflicts in 148 countries have been recorded for the period after World War II (1946–2003). 
Of these, 116 conflicts in 78 countries were active in the period after the end of the Cold War (1989–
2003). Most conflicts are internal: only seven interstate armed conflicts were recorded in the period 
1989–2003, of which two were still active in 2003 (Eriksson and Wallensteen, 2004). 
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contribute to, the resolution of conflict as well as to the post-conflict rehabilitation of 
war-torn countries. In response to a reinterpretation of conflict dynamics and their 
more multidimensional nature, a more multidimensional type of response was also 
put forward, mainly characterised by specific tools and priorities geared to conflict 
and post-conflict scenarios in order to achieve long-lasting peace. In this scenario, 
liberal peace ideas, intimately linked to a territorially sovereign and democratic state, 
became the foil by which threats were to be identified and responses to conflict and 
post-conflict were to be defined (Richmond, 2007: 13).  
Included in these new concepts and practices of external involvement in conflict or 
post-conflict scenarios, conflict prevention became an assumed priority. In its 
traditional and common sense, conflict prevention traditionally aims basically at 
preventing existing social conflicts from escalating and becoming violent, since non-
violent conflict can be seen as a factor of social transformation in a given society. 
This concept is usually divided into two categories: operational prevention and 
structural prevention. According to the Carnegie Commission for Preventing Deadly 
Conflicts, operational prevention takes place with the help of outsiders when the 
parties cannot do it by themselves, and maintains that in this case there should be a 
leading country, individual or organization, a coherent political, military and 
humanitarian approach drawing on adequate resources and a plan for the restoration 
of the authority in the host country (Carnegie Commission, 1997: xxi). Regarding 
structural prevention, it includes and emphasises security, well-being and justice as 
well as putting in place internationally recognised legal systems, dispute resolution 
mechanisms, meeting people’s basic economic, social, cultural and humanitarian 
human needs (Carnegie Commission, 1997: xxviii). Structural prevention thus aims 
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at addressing the deepest causes of conflicts and stimulating a sustainable peace 
process in the longer-term, contributing to rebuild societies that have been struck by 
war. Therefore, effective prevention strategies would depend on a correct 
identification and analysis of conflicts and their causes. In the case of internal 
conflicts, these causes are usually related to the political culture of the country - 
democratic deficit, human rights violations, and private appropriation by the State - 
as well as to the structure of the community – ethnic or religious diversity, group 
asymmetry or a culture of violence. In the attempt to better address these complex 
causes, the international community progressively defined a project of liberal 
democracy, free market and globalised economies, development and human rights 
guarantees (Richmond, 2004:132).18 One can trace the theoretical and practical roots 
of the liberal peace project back at least to the writings of philosophers such as John 
Locke19, Immanuel Kant or even Adam Smith (Paris, 2004: 41). According to Locke 
(Two Treatises of Government, 1698), for example, only one type of government 
would be compatible with a secure and just peace: a law-based regime operating 
under constitutional rules and established by popular consent. The creation of a 
government that did not correspond to these features and violated individual liberties 
and freedoms would contribute to a return to the state of nature and to all the 
violence and insecurity entailed (Paris, 2004: 47). In the same line, Immanuel Kant’s 
thinking also provides us with a very comprehensive representation of the liberal 
peace project and of how it should be fomented in modern states (Richmond, 2007: 
                                                 
18 An example of this political and economic liberalisation, which conforms the liberal peace model, is 
the World Bank’s framework for conflict analysis and which identifies key areas of action such as 
social and ethnic relations, economic structures, governance and political institutions and human 
rights or security (Richmond, 2007: 57). 
19 Locke and other liberal theorists opposed to the idea of authoritarian rule since it threatens 
individual freedom, violates natural rights and promotes rebellion and civil unrest (Paris, 2004: 47). 
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2025). His work The Perpetual Peace: a Philosophical Sketch (1795)  foresaw the 
conditions for a permanent union for peace and security (Richmond, 2007: 26).  
Those conditions were that all States should be republican (democratic); international 
order should rest upon a federation of States; and non-citizens should be granted 
‘universal hospitality’. In 1965, and by affirming that world peace “must be planted 
on the tested foundations of political liberty” (Wilson, 1965 apud Paris, 2004: 41) 
and that a precondition for international peace was political stability within states, 
securing rights of the people and democratic self-determination, Woodrow Wilson 
became one of the first statesman to articulate what is now known as the liberal 
peace thesis (Paris, 2004: 41), a thesis that was progressively formulated, rephrased 
and embraced by various others political theorists, politicians and international 
analysts. These ideas linked peace to self-determination and liberal democracy 
(Richmond, 2007: 39) and clearly set the basis for the understanding and 
implementation of the liberal peace ideas underlying contemporary peacebuilding 
model. In this context, and since the liberal peace conception recognises that peace 
may not be a natural condition but that it may rest upon some political, economic and 
social preconditions, it became the central core of the several forms of economic, 
political and social intervention and engagement of external actors (Richmond, 2007: 
52).  
The concept of post-conflict peacebuilding, for example, first mentioned and referred 
to in United Nations’ Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1992 Agenda for 
Peace, was defined as 
                                                 
20 Kant’s Perpetual Peace: a Philosophical Sketch was based on an understanding of peace that 
believed in a ‘categorical imperative’ that exists as an innate moral law. This allowed for its 
universalisation, and dictated that human beings should be treated as ends rather than as means. This 
would imply the creation of just laws that were to be reflected ideally in a republican political order 
(in a sense of a democratic one) (Richmond, 2007:26) 
 61
an action to identify and support structures which will tend to 
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict, 
rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil 
war and strife, and tackling the deepest causes of conflict: economic 
despair, social injustice and political oppression. (Boutros-Ghali, 
1992)21  
 
Later, in 1995, the Suplement to An Agenda for Peace extended and clarified this 
definition as follows 
 
(…) comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which 
will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and 
well-being among people. Through agreements ending civil strife, 
these may include disarming the previously warring parties and the 
restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, 
repatriation of refugees, advisory and training support for security 
personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human 
rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and 
promoting formal and informal processes of political participation. 
(Boutros-Ghali, 1995) 
 
The underlying concern was the need to include a more comprehensive and 
multidimensional approach in conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding, by 
identifying the deeper causes of conflict and supporting structures that could actually 
and effectively consolidate peace.  
In the liberal peace project tradition, peacebuilding thus increasingly refers to the full 
spectrum of interventions designed to facilitate the establishment of durable peace 
and prevent the recurrence of violence. Such interventions include peacekeeping, 
peace support operations, disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and 
reintegration. Taking a Galtungian approach, it incorporates elements of both 
negative peace and positive peace, meaning the absence of both physical and 
                                                 
21 The Agenda for Peace is avaliable at www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html 
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structural violence, seeking to address the root causes and effects of conflict by 
restoring broken relationships, promoting reconciliation, institution-building and 
political reform, as well as facilitating economic transformation (Karbo, 2008: 115). 
Although this concept has been expanded ever since, to cover broader objectives 
aimed at alleviating the worst effects of war on populations and promote a more 
sustainable and long-term development,22 the progressive practice and involvement 
of the UN in this context ended up consolidating what has progressively been known 
as the UN’s post-settlement peacebuilding ‘standard operational procedure’23  
(Ramsbotham, 1999). Within this process, the crucial work of demobilizing ex-
combatants, rebuilding societies, establishing political institutions and creating the 
conditions for economic and social development to manage and ultimately prevent 
violent conflicts has become the mainstay of a large array of development and 
humanitarian actors, international institutions and national bodies (Krause and 
Jütersonke, 2005: 447). Roland Paris further divides the mechanisms used to promote 
these liberal political and economic models into four broad categories: shaping the 
content of peace agreements24 (in order to include the goal of political liberalisation); 
providing ‘expert’ advice to local parties during the implementation of the agreement 
(thus guiding the process of political and economic liberalisation); imposing 
                                                 
22 For example, Michael Pugh defends that in the context of the United Nations-authorised peace 
support measures, peacebuilding can be defined as a policy of external international help for 
developing countries designed to support indigenous social, cultural and economic development and 
self-reliance, by aiding recovery from war and reducing or eliminating resort to future violence. 
(Pugh, 1995:328) 
23 This is a sort of multifaceted ‘model’ that has been implemented mainly in the course of the 1990’s 
in a number of countries- Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, Kosovo, East Timor and 
which includes a number of crucial and well-defined efforts and processes, which include addressing 
the return of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons to the disarming, demobilisation and 
reintegration of former combatants into civilian society, providing assistance for democratic 
development, re-establishing the rule of law and supporting economic and social development. 
24 There are several examples of this approach: El Salvador, Rwanda or Bosnia, with peace 
agreements clearly obeying to the political goals and principles of the international mediators.  
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conditionalities on economic and political reforms in exchange for economic aid; 
performing quasi-governmental functions, or ‘proxy governance’, with external 
actors helping host governments and institutions perform administrative tasks (Paris, 
2002: 642-645). 
The conflict prevention and peacebuilding ideas have thus come to mean all types of 
peace initiatives in the life cycle of a conflict thus becoming a catch-all term as well 
as an easy entry point for academics and policy-makers who traditionally did not 
have much to do with the field of conflict prevention in the first place (John, 2005: 
3).  
According to Richmond, this sort of contemporary ‘peacebuilding consensus’ 
represents a new discourse and practice of both means and ends which include 
mediation, peacekeeping, conflict resolution, prevention and transformation, as well 
as development strategies in a multidimensional process, aimed at the amelioration 
of conflict (Richmond, 2004: 131). It presupposes that there is a universally agreed 
normative and cultural basis for the liberal peace and that such practices will be 
supported by all actors involved (Richmond, 2007: 112). At the same time, this 
consensus seems to indicate that if war is to be avoided or reverted, certain forms of 
governance need to be put in place, through multiple interventions (Richmond, 2007: 
154), including those of a more humanitarian or military nature. This consensus, 
however, is here considered as highly contested and flawed, as well as based on a 
limited interpretation and evaluation of both the causes of conflict and the necessary 
measures to prevent or tackle it. 
Proof of this is the fact that despite the relative overall success of many United 
Nations-led peacebuilding missions, there have been important and repeated failures 
 64
and limitations related both to the model itself (and the assumptions and priorities 
underlying it) and to its implementation, mainly concerning the true capacity 
developed by the international community to understand conflict and to support and 
develop sustainable political, economic and social community structures in many 
countries experiencing violent armed conflict. Although these efforts in transforming 
war-torn countries into liberal market democracies have been implemented in several 
states25, in most cases they have not succeeded in reshaping and rebuilding the 
domestic affairs and structures of host countries. The prospects of peace and stability 
in such contexts thus become illusive and void. 
Furthermore, and although theoretically, at least, the United Nations acknowledge 
the uniqueness and the different circumstances of each conflict and post-conflict 
situation, denying the type of ‘one-size-fits-all’ peacebuilding model, practice tends 
to show the imposition of a specific neo-liberal model, translated into demands for 
compliance and respect for a catalogue of basic civil and political rights, elections, 
democratic institutions. More importantly and worrying is the fact that this is done at 
the expense of a deliberate blurring of economic and social rights and often ignoring 
the more complex and structural causes of conflict. In fact, a more careful analysis of 
most of the resolution and peacebuilding processes in which this model has been, or 
is being, applied shows that there is a worrying tendency of major actors involved, 
including the United Nations, to adopt a state-centric, top-down approach to conflict 
prevention and post-settlement peacebuilding (Miall, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, 
1999: 198). 
                                                 
25 Examples of such interventions are Namibia, El Salvador, Nicaragua or Mozambique. For more 
detailed and complete information on these cases, please see Paris, Roland (2004), At War’s End: 
Building Peace after Civil Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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At the same time, these responses and strategies are often based on faulty and limited 
assumptions. For example, it is almost naturally assumed that the liberal peace ideas, 
obeying the standards of liberal states and institutions, are multilaterally guaranteed, 
democratic, and incorporating the mechanisms to solve conflict, oppression, 
underdevelopment and implementing human rights and democratic governance 
(Richmond, 2007: 54). In some circumstances, prevention and peacebuilding efforts 
tend to rest on the assumption that a sophisticated, yet still utopian, ‘social 
engineering’ approach could replace, or accelerate, a process of state formation that 
occurs rather more organically (Krause and Jütersonke, 2005: 448).  
What this clearly suggests is that what is being conceived within this peacebuilding 
consensus and the liberal peace project is an hegemonic discourse in peace that has 
been redefined in order to create a greater consensus on the ideas of democratisation, 
free market, human rights and development that will allegedly lead to peace and 
stability in post-conflict societies (Richmond, 2007: 80). Quoting Richmond on this, 
the definition of liberal peace in this context is one 
 
[…] contained within the methodological and objective-oriented 
peacebilding consensus where like-minded states, international, 
regional and local actors coexist in a western-oriented international 
society in which states are democratic, human rights are observed, and 
multilateralism is the norm except in extreme circumstances. This 
view of liberal peace provides the model for that being produced in 
conflict zones through peacebuilding. (Richmond, 2007: 121) 
 
Although peacebuilding interventions in post-conflict situations has been viewed by 
Western actors as prime opportunities for reconstruction of the state, and most 
significantly, its reform, Robin Luckham writes that 
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The problem remains that reform tends to be conceived in terms 
dictated by the major donors and international agencies, prioritising 
the usual formula of liberal democracy, good governance and 
economic liberalization. Whilst elements of this formula are desirable 
in themselves, the entire package, and the manner in which it is 
promoted or imposed from the outside, tends to inhibit the 
fundamental rethinking that post-conflict states require about the 
nature and purposes of political authority. (Luckham, 2004 apud 
Karbo, 2008: 115) 
 
Preventing conflict and building peace is thus seen as a highly externally driven 
process that often results in an experiment of social engineering controlled by 
outsiders and often disengaged from the societies they are trying to rebuild. Others -
like Roland Paris (2004) or Mark Duffield (2001)- have taken this argument even 
further and argue that peacebuilding, within such models, basically serves the 
external actor’s own agendas by ‘transplanting western models of social, political 
and economic organisation into war-torn states in order to control civil conflict in the 
peripheries of the international system’ (Zeeuw, 2001: 27). According to this view, 
most efforts to prevent conflict and build peace have been co-opted into a global 
security regime that uses conflict resolution, social reconstruction and development 
simply to transform target societies in the image of the interveners, without 
considering their true impact and effectiveness in terms of building sustainable 
peace. In this sense, conflict prevention and peacebuilding are considered primarily 
as a matter of restoring law and order, a security problem in the satisfaction of which 
the entire governmental and non-governmental efforts will be coordinated (John, 
2005: 10). The main goal is to pacify the unruly periphery and maintain the status 
quo and stability in the developed core of the world system (Ramsbotham, 2005: 
120). In fact, and even if one does not want to take such argument to an extreme, it 
must be acknowledged that traditional models of external involvement in such 
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conflicting contexts tend to depend greatly on some specific interests of external 
actors, be they individual states or regional or international organisations (which 
depend on the interests of the states that sustain them).  
This sort of global liberal governance thus responds to the turbulence of emerging 
political complexes by creating its own emerging strategic complexes as a means of 
dealing with the instances of violence that the densely mediated policies of the West 
periodically find unacceptable there or in response to the security threats that they are 
generally said to pose. As a consequence, conflict prevention becomes a part of that 
same strategic complex (Dillon and Reid, 2000 apud John, 2005: 14). Therefore, when 
attempted in countries transitioning from violent conflict, conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding as advocated and modeled by the West tends to encounter tremendous 
challenges (Labonte, 2003:261). In this sense, multilateral or bilateral approaches to 
conflict prevention and peacebuilding, whether driven by donor tools and capacities 
(deductive) or by conflict parameters (inductive), help shape and determine 
peacebuilding outcomes. Because deductive approaches disregard questions about 
peacebuilding priorities and tend to favour institutions over processes, they often result 
in failed or mixed outcomes. In contrast, inductive approaches to peacebuilding are 
problem driven and tend to deploy international assistance to redress chronic 
inequalities or social cleavages, in addition to aiding conflict resolution efforts. 
Although a more inductive approach to conflict prevention - which focus on the 
explanation of the social, economic and political factors that cause or contribute to 
conflict-, is basically aimed at identifying appropriate ways for external action that 
may redress those causes, it can also be more difficult to sustain. In fact, identifying 
root causes is a complex and demanding task and the international community is often 
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not willing or well-equipped to design the appropriate strategies to do so (Zeeuw, 
2001: 14-15). In fact, a quick analysis of past interventions easily shows us that 
repeated failure in acknowledging the complexity of peacebuilding tasks can, and has 
been, costly in human, political and economic terms. Because most programmes and 
forms of involvement are usually temporary and based on technical fixes in the form of 
disarmament, law and order programmes or elections, external assistance to war-torn 
societies has often been translated into a ‘quick-fix’ approach (Zeeuw, 2001: 26). Most 
peacebuilding and reconstruction programs rely on democratic institution building and 
economic recovery through free market-oriented strategies, frequently assuming that 
such process ends with the establishment of a new government along with the 
introduction of economic recovery packages, without paying attention to how these 
projects are actually undermined by the lack of social and economic foundations in 
such contexts. This clearly shows that not enough attention is being given to local 
political, social and economic contexts that can, in fact, determine the sustainability of 
these peacebuilding and conflict prevention strategies (Jeong, 2005: 2). 
In this context, as Reychler refers, positive and constructive lessons learned in 
conflict prevention and peace-building efforts have been inhibited by some important 
political impediments, such as a lack of perceived interests or competing definitions 
of peace and peacebuilding goals (Reychler, 2007: 153). He summarises this as 
follows 
 
First, there is the problem of commitment to conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding. The propensity to intervene is related with the 
perception of interests. When vital interests are at stake, donors will 
tend to make greater efforts than when interests at stake are perceived 
as marginal. Second, when there is no consensus on the peace one 
wants to achieve, it is difficult to build it. (Reychler, 2007: 153) 
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In sum, and although rehabilitation after violent conflict is today relevant to many 
countries, it is in general too narrowly specified, too short term and too fragmented 
with no macro strategic or conceptual frame. Further it is usually based on quite 
inadequate knowledge of the history, priorities and dynamics of the afflicted country.  
Taking this into consideration, and despite the assumption of a so-called 
peacebuilding consensus, this apparent consensus could well be a mask for the darker 
dynamics of hegemony in the international system (Duffield, 2001). This suggests 
that the processes being used to build peace today serve the interests of dominant 
actors rather than constitute a peace based on real consensus, including the recipients 
of those same processes (Richmond, 2007: 123). Furthermore, although globalisation 
contributed to an increased awareness of the conflicts that need redressing and of the 
tools to do it, it also seems to be true that instead of a consensus what has been 
resulting is a lack of consensus further weakening peacebuilding and calling for a 
bigger attention to concepts and mechanisms used to prevent and resolve conflicts 
(Richmond, 2004: 132). 
Therefore, it appears to us that it is of critical importance that, in any conflict or post-
conflict society, multilateral and bilateral donors recognize that when strategies are 
well devised and efficiently employed, they can have the potential to generate a 
range of benefits that extend well beyond the post-conflict phase (Labonte, 2003: 
271). Acknowledging this is particularly important since it basically defines whether 
involvement and intervention is truly committed to creating the sustainable structures 
for sustainable peace or not. In other words, if one envisages peace merely as the 
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absence of armed conflict, without looking at the structural dimension of peace, then 
intervention will hardly be effective in the longer-term. 
 
 
2.3. Chapter conclusions 
The end of the Cold War seems to have offered the opportunity for international 
actors to revisit dominant conceptions of security and development at the 
international and domestic levels, and to devise supposedly coherent policy 
instruments and policies to address violent conflicts from a peacebuilding 
perspective. At the same time, the bridging of the security and development agendas 
within the concept of peacebuilding also seemed to help dealing with a full range of 
issues threatening international peace and stability (Tschirgi, 2003: 1). The 
international stage was then set to take a holistic approach at the complex problems 
ailing the global community beyond the stability of the international system and the 
security of states. Reflecting new concerns and priorities - related to human rights, 
good governance and rule of law, policy developments or institutional reforms -, 
liberal peace conceptions and peacebuilding aimed at the prevention and resolution 
of violent conflicts, the consolidation of peace, and post-conflict reconstruction in 
order to avoid a resumption of war. All this should be achieved by addressing the 
proximate and root causes of conflicts including structural, political, socio-cultural, 
economic and environmental factors (Tschirgi, 2003: 2-3). In theory, conflict 
prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding was to be sustained in distinct, yet 
interrelated, ‘pillars’: security related to all aspects of public safety, aiming at 
creating a safe and secure environment; justice and reconciliation through formal and 
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informal mechanisms and an impartial and accountable legal system for the future; 
social and economic well-being to address fundamental social and economic needs; 
and governance and participation to create legitimate, effective political and 
administrative institutions and participatory processes (Hamre and Sullivan 2002: 91-
92).  
However, time and a more rigorous analysis of reality has come to show us that 
peacebuilding and conflict prevention missions, important as they are, are not simply 
exercises of conflict management. They are rather the reflection of a particular model 
of domestic governance that is essentially globalised from the core to the periphery 
of the international system and that is based on the principles of liberal market 
democracy (Paris, 2002: 638). Despite being advocated as neutral, objective and 
benevolent, the liberal peace model is, at the same time, also accused of establishing 
and maintaining insidious practices of external intervention (Richmond, 2007: 73) 
obeying to the principles and values advocated universally mostly by Western 
developed states and institutions. The values and institutions of the liberal 
democratic core are thus transplanted into the domestic affairs of peripheral host 
states (Paris, 2002: 638), in an effort to reconstruct parts of the periphery at the 
image of the core. This sort of liberal social engineering project therefore assumes 
that the international community can unpack the historical process by which 
contemporary states were built, determine how a stable and secure domestic order 
was created, and apply the ‘recipe’ – with appropriate adaptation to local 
circumstance – to all kinds of post-conflict environments. These efforts are all based 
not only on some idea of what will or will not work in a given context, but more 
importantly on what the end product – a stable, participatory, liberal, democratic and 
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capitalist state- should look like (Krause and Jütersonke, 2005: 451). . However, and 
being based on conditionality, liberal peace goals may engender complex and 
problematic internal contradictions, since the creation of a sovereign state according 
to such principles and values may not necessarily be compatible with economic and 
political liberalisation, good governance and human rights. Ultimately, as pointed out 
by Duffield, this may mean that liberal peace can be geared towards a logic of 
exclusion and selective incorporation, mainly constructed, maintained and stimulated 
by external actors (Richmond, 2007: 83). 
However, and as Jeong wisely reminds us, the experiences in the mid-1990s in places 
like Somalia, Bosnia or Liberia, for example, have come to show the international 
community that sustainable peace based on principles of justice can be a very illusive 
objective if considered in the absence of a long-term perspective of structural 
transformation (Jeong, 2005: xi). According to Richmond, this simply means an 
illiberal peacebuilding interval where external actors control governance until they 
consider societies to be sustainable constituted and allow local institutions and 
populations to control themselves (Richmond, 2007: 150). From a critical stance, this 
reflects a minimalist approach focused on prevention and peacebuilding efforts 
without necessarily creating positive conditions for structural transformation (Jeong, 
2005: 22) that undermines, in practice, the need for a more comprehensive and 
coherent approach to internal violent conflict in poor developing countries. 
According to Nicole Ball (2005) 
 
Civil wars occur at different levels of political and economic 
development, with diverse political and social systems and varying 
physical and human resource endowment, cultural and historical 
experiences. (Ball, 2005) 
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 In this context, for structural peacebuilding to occur, the focus should be on the 
systemic and structural conditions that foster violent conflict. Stable peace must thus 
be built on social, economic and political foundations that are a response to the needs 
of the people. Therefore, the root causes of poverty, corruption, discrimination and 
unfair distribution of resources need to be addressed (Karbo, 2008: 122). 
In this sense, the question here is not so much whether the international community 
should or should not get involved in conflict prevention and peacebuilding in war-
torn societies, but rather the way in which such involvement takes place and under 
what circumstances and conditions. In this sense, both peacebuilding and liberal 
peace projects are here viewed and criticized for being a biased strategy in favour of 
liberal political and economic models that promotes a very imbalanced agenda of 
human rights and obscures the much more complex and structural causes that sustain 
and reproduce conflict. The attachment of political and ideological strings to these 
policies and strategies further reinforces the negative impact that such interventions 
may have. Furthermore, the definition and implementation of models that are 
universally and almost blindly applied to every single contexts runs the risk of 
aggravating, in the longer-term, the conditions that lead to conflict in the first place. 
If prevention and reconstruction strategies do not understand the deeper and less 
visible causes that may lead to conflict, and define priorities accordingly without 
imposing specific biased and limited political or economic models, then they will 
hardly ever be effective. 
In sum, it is fundamental to acknowledge that different post-conflict settings require 
different priorities and consequently define and implement more effective and 
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sustained strategies that avoid one-fit-all type of models and actually respond to the 
complexities of conflicts. In order to do that effectively, prevention and 
peacebuilding frameworks must instead sharpen and retain their focus in order to 
consolidate peace in the short term while increasing the likelihood that future conflict 
can be managed without resorting to violence (Labonte, 2003: 270). In the line of 
Azar’s theory of protracted social conflict, peacebuilding and conflict prevention 
strategies should imply something more positive and dynamic than simply creating a 
stable and organized state. It should be about building political, economic and social 
institutions based on the notions of good governance, inclusion and human well-
being (Krause and Jütersonke, 2005: 454). It should have interacting economic, 
political and social dynamics and effects, ranging from livelihood rebuilding, 
reduction of perceived inequity, reconciliation and legitimacy restoration not least by 
rehabilitating access to basic services. 
All these tasks and endeavours seem to be even more fundamentally challenging in 
societies characterized by deep social and economic inequalities that are common to 
many divided and impoverished countries; considering that in such contexts one of 
the main gaps in dominant conflict prevention and peacebuilding is exactly the lack 
of attention given to socio-economic inequalities and the role these play in feeding 
conflict, prevention and peacebuilding strategies must be geared towards modifying 
social structures and processes associated with such political and economic power 
imbalances (Jeong, 2005: 3). In this sense, political and economic stability, as well as 
social reconciliation highly depend, in the long run, upon how to effectively identify, 
tackle and decrease the gross inequalities between racially and ethnically divided 
groups through poverty reduction (Jeong, 2005: 12). Bearing this in mind, the next 
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chapter will present an alternative approach to conflict, based on the recognition that 
thoroughly addressing socio-economic inequalities and guaranteeing economic and 
social rights to the population can provide a more sustainable basis for peace. 
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“When you leave a person in his or her place, there is peace, but when 
you displace a person from his or her place, problems will start. When 
a person is not in his place, has no food, has no shelter, has no school, 
has no health service, there are looming problems and this is the 
beginning of war”  
(Cardinal Zubeir Wako, Catholic Archbishop of Khartoum) 
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3- ADDRESSING SOCIO-ECONOMIC INEQUALITIES AS A BASIS FOR PEACE: AN 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT? 
 
3.1. Introduction 
As it has become clear from the previous chapter, since the end of the Cold War 
peace and development have become intimately related, with the UN and other 
international actors attempting to address the twin imperatives of security and 
development through integrated and multidimensional approaches and policies. At 
the same time, the scope of peacebuilding has been broadened significantly, 
progressively incorporating conflict prevention, conflict management and post-
conflict reconstruction (Tschirgi, 2003: i). Following this, the imperative of liberal 
peace became an end in itself that appeared to legitimate the means used, giving rise 
to some significant contradictions in contemporary practices aimed at, desirably, 
constructing peace from below (Richmond, 2007: 128). 
This amplification and globalisation of liberal peace efforts and strategies towards 
violent conflict has been viewed both as a solution to the complexities of the so-
called new wars in the periphery trough the promotion of liberalisation, 
democratisation and human rights, and also as a sort of hegemonic project led by and 
according to the Western powers, economies and norms (Richmond, 2007: 75). 
Intended as a cure against economic ‘marginalisation’ and aimed at the dismantling 
of patrimonial regimes, liberalisation has, up until now, helped to increase rather than 
reduce structural tensions (Chabal et al, 2005: 39). This resulted inevitably in a 
scenario where the imposition of models, values and goals rendered sustainable and 
effective strategies to achieve peace almost unachievable goals.  
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For many scholars and authors, the main explanation and justification for repeated 
failures to address conflict and promote peace under this framework was and still is 
the focus on the crucial role played by root causes in originating conflict. According 
to dominant approaches to peace and conflict, the failure to address the root causes of 
a given conflict will inevitably compromise successful outcomes of interventions and 
peacebuilding strategies. The widely shared conviction that successfully achieving 
peace and stability requires addressing and acknowledging the ‘root causes’ thus 
seems to resolve the tension between theory and practice of intervening in conflict or 
post-conflict scenarios. By knowing parties well and taking their grievances 
seriously, as well as context and needs success is almost guaranteed. In this sense, 
failing to address and identify such root causes will inevitably lead to failure and 
unsustainability of peace processes.  
This is, however, a frequently contested view. Susan Woodward, for example, 
identifies two main problems with this explanation: first of all, it is so widely shared 
and so impervious to variation in outcomes that it prevents careful research on the 
relation between policies and practices of intervention and specific consequences in a 
case; secondly, it is probably a wrong and faulty explanation. Woodward thus 
proposes three sets of reasons why a focus on the ‘root causes’ of a conflict will not 
improve the outcomes and effectiveness of peacemaking or peacebuilding 
interventions and can even be counterproductive:  (1) the knowledge on causes 
shaping current policies, (2) the new research on civil war that distinguishes the 
causes of war from the causes of violence and the transformations caused by war 
which peacebuilders face, (3) and the interests of those who matter in intervention 
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26(Woodward, 2007) . She organizes these reasons into three broad questions. The 
first question concerns what do we know about the causes of civil conflict?  
Policies to end the violence and create peace when intervention takes place have 
also, however, been largely shaped by one or all of three main causal arguments 
concerning the causes of conflict: the cultural argument (cultural content of societies 
dictates paths to peace or violence), the economic argument (civil war is caused by 
rebel groups seeking economic gain and creating parallel and profitable war 
economies), and the political regime argument (civil war is caused by authoritarian 
rule and lack of democracy). Woodward’s main argument concerning this question is 
that these arguments and concerns may well seem understandable and valid; 
however, if effective peacebuilding depends on addressing those root causes and the 
knowledge on which policies are based is wrong, then intervention may well end up 
doing more harm than ignoring cause altogether.27 Moreover, and somehow most 
importantly, the parties an actors involved themselves will inevitably disagree on the 
identification of those same root causes, which clearly results from the inherently 
complex and multi-causal nature of civil wars (Woodward, 2007). The second 
question is what does the newest research on the dynamics of civil war itself tell us 
about the role that its causes should play in bringing the violence to an end? When 
attempting to understand why the root causes may not necessarily matter when 
addressing conflict, one must be aware and acknowledge the dynamic and 
                                                 
26 Complementarily to this analysis, Woodward identifies 3 sets of common explanations for failure in 
developed literature: the mismatch between committed resource and the complexity of a specific 
context and conflict (Sambanis and Doyle, 2000), the lack of donor coordination on effective strategy, 
program and projects once resources are committed (Jones, 2002), and insufficient to statebuilding 
alongside relief and reconstruction (Paris, 2004; Woodward, 2002).  
27 More recent research on the causes of civil war focuses on micro foundations and results in an 
important distinction, suggested by Stathis Kalyvas, between the causes of violence in civil wars and 
the causes of civil war. According to Kalyvas, these are not the same. To explain violence, one must 
look to personal and local causes, not the causal narratives of macropolitics often adopted and taken 
by external actors involved in peacemaking (Kalyvas, 2006 apud Woodward, 2007). 
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transformative nature of civil conflict. Therefore, successfully addressing it and 
promoting peace requires addressing the reality outcomes and changes resulting from 
conflict (Woodward, 2007). Thirdly and finally, how do the policymakers and 
practitioners who decide whether and how we intervene address those causes once 
we learn what they are? 
In order to understand if the root causes of conflict truly matter when building peace, 
Woodward suggests that one must first of all understand to whom these root causes 
actually matter? In this sense, she argues that there must also be an assessment of the 
degree of compatibility between the importance taking root causes seriously and the 
interests and motivations of those who intervene and design the approaches to solve 
conflict and build peace. This criticism is clearly related to the recognition of the 
highly political nature of such peacebuiling and peacemaking strategies thus 
questioning the true concern and usefulness of root causes when defining the most 
appropriate strategies to respond to civil war (Woodward, 2007). 
In sum, such an argument is based on three basic assumptions: if analysis of the 
causes is wrong it may result in responses that can ultimate cause further harm in the 
future; secondly, understanding and addressing the root causes may detract attention 
from the crucial role played by the changes brought by conflict itself; finally, often 
the identification of root causes corresponds essentially to the broader interests of 
those leading the intervening strategies, thus resulting in inadequate and 
counterproductive responses to conflict. 
But despite this criticism, the so-called emerging peacebuilding consensus proved to 
be very ambitious, often resulting in a ‘virtual peace’ based upon contested attempts 
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to import liberal democratic models via military intervention and/or political, social, 
and economic institution building and reconstruction (Richmond, 2007: 150). 
However, the increasing existence of internal violent conflicts that did not 
correspond to ideological divergences confronted the international community with 
important challenges in terms of its capacity to accurately understand violent conflict 
and define appropriate conflict prevention and conflict resolution tools. Continuous 
crises, mainly in Africa and Latin America, helped gain awareness that internal 
violent conflict was more frequent in countries with low socio-economic 
development and inclusiveness (Ellingsen, 2000: 238), and also of the way in which 
political, structural and socio-economic factors all play a role and contribute to 
render a given country more unstable and conflict-prone.  
If a given country suffers from severe political problems such as discriminatory 
political and socio-economic institutions, exclusionary ideologies, inter-group and 
elite-based politics that create and fuel inequality and exclusion, violent conflict is 
usually more likely to occur (Brown, 1997: 9). In this same line, the economic and 
social factors that can be identified as potential sources of internal conflict are 
economic problems, discriminatory economic systems and the trials and tribulations 
of economic development and modernization (Brown, 1997: 10). Therefore, focusing 
on political and military stabilization and order is clearly not enough to end 
protracted social conflicts based on ethnic or religious rivalries sustained and 
aggravated by deep political and economic interests and inequalities (Jeong, 2005: 
xi). 
In this chapter, and again acknowledging the need for deconstructing simplistic 
views of ethno-religious factors shared by many of the actors involved in violent 
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conflict, we argue that effectively ending them and achieving sustainable peace 
implies avoiding acritical models and concepts and, above all, addressing the more 
complex social and economic inequalities at stake. Underlying this analysis is the 
belief that in order to address such inequalities effectively, actors involved in conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding strategies must acknowledge and transversally enforce 
economic and social rights guarantees. Such an endeavour clearly implies a 
redefinition of the priorities that are traditionally assumed when it comes to human 
rights as basic conditions for peace. As it has been repeatedly mentioned in the 
previous chapter, one of the main criticisms to dominant peacebuilding models and 
liberal peace ideas is the fact that they acknowledge the importance of human rights, 
but conceive them in very limited terms. Within the liberal peace discourse, human 
rights are basically associated with civil and political rights, often ignoring and 
neglecting their intrinsic economic, social and cultural dimension.  
It is a fact that in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognized that 
all individual human beings have civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights 
that should be respected and fulfilled in order to live well. All these rights were also 
framed as indivisible and interdependent. However, the evolution of the system of 
universal protection of human rights came to show that both domestically and 
internationally, priority is often given to civil and political rights over basic 
economic, social and cultural rights. The failure of the international community to 
elaborate on the content and implementation of economic, social and cultural rights 
has perpetuated the notion that these rights are less essential to dignified personhood 
than civil and political rights (Puta-Chekwe and Flood, 2001: 43). However, and as 
Jack Donnelly refers 
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Human dignity, the realization of which is the aim of human rights, 
cannot be reduced to dimensions that can be encompassed by a short 
or narrow list of “basic” human rights. All human rights are “basic 
rights” in the fundamental sense that systematic violations of any 
human right preclude realizing a life full of human dignity – that is, 
prevent one from enjoying the minimum conditions necessary for a 
life worthy of a human being. (Donnelly apud Puta-Chekwe and 
Flood, 2001: 45) 
 
Basic economic and social rights as established in the main human rights treaties thus 
include the right to work, the right to education, and the right to a standard of living 
adequate for health and well-being, including food, clothing, housing, medical care 
and social services (Puta-Chekwe and Flood, 2001: 46) without any kind of 
discrimination. 
However, and although the UN and many other international actors have attempted to 
develop a more inclusive and comprehensive approach to their work, namely when it 
comes to human rights considerations, the practical results of its human rights 
component within the broader work of conflict prevention and peacebuilding are 
limited and far from satisfying. The institutions and actors involved in conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding efforts, who are also responsible for contributing to the 
realization of these rights, often fail in their role or are even counterproductive, causing 
further harm when they should be providing assistance (Tigerstrom, 2001: 139). To a 
certain extent this reflects an important gap between theory and practice concerning 
human rights work and the still existing multiple “flaws” of the current prevention and 
peacebuilding models, both conceptually and in practice. The perverse tendency to 
draw a rigid distinction between civil and political rights and economic, social and 
cultural rights, thus ignores and undermines the need for a global and joint action in the 
field and the fundamental place and role of all human rights in the whole process. 
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Furthermore, such activities in the field of human rights tend to be concentrated on 
norms and procedures, seldom reaching all the relevant areas of policy making, 
especially when it comes to economic and social rights. The neo-liberal economic 
policies, which are usually associated with the liberal peace ideology, have been barely 
contested assumptions underlying external economic reconstruction assistance and 
management in war-torn societies (Pugh, 2005: 1). As a consequence these dominant 
models of international assistance in conflict and post-conflict scenarios tend to 
reproduce and perpetuate the flaws of already weak political and economic structures 
further obscuring the potential causes for violent conflict existing in certain conflict-
prone societies, namely in those where socio-economic inequalities are rooted and 
structural. 
Therefore, as Jeong stresses, a strict consideration of inflation control and other 
technicalities in these contexts are usually not enough to end or prevent violent 
conflict from occurring. In order to reduce inequality and potential resulting 
animosities, distributional aspects of macroeconomic policies have to be considered 
in the context of social and political needs (Jeong, 2005: 12). Economic growth and 
patterns of income distribution have also to be considered in an integrative 
framework in order to build harmonious relations between different social groups. 
Economic programs must be designed to create stability and equity, since social 
tension is created not only by perceived but also real imbalances in income and 
wealth (Jeong, 2005: 17). 
This type of reasoning and measures become particularly important if we consider that 
an estimated one-fifth or one-quarter of the world’s population lives in absolute 
poverty, without adequate food, shelter and health care and where the marginalisation 
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of economic, social and cultural rights serves to marginalize further the poorest and 
most vulnerable groups of society. In this perspective, economic and social rights are 
basic and fundamental human rights that must be implemented and fulfilled in any 
circumstances but that become particularly important in conflict and post-conflict 
scenarios. In fact, it has already been argued that the denial of fundamental human 
rights such as the right to life, housing, food or respect for cultural life, as well as 
discrimination or systematic and large scale exclusion by the institutions and decision-
making mechanisms in societies with internal ethno-religious cleavages are frequently 
at the origin of many contemporary violent conflicts. Such conflicts simultaneously 
demonstrate how important the indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights 
is. In fact, civil and political rights alone are seen as useless if not complemented and 
reinforced by the fulfilment of economic and social rights, crucial for the survival and 
well being of all people. Some of the underlying causes of such violent conflicts are 
what John Burton called ‘unmet human needs’, which include socio-economic 
security, belonging, participation and socio-economic well-being. According to 
Burton’s approach, in order to live and attain well-being, humans need certain 
essentials. This means that, as long as there are sectors of the population living below 
all standards of human dignity and under extreme poverty and if these people have 
been discriminated against for an extended period of time, the resentment they carry 
can fuel the most intense and violent conflicts (Hauss, 2003). Given these potential 
consequences of severe inequalities, all efforts to prevent violent conflict and build 
peace must include policies to monitor and correct them. Decent housing, jobs, 
education and health must be the fundamental objective of both government’s and 
external actor’s policies and this effort is one in which all sectors of the population, 
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without exception, must be engaged (Barbara von Tigerstrom 2001:147). More 
recently, Ho-Won Jeong has also examined and underlined how security, political, 
social and economic components must not be isolated when it comes to conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding efforts and should always support each other in 
rebuilding a society’s fabric. He presents a conceptual framework for the design of 
peace building and the coordination of different functions in the field and concludes 
that sustainable peace based simply on justice can be an illusive goal in the absence of 
longer-term perspective of structural change and it may not be sufficient to end a 
protracted conflict (Jeong, 2005: 18). The acknowledgment and recognition of the 
existence of various types of underlying factors, of a more material and structural 
nature (such as political and socio-economic inequalities), which are important to fully 
understand the emergence or perpetuation of conflicts in these societies, become 
fundamental elements for the definition of alternative strategies to prevent or resolve 
conflicts of such complex nature. 
Again drawing from John Burton’s human needs argument, violent conflict is seen as 
socio-biological, derived from a suppression of a basic hierarchy of human needs 
requiring social changes to remove conditions that may lead to conflict (Richmond, 
2007: 88). Violence thus occurs when certain individuals or groups do not see any 
other way to meet their need, or when they need understanding, respect and 
consideration for their needs. The great promise of human needs theory is that it 
would provide a relatively objective basis, transcending local political and cultural 
differences, for understanding the sources of conflict, designing conflict resolution 
processes, and founding conflict analysis and resolution as an autonomous discipline 
(Burton, 1990). In this sense, Burton’s concept of basic human needs may also offers 
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a possible method of grounding the field of conflict analysis and resolution. The 
importance of this ambitious project is now generally recognized by conflict 
theorists, whether they agree with Burton or not (Kök, 2007). Often ignored and 
neglected by peace researchers, human needs theory thus looks at the roots of 
conflict and offers valuable insights into the sources of conflict, and thus possible 
resolutions. 
Such a position has some similarity with Galtung’s structuralist argument, which 
considers violent conflict as a result of more structural forms of violence. According 
to this perspective, the lack of socio-economic development and equitable structures 
of distribution of resources can be a powerful source of disruptive violence in a 
society. The absence or denial of access to basic infrastructure, employment 
opportunities, access to education or health services can generate frictions in a state 
and ultimately manifest itself in the form of violent conflicts. Avoiding them thus 
requires real change in political, economic and social structures in order to tackle the 
structural oppression that may lead to violent conflict (Richmond, 2007: 88). 
In such circumstances, addressing political inequality and maintaining an equitable 
social contract between the government and the population must go hand in hand 
with rectifying economic grievances of a more structural nature (Besançon, 2005: 
409). Devoting greater resources to reducing distributional inequalities is likely to 
reduce the conflict-inducing effects, such as the ones underlined in Azar’s theory of 
protracted social conflict (the communal content of a society, deprivation of human 
needs, governance and the role of State and the international linkages). Greater 
attention to poverty and inequality can also enhance the prospects for economic 
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28growth in the longer term, as it has been showed in several studies  (Paris, 2001: 
779). 
 
3.2. From wishful thinking to reality: economic and social rights in conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding  
All these approaches and arguments are interesting and helpful in trying to identify 
the root causes of conflict and also the best and more appropriate tools to render 
violent conflict an outcome, that far from being inevitable, can at least become 
preventable if the multiple causes at stake are identified and tackled. Yet, this is not 
[usually] part of the current conflict prevention and peace building agendas, which 
tend to consider poverty and inequality only at the level of the individual, not as a 
group phenomenon (Stewart, 2002a: 3), much less as a potential cause of violent 
conflict. Reality, however, is usually quite different. 
In fact, although some research and findings have tried to include the economic 
component to explain civil wars (mainly through the inclusion of economic growth 
indicators, resources available, elite manipulation) (Besançon, 2005:394), socio-
economic inequality is rarely seriously considered as a contributor to internal conflict 
and even less seriously tackled in actual strategies being implemented. However, in 
situations where major grievances occur between ethnic or religious groups, with 
long lasting abuse and repression at the political, social and economic level, greater 
socio-economic inequality may in fact render rebellion easier or, at least, more likely 
(Besançon, 2005: 396). 
                                                 
28 For further information please see Nancy Birdsall and Frederik Jaspersen (eds.) (2007), Pathways to 
Growth: Comparing East Asia and Latin America, Washington D.C.: Inter-American Development 
Bank (apud Paris, 2001: 779). 
 89
Several authors have sustained this hypothesis theoretically and tried to understand if 
and how economic forces contribute to violent conflict, looking not only at how 
poverty, unemployment or unequal economic growth fuel social discontent, but also 
at how violence and instability are used to gain (or maintain) access to scarce 
resources (USAID, 2005: 16). According to this view, poverty and stagnant or 
negative economic growth [as well as important available resources] are highly 
correlated with the emergence of violent civil conflict. But despite this correlation, 
the relationship between socio-economic inequality and violent conflict, however, is 
often conceived as more ambiguous (USAID, 2005: 17) and limited. In fact, 
contemporary studies of civil war, namely those conducted by Collier and other for 
the World Bank, conclude that the risk of civil conflict is not increased by inequality 
at the level of individuals (vertical inequality) (Østby, 2003). A recent trend in 
theories of civil war emphasizes the economic or material benefits that elites stand to 
gain from civil war, an argument that has been used and defended by both 
economists and political scientists resorting to the financial motives and constraints 
that may well be determinants of war (Østby, 2003, Sambanis, 2002). Such theories 
oppose the relative deprivation theories29 and reject the idea that frustration leads to 
conflict based on the argument that inequality and discontent are more or less always 
present in practically all societies. Consequently, proponents of the so-called 
‘resource mobilization’ or ‘mobilization opportunity’ believe that the most direct and 
                                                 
29 The relative deprivation approach explains individual and group violence by placing the relative 
sense of deprivation as the most important factor in creating grievances and mobilizing people for 
adopting a violent behaviour. At the core of these grievances is the idea of unrealised expectations and 
violence results from an intolerable gap between what people want and what they actually get (Porto, 
2008: 59). 
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influential explanatory factors are not perceived grievances, but rather financial and 
political opportunities for mobilizing rebel groups (Østby, 2003: 6; Collier, 2000). 
Collier and others have focused directly on post-conflict aid aimed at interrupting 
what they called the ‘conflict trap’ also by focusing on their argued ‘greed and 
grievance’ approach (Woodward, 2007). Under this approach, Collier specifically 
stresses the existence and direct influence of [hidden] economic agendas as causes of 
violent internal conflict. In fact, in the equation ‘greed versus grievances’, Collier 
questions the role of grievance as central variable to explain most internal conflicts, 
considering it much less important than economic factors (Collier, 2000). In this 
context, the true cause of violent internal conflict is not grievance (either from the 
general population or specific groups), but rather the silent force of greed of specific 
groups, namely criminals, opportunistic, linked to the market or armed groups, all 
sharing their interest in perpetuating conflict and clear opposition to peace processes. 
Therefore, the argument goes, some societies are more conflict-prone than others 
because rebellion may offer higher economic benefits than peace. However, and 
since the narrative of grievances is often more welcomed by the international 
community involved in these contexts than the argument of greed, the discourse used 
by those groups economically benefiting from conflict is usually entirely dominated 
and instrumentalised by the grievance factor (Collier, 2000).30 Furthermore, and 
according to this argument, if one accepts the idea that grievance causes conflict this 
would mean that interventions should be aimed at addressing the objective causes of 
grievance, namely reduce inequality and increase political rights. However, he also 
                                                 
30 Collier specifically points out some factors that may increase the likelihood of civil conflict linked 
to its greed theory: high economic dependency from the export of primary goods; low levels of 
education; high proportion of young men; and economic decrease (which may result in violent action 
by the population). 
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considers these objectives, no matter how noble or desirable they may be, will 
ultimately be ineffective in achieving civil peace (Collier, 2000a: 15). As a result of 
such reasoning, Collier argues that the recognition of this role of hidden economic 
agendas in internal violent conflicts demands new and alternative approaches to 
conflict prevention and conflict resolution from the international community. The 
centrality of the greed factor in the conflict equation requires different intervention 
mechanisms and policies, focusing on the economic profit dimension resulting from 
conflict. Collier thus suggests policies and measures to restrict the entry of illegal 
goods in international markets, fight poverty through development aid, stimulate 
more competitive internal markets, avoid manipulation and monopoly by certain 
groups, stimulate rapid democratic transitions and reinforce involve in mediation and 
negotiation of peace agreements (Collier, 2000). 
However, and despite the importance of shedding some light on the economic use 
and profit resulting from conflict in many societies, this is a potentially limiting 
approach, since it excludes many other important factors to explain and address 
violent internal conflict. Alternative arguments thus remain important to underline 
and reorient analysis. Mary Kaldor, for example, argues that despite the existence of 
objective economic conditions that may stimulate dynamics to prolong war (which 
may become a way of social and economic structuring of societies), the economic 
motivation alone is not enough to explain the scale, brutality and sheer viciousness of 
new wars (Kaldor, 1999: 106). Nevertheless, and despite divergence among scholars, 
evidence suggests that socio-economic disparities can in fact create an important 
incentive for violence, especially between different groups, and especially if a given 
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ethnic or religious group is systematically excluded from an equitable share of 
economic opportunity (Ballentine and Sherman, 2003 apud USAID, 2005: 17). 
According to Ted Gurr (1970), for example, the discontent arising from the 
perception of relative deprivation tends to be one of the most basic and crucial 
factors contributing to one’s participation in violence (apud Besançon, 2005: 395). 
Gurr’s relative deprivation theory identifies a sense of injustice as a source of social 
unrest, and the frustration-aggression approach sees frustration as a sufficient 
condition for aggression (Richmond, 2007: 88).31 According to Gurr’s research, it 
refers to the discontent people feel when they compare their positions to those of 
other similarly situated and find out that they have less than they deserve. It is a 
condition that is measured by comparing one group’s situation to the situations of 
those who are more advantaged. This is seen as a potential cause of social 
movements, leading in extreme situations to political violence such as rioting, 
terrorism and civil wars (Gurr, 1970). In this context, relative deprivation occurs 
when expected need satisfaction increases linearly over time, whereas the actual need 
satisfaction levels off after some time. The more unequal the distribution of rights the 
                                                 
31 The literature on relative deprivation is well organized in Ted Gurr's Why Men Rebel (1970). The 
idea of relative deprivation has been used either to measure fairness, inequality, or social justice, or to 
explain grievance, social hostility, or aggression. Relative deprivation "is defined as actors' perception 
of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities". It is the gap between 
that "to which people believe they are rightfully entitled" and that which "they think they are capable 
of getting and keeping" (Gurr, 1970: 24). It is essential to note that deprivation is not based on wants 
or needs alone, but on the wants and needs that we feel we ought to have or deserve.  
In its other research, Minorities at Risk Project, Gurr surveys the world to present "an integrated 
substantive and empirical analysis of communal status and conflict since the end of World War II, 
with special attention to the decade of the 1980's". From this study, Gurr came up with coded data on 
227 communal groups throughout the world and that he used to assess a general model of how and 
why they mobilize to defend and promote their collective interests. Statistical analysis shows that 
cultural identity, inequalities, and historical loss of autonomy all contribute substantially to their 
grievances. Political mobilization, grievances, and the international diffusion and contagion of 
communal conflict jointly explain the extent of political action in the 1980s. Democracy, state power, 
and institutional change help determine whether conflict takes the form of protest or rebellion (Gurr, 
1993). 
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larger the frustration (Ellingsen, 2000: 235). As a consequence, the growing gap 
between the expected and the actual causes frustration and mobilizes people to 
engage in conflict. This happens basically because groups believe that given their 
unequal condition there is nothing to lose and everything to gain in resorting to 
violence (Besançon, 2005: 396). By highlighting the importance of perception, 
perceived inequality or grievance becomes as relevant as are objective conditions 
(Chabal et al, 2005: 19). 
This debate on the role of inequality in internal violent conflict has also increasingly 
focused on horizontal inequalities32, i.e. ‘systemic inequalities between culturally 
formed groups’ (Stewart, 2002a). Frances Stewart’s horizontal inequality theory is 
focused on inequalities between groups and encompasses not only political 
participation but also, and above all, economic assets, employment and incomes, and 
access to social services (Smoljan: 2003: 237). Stewart’s central thesis is that 
horizontal inequalities matter to people in different groups and may ultimately lead 
to unhappiness, resentment and a cause of social instability (Stewart, 2002a: 8). 
Horizontal inequalities are presented as significant and multidimensional, since they 
have an impact on both individual well-being and social stability (and the two are 
connected). The esteem of a group impacts on individual well-being and arises from 
the relative position of the group in various dimensions (Stewart, 2002a: 9), such as 
political participation, economic (assets, incomes and employment) and social 
aspects, with each containing a number of elements. 
                                                 
32Horizontal inequality is considered important because any group seeking to organise itself to pursue 
a common agenda faces a ‘collective action’ problem, whereby the group may be unable to co-operate 
due to mutual suspicion (Yanacopolus and Hanlon, 2006: 153). 
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Horizontal inequality thus captures inequality across groups with common identities, 
in terms of distribution of income, assets, educational opportunities, political 
positions, etc and it claims that the significance of horizontal inequality lies in 
perceived inequality as much as in objective distributional characteristics (Chabal et 
al, 2005: 22-23). Again here the perceptions are as important and relevant as reality 
for the outcomes, both with respect to what differences actually are, as well as how 
much group members mind about the differences (Stewart, 2002a: 12). 
In this context, several aspects of horizontal inequality have been considered 
important sources of violent behaviour: unequal access to assets (land, capital), 
which are crucial to the livelihoods of people; unequal access to wage employment; 
unequal access to public social services; and unequal benefit from economic 
opportunities. In this line, resentment between groups based on these inequalities 
may be build up over differences in living standards between the groups 
(Yanacopolus and Hanlon, 2006: 153-154). Stewart has also put forward some 
economic hypotheses to explain intra-state violent conflict, based on factors related 
to group motivation or the failure of the social contract (Stewart, 2002: 343). 
Concerning the group motivation hypothesis, since conflicts usually involve groups 
fighting each other, group motives, resentments and ambitions can be important 
motivation for war. These groups can certainly be divided along ethnic, cultural or 
religious lines, but the group differences only become worth fighting for and 
important if there are other important differences concerning access to and 
distribution of political or economic power and rights. In this sense, the lack of 
inclusiveness can also take the form of a real or perceived rise in horizontal 
inequality (Yanacopolus and Hanlon, 2006: 158). In this situation, relatively 
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deprived groups are likely to seek redress, but when this does not come, resort to war 
is likely to be the option. Resentments inspired by group differences, termed 
horizontal inequalities, are thus considered an important cause of violent conflict33 
(Stewart, 2002: 343). The failure of social contract, on the other hand, derives from 
the view that social stability is based on a hypothetical social contract between the 
people and the government. In this contract, people accept state authority so long as 
the state delivers services and provides reasonable economic conditions, such as 
employment and incomes. With economic stagnation or decline and worsening state 
provided services, the social contract tends to break down. According to the research, 
these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, on the contrary. For example, the 
conflict in Sudan is clearly one of deep horizontal inequalities, with the South being 
clearly historically deprived and neglected, and powerful private gains that help 
perpetuate the conflict (especially on the part of the Sudanese government) (Stewart, 
2002: 343). As we shall see in the next section, the continuous political and socio-
economic exclusion of the Southern Christian and Animist population in Sudan has 
been an important incentive to violence and conflict. As a consequence, conflict 
prevention and post-conflict strategies must include an understanding of such 
inequalities and tackle them accordingly.  On the economic side, for example, 
policies and strategies should include public investment, equal employment policies, 
land reform, education policies, extending access to public social services, among 
others. However, such policies are not necessarily substitute of poverty reduction 
policies. On the political side, measures should include inclusiveness and avoid 
                                                 
33 Furthermore, analysis demonstrates that horizontal inequalities frequently have their origin in 
historical circumstances (for example, in the case of Sudan, as shall be demonstrated later), such as 
colonial policies, which tended to privilege some groups over others. Sometimes, however, such 
inequalities are not caused by deliberate agency at all but simply become evident within certain 
circumstances (Stewart, 2002a apud Østby, 2003: 20). 
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monopoly of political power by one group or another, which may be cause further 
inequalities and violence (Stewart, 2002a: 34). 
 In this sense, reconstituting the social contract that sustains peace is fundamental in 
post-conflict situations. This requires broad-based inclusive development and growth 
in order to address and tackle the horizontal inequalities that led to violent conflict. 
Sustained economic and social growth is crucial for ensuring the livelihoods of 
marginalized people after war and for the social contract to be maintained and 
horizontal inequalities narrowed (Yanacopolus and Hanlon, 2006: 159). 
Therefore, studying the role of economic inequality in civil conflict of one kind or 
another implies assessing and understanding how inequality is institutionalised and 
shaped by history and changes in social relations (Cramer apud Chabal et al, 2005: 
38). 
But even if negative economic growth and inequality is related to the emergence of 
violent conflict, it is important not to fall into the simplistic idea that economic 
development solely will naturally and immediately put an end to violence. On the 
contrary, if it contributes to exacerbate pre-existing divisions it will probably make 
things worse. The liberal project, for example, tends to focus on a development 
model that does not address fundamental problems; it rather often aggravates and 
perpetuates them. Therefore, and in order to move from an estimation of risk to a 
conflict prevention perspective, it is crucial to investigate how and why such 
variables like poverty and conflict are correlated in the first place (USAID, 2005: 
37). The liberal peace project is usually portrayed as a peace with two dimensions: 
economic liberalization supported by political liberalization and vice-versa. These 
two combined are thus presented as the tenets of the dominant peacebuilding 
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paradigms and its positive effects attributed beyond peace to poverty reduction and 
human security (Salih, 2008: 182). According to Salih, however 
 
[…] despite its noble objectives, this conception of liberal peace 
(especially in African contexts) has suffered a serious blind spot 
inherent in the liberalism and the liberalization processes it proposed. 
In fact, instead helping address the more structural factors of violence 
– such as poverty and inequality- it has ended up privileging the 
liberal aspects of peace (democracy and rule of law) and neglecting 
the social and economic dimension.34 (Salih, 2008: 182) 
 
 
Our analysis thus suggests that important policy conclusions for conflict-prone 
countries can be drawn, based on the assumption that economic and social policies 
and rights are fundamental to systematically reduce horizontal inequalities. For 
example, policies to tackle poverty will reduce the likelihood of war and serve also 
as important development objectives. Policies towards increasing investment, 
employment, education and other basic social services should aim at reducing 
imbalances and inequalities (Stewart, 2002: 344). This basically suggests that 
effectively reducing deep horizontal inequalities through sustainable and equal socio-
economic policies and measures becomes an essential step to eliminate a major 
source of violent conflict.  
In general, however, success in pos-conflict peacebuilding is based on three main 
conditions and premises: establishing security; restoring good governance, including 
the rule of law and creating economic opportunity through market-oriented 
economies. Although these are important aspects of peace building, these strategies 
usually lack a deliberate program for linking immediate post-conflict needs with 
                                                 
34 According to Salih, the increasing poverty indicators as well as the low Human Development 
indicators in many African countries illustrate well how the liberal peacebuilding processes in post-
conflict states are yet to improve the social (and economic) conditions of the African poor. 
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medium and long-term development (Forman, 2002: 125), namely at the socio-
economic level. Until recently, socio-economic tasks were considered part of long-
range development assistance programs that could only begin once peace was at 
hand. But research also clearly shows that at the end of a conflict, a small window of 
opportunity exists to restore economic hope and social well-being (Forman, 2002: 
126). Such opportunities must, therefore, be used. In this context, measures and 
policies that actually help guarantee and fulfil economic and social rights in conflict 
and post-conflict contexts become necessary and urgent. These measures include not 
only legislative and constitutional reforms, but also the use of non-judicial 
institutions that may help protect, monitor and implement economic and social rights 
at the national level (Tigerstrom, 2001: 139). The creation and enforcement of 
national human rights institutions may be an important contribution to bringing 
economic and social rights into the political agendas of conflict and post-conflict 
actors, since the purpose of these institutions is to promote fairness, human dignity 
and protect individuals from abuses of power or lack of action from the State and its 
agents, also in the case of economic and social rights. Other strategies should include 
group-specific measures aimed at promoting equality, wealth distribution and active 
social and economic participation (Sambanis, 2001: 281). Ensuring that citizens in 
war-torn societies can resume a normal existence requires more than just the care and 
feeding of refugees and internally displaced. It means providing food security, public 
health, shelter, educational systems, and a social safety net for all citizens. An 
economic strategy for assistance must therefore be designed to ensure the 
reconstruction of physical infrastructure, to generate employment, to open markets, 
and also create legal reforms that ensure economic and social rights for all groups 
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(Forman, 2002: 126). However, the implementation of economic and social rights 
has been historically a problematic area in the international human rights law theory 
and practice and it becomes especially so when it comes to conflict and post-conflict 
scenarios. Among other problems, the neglect of these rights has meant that the 
means to prevent and remedy violations of rights remain underdeveloped 
(Tigerstrom, 2001: 139), or simply not implemented and cared for, often contributing 
to violence and war. 
Interventions to prevent or resolve violent conflicts cannot therefore be based on 
action and policies focusing on a single dimension of conflict, such as ethnic tension 
or political exclusion, nor can they focus on a single level. It is fundamental that 
problems are addressed in relation to all levels of analysis and to the solutions that 
can be strengthened and built at each (USAID, 2005: 31). A major problem may be 
that the government of a conflict-prone country may resist such actions, since it is a 
beneficiary of those same imbalances. Again, as we shall see in the next section, 
Sudan is a clear case of this situation. 
In these cases, and although actual change must also come from domestic actors, 
external actors have a responsibility to address the need to reduce horizontal 
inequalities. Inclusive and sustainable socio-economic development promotes a 
positive social environment by providing families and neighbourhoods with 
opportunities to work together instead of fighting each other. New economic and 
social boundaries must be built in order to provide the basis for reconstruction and 
peace to the various groups within the community (Jeong, 20005: 126). Of course 
this has to be achieved through gradual, integrated and sustainable steps and 
measures, which are especially important in order to give visibility to and help 
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overcome poverty, gender inequalities, educational decline, and unemployment. For 
example, income can be boosted by the creation of basic infrastructures, roads, 
housing, water and sanitation (Jeong, 2005: 28) thus creating conditions for more 
equal access to basic services and human needs. This will ultimately help provide the 
essential conditions for the fulfilment of the population’s economic and social rights 
and enhance peacetime opportunities. 
 
3.3. Chapter conclusions 
As it has been previously suggested, since many groups of people who fight together 
perceive themselves as belonging to a common ethnic or religious culture, there is a 
tendency to attribute wars to ‘primordial’ ethnic passions. However, by labelling 
conflicts as religious or ethnic they become intractable and attention is usually 
diverted from important underlying political, social and economic factors (Stewart, 
2002: 342).  
It is more than clear now that conflicts are extremely complex and do not simply 
occur because there are ethno-religious differences among the population or because 
people are unhappy or greedy. Conflicts occur mainly when a varied range of causes 
found at multiple levels come together and reinforce each other (USAID, 2005: 37). 
In his analysis of ethnicity and its management in Africa, Osaghae argues that “wars 
do not break out merely because there are different ethnic groups” (Osaghae, 1994:7-
8).  
Sharing this view – and although aware of the importance of existing ethnic or 
religious cleavages within a given society- the cross-cutting hypothesis put forward 
here is that accurate and rigorous analysis and understandings of violent conflicts in 
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societies with marked ethno-religious cleavages must make visible and take into due 
account the role and influence of socio-economic inequalities and the degree of 
denial of economic, social and cultural rights of specific groups. As mentioned by 
Klaus Schlichte, the deeper causes of contemporary wars may be existing socio-
economic disparities which are associated with discriminatory behaviours: “so-called 
ethnic conflicts sometimes result from the marginalisation of one group by another, 
with political and economic, as well as cultural marginalisation taking place” 
(Schlichte  apud Ferreira, 2005b: 69). A deeper understanding of these conflicts, 
considers economic discrimination, income inequality and scarce or unequal access 
to resources factors that ultimately make people more receptive to ethnic and 
nationalistic appeals (Ellingsen, 2000: 245) that may result in violent behaviour 
against the government or the ruling elites. 
In the past few decades, there has been an increased interest in understanding these 
so-called root causes in order to better tackle them. But this has been a particularly 
difficult and complex task since major root causes include political, economic and 
social inequalities, extreme poverty, economic stagnation, poor governance, high 
unemployment, and economic incentives to fight (Stewart, 2002: 342). Moreover, 
income inequalities not only jeopardize peace but also undermine any potential for 
long-term growth (Jeong, 2005: 131).  
Furthermore, violent conflicts, especially internal ones, have always been an 
important source of poverty and underdevelopment in the so-called low-income 
countries under stress. In 2002, eight of ten of the world’s poorest countries were 
suffering or had suffered from large-scale violent conflict. In these cases, violent 
conflicts have heavy human, economic and social costs and tend to be a major cause 
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of underdevelopment and poverty (Stewart, 2002: 342). It is easy to understand and 
perceive that, in such contexts, without economic hope and equity peace can hardly 
hold. Although poverty is not considered to be a direct cause of conflict, it is a 
symptom of the decline of the state’s capacity to protect and provide for its citizens, 
and it also becomes an important aggravating factor. 
Although reconstruction in war-prone societies needs to be aimed at the alleviation 
of absolute poverty and economic diversification [between and among groups], 
evidence suggests that these objectives are not usually easily achieved or even 
acknowledged. This can be explained by the lack of civil sector investment in 
agriculture, transport, water, sanitation, education and health in most post-war 
strategies (Jeong, 2005: 132).  Furthermore, in most peacebuilding [and conflict 
prevention] packages, attention is focused on reforms oriented toward a market 
economy where the establishment of liberal economic policies is frequently a 
condition attached to international forms of assistance (Moore apud Jeong, 2005: 
124), but usually not the most effective or necessary ones. 
Alternative interpretations to internal conflict must, therefore, include specific and 
more structural economic factors that predispose to conflict. In this sense, to reduce 
the likelihood of conflict, it is essential to promote inclusive development, reduce 
inequalities between groups and tackle unemployment (Stewart, 2002: 342). This 
means that essential measures should include a more clear conception of economic 
and social rights in post-conflict policy settings, namely within peace agreements. In 
order to meet the most pressing and urgent socio-economic needs of the population, 
priority must be given to providing basic social services and economic opportunities. 
In this sense, peace strategies would be most successful if they organize the priorities 
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of reconstruction in a sustainable way. Development [and socio-economic 
sustainable incentives] must thus aim at improving the conditions for peace by 
rendering inequalities visible and consequently meeting the needs of economically 
and socially marginalized groups. This will ultimately benefit the whole community 
(Jeong, 2005: 124). Group-specific measures of inequality, political participation and 
wealth distribution as well as territorial concentration of groups are all variables that 
must be considered and analysed (Sambanis, 2001: 281) in order to obtain more 
accurate explanations for violent conflict. [Sustainable] economic growth and 
patterns of equal income distribution have also to be considered in an integrated 
framework of building harmonious relations among different groups (Jeong, 2005: 
153). Investment in human resources, providing socio-economic services and 
economically integrating groups and communities also definitely contribute to 
addressing and removing the social and economic causes of violent conflict (Jeong, 
2000: 125) and must therefore be integral part of conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding efforts. 
These are all fundamental priorities to render visible all those structural inequalities 
that may compromise peace efforts, especially those that are, at their basis and in 
principle, highly incomplete and fragile. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 104
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The cycle of violence can only be broken when peace is no longer a 
prisoner of past paradigms” 
(Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006) 
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4. HISTORICAL TRAJECTORIES OF THE NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT IN SUDAN 
 
4.1. Introduction 
More than a history of violent internal conflict, Sudan is marked by a history of 
profound exclusion, of which violent conflict has become one tragic illustration. In 
fact, throughout Sudanese history, several groups have been repeatedly and 
systematically excluded from the social, economic, cultural and political life of the 
country, a trend that has was perpetuated, reshaped and accentuated since the 
colonial periods in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and continued after 
independence in 1956. In fact, and as we shall analyse further on, throughout the 
several stages of Sudan’s colonization and independence, various forms and levels of 
exclusion and marginalisation of certain groups have been put in place, aiming at 
establishing a different pattern of development and growth between the North and 
the South of the country. 
This shows, therefore, that there are important economic and political patterns of 
inequality which have historically affected the development and exercise of state 
power in Sudan since at least the nineteenth century. That helps understand the 
process and consequences of regional underdevelopment, and the conjunction 
between perceptions of religion and ethnicity specific to this part of Africa, as well as 
its real conflict potential. Sudan is a clearly heterogeneous territory, both ethnically – 
52 percent Blacks, 39 percent Arabs, 6 percent Beja, foreigners 2 percent, others 1 
percent- and religiously- 70 percent Sunit Muslims, 25 percent Animist, 5 percent 
Christians (Sosa, 2004: 125). These ethnic and religious divisions are well reflected 
geographically: Muslim Arabs predominantly in the North, and African Christians 
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and other traditional religious in the South. Given this diversity, the conflict between 
the Northern and Southern Sudan has usually been misunderstood, because the 
historical roots of the conflict have been misrepresented (Johnson, 2003: 1) due to 
superficial and primordial interpretations and explanations based on the primary role 
of ethnicity and religion. As a consequence, academic studies of Sudan have been 
nearly as deeply affected by the divisions of the country as are Sudanese themselves. 
‘Ethnicity’ is taken for granted in history as in political science, often drawing from a 
simplified understanding of ethnography (Johnson, 2003: xii). However, Sudan’s 
history and conflict are far more complex and diverse than it seems. This diversity 
makes it difficult to explain the current North-South conflict in simple cultural, 
ethnic or racial terms. What had been seen in the 1980s as a war between the North 
and the South, Muslims against Christians, ‘Arabs’ against ‘Africans’, has, after 
nearly two decades of hostilities, broken the bounds of any North-South conflict. 
Fighting has spread into theatres outside Southern Sudan and beyond the Sudan’s 
borders. Not only are Muslims fighting Muslims, but Africans are fighting Africans. 
A war once described as being fought over scarce resources is now being waged for 
the total control of abundant oil reserves. In fact, the war has widened fractures 
throughout Sudanese society, way beyond the old divisions between North and 
South, Arab and African, Muslim and Christian or non-Muslim (Johnson, 2003), 
accentuating and deepening socio-economic inequalities. 
In this sense, in order to understand peace and conflict in Sudan, one must first 
understand Sudan’s history and the role of successive governements in producing 
regional underdevelopment and racial and cultural antagonism. In fact, the 
development and evolution of governments is considered to have been one of the 
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most consistent influences on the definition of economic, political and ultimately 
social relations within the Sudan (Johnson, 2003: 2).  
The so-called ‘scramble for Africa’, of which the earliest materializations were 
Egypt’s Southern expeditions to control the resources of the Nile and its hinterlands, 
further aggravated the geography of conflict in which Sudan merged into shortly 
after independence (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 58-59). Furthermore, the internal 
boundaries of Sudan have been frequently changed, but with little or no consensus 
from the country’s inhabitants, who have been plagued by famine, drought and death 
as they sought the right to live with dignity and with equal access to resources and 
wealth. This is particularly true for the South where the struggle for self-
determination has taken place for all those who had been forced by Arabization and 
Islamization (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 61). 
 
4.2. The complex roots of Sudan’s civil conflict 
Although it was only in the nineteenth century that the territory of Southern Sudan 
was opened up to the exploitation of a government centred in Khartoum (Johnson: 
2003: 2), the history of the complex and existing antagonisms between Black African 
and Arab communities in the territory of today’s Sudan goes back to slavery times.  
In fact, in Sudan, the legacies of slavery, slave trade and colonialism are particularly 
important to understand both internal violent conflict and the interplay between the 
processes of state formation and nation-building characterized by a crisis of 
democratic citizenship (Idris, 2005: 4) that are particularly characteristic of Sudan. 
The South was historically used by Arab slave owners as a source of cheap labour for 
international trade for centuries until the English and Egyptian powers decided to end 
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slavery in the nineteenth century. In a sense, the South has been marginalized for 
several decades, if not centuries. Earlier states in the territory, such as the Sennar, 
established along the Blue Nile in the sixteenth century, or the Darfur sultanate 
created in Western Sudan in the seventeenth century, have all defined the type of 
power relations established throughout the territory based on manpower, slaves, 
wealth and food coming from each state’s hinterlands and controlled regions 
(Johnson, 2003:2).  
The increasing commercial and political contacts and relations between the Sennar 
and Darfur states and external Muslim states clearly contributed to a progressive 
introduction and entrenchment of Islam in Sudan, which culminated in the adoption 
of Arabic legal texts and principles, as well as literacy in Arabic. The acceptance of 
Islam by the Sudanic kingdoms helped to sharpen the divide between the states and 
their hinterlands; between those who could claim the protection in law, and those 
who had no recognised legal rights. Despite that, many Muslims in Sudan continued 
to follow forms of customary law at variance with the shari’a, and relations between 
Muslims and non-Muslims were not characterised by a ‘jihadic’ fervour (Johnson, 
2003: 3) But even if Islam became the religion of these states, none developed their 
own body of experts (or ulama) thus making it a very specific and particular 
interpretation of Islam.  
In terms of benefits and social status, this period was characterised by a social 
stratification that was based mainly on people’s territorial origins, meaning that those 
being born and living closest to the Muslim centres tended to have more benefits 
while those living or coming from the ‘pagan’ peripheries, from which most soldiers 
were also drawn, were usually excluded or disregarded. However, being Muslim was 
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not a necessary guarantee of rights, freedoms or benefits neither was soldier’s 
frequent conversion to Islam. The same applied when it came to slavery. Although 
the groups mostly targeted for slavery were non-Arab and non-Muslims, being a 
Muslim in these societies was no guarantee for not being enslaved. In Sudan, 
although slaves were usually obtained through raid on the non-Muslim and non-Arab 
populations in Southern Sudan and Nuba Mountains, captives often included many 
Muslims from Western Africa and the Western Sudan (Idris, 2005: 28). 
In 1821, Mohammed Ali Pasha invaded Sudan in 1821 in search of slaves, ivory and 
gold to finance Egypt’s modernization project and establishing the beginning of the 
Turko-Egyptian conquest, which laid the foundations of a centralized state in 
Northern Sudan while embarking on a strategy of enslavement of Southern people 
(Idris, 2005: 27-28). In fact, brutal forms of slave raiding, corruption and economic 
exploitation characterized the Turko-Egyptian ruling period in Sudan35. Although the 
invasion did not fulfil all the needs, the Turkiyya- the Turco-Egyptian regime in 
Sudan- did alter significantly the political and economic balance in the country 
(Johnson, 2003: 4), by establishing a pattern of economic exploitation of the 
Southern regions – not only through slave-raiding but also exploitation and use of the 
region’s resources, which became formally and officially excluded from the 
developed communities and political power (El- Battahani, 2006: 10-11). The 
Southern Sudan had thus been largely excluded or unaffected by the succession of 
                                                 
35 During the Turko-Egyptian rule, not only did the number of slaves increase but domestic slavery 
too became more common in the North. From 1821 to 1831, the Turko-Egyptian government began a 
new stage of state-organized slave raids, which first targeted people in Ethiopia and the Nuba 
Mountains. The collapse of the ivory market and the difficulties in establishing a stable trading system 
encouraged many merchants from the north to turn to slave trade as the only viable economic activity 
(Idris, 2005: 29). 
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Sudanic states in the North until the Turko-Egyptian regime’s conquest of the Sudan 
managed to break this trend and upset the existing territorial balance. 
The strategy adopted by this regime was clearly one of territorial conquest and slave 
raiding which successfully started in the Northern regions of Nubia, Sennar, 
Kordofan and the Red Sea and continued, for the first time in Sudan’s history, into 
the Upper Nile basin. Along with this expansion to the South came an increasing 
impoverishment of some Northern regions as well as the beginning of a North-South 
divide in Sudan.36 As Douglas Johnson puts it, the increasing exploitation of new 
lands in the South progressively gave certain sections of the Muslim and Arabic-
speaking population of the North a personal stake in its subjugation.  A religious 
divide was then imposed on the country (Johnson, 2003: 5). The Turkyya was later 
replaced by a new pro-slavery and pro-slave trade state in 1885 until 1898, led by 
military and religious leader ‘Madhi’ (or ‘the expected saviour’) Muhammad Ahmad, 
establishing the Mahdiyya37 state. In 1885, Sudan was proclaimed an Islamic 
independent state, by Mahdi’s successor Khalifa Abdallahi, who was ultimately 
defeated by British forces in 1898. The Mahdist movement had important popular 
support and defeated the Turko-Egyptian rule forcing the majority of Turkish, 
European and other foreign merchants and slave traders to leave the country, who 
were replaced by the Northern merchants – the jallaba (Idris, 2005: 31). The Mahdist 
state, unlike its predecessors, who had ruled mainly trough feudal relations and the 
recognition of the rights of hereditary rulers, established allegiance through religion 
                                                 
36 Due to the idea of having the South as the state’s main exploitable region, the political and 
economic system during the Turkiyya was characterised by deep racial stratification and widespread 
identification of Southerners with low status (Johnson, 2003: 6). 
37 The Mahdiyya rule constituted a syncretic, millenarian movement that fuse proto-nationalist 
aspirations with the resentments of the northern merchant classes (jellaba) against the Turkiya and the 
equally strong resentment of the Southern peoples against those same jellaba and the Egyptian rule 
(Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 28). 
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and the personal oath of loyalty to the religious leader of the state as Imam, the 
Mahdi and later the Khalifa, and clearly divided the whole territory between the 
followers of the Mahdi and the ‘unbelievers’ (whether Muslims or non-Muslims) 
(Johnson, 2003: 7). However, even if the Mahdiyya aimed at keeping the South 
under control and ultimately convert it to Islam and by the development of a kind of 
internal colonialism, the truth is that the South soon came out of the state’s control, 
including for slave-raiding purposes.38 The slave trade during the Mahdist state led 
to a clash of racialized identities out of which came a violent political regime in 
which the Southerners were subjected to discrimination and exploitation (Idris, 2005: 
32). Those who did not belong to an imagined community of Arab-Islamic were not 
dignified and considered enslaveable (Idris, 2005: 32). 
From this perspective and through such strategy, identities such as race and ethnicity 
were made no longer culturally flexible, but rather political and rigid (Idris, 2005: 
21). Such change was- and has been - the expression of a system of socio-economic 
relations that favoured, and still does, specific interests of particular local governing 
elites in Northern Sudan, as well as other regional and colonial powers with a 
particular interest in stimulating slavery and maintaining a certain degree of 
inequality between Northern and Southern populations. 
In relation to this, Douglas Johnson argues that 
 
The origins of Sudan’s current problem predate the unequal legacy of 
the colonial state system in the twentieth century. They can be found 
in the ideas of legitimate power and governance developed in the 
Sudanic states of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which were 
incorporated into the structures of the Turco-Egyptian empire, 
achieved new force in the Jihad state of the Mahdyya and were never 
                                                 
38 The incursions into the South tended to be mainly for food during the great famine of 1888-92) 
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fully replaced but rather occasionally adapted by the … colonial state. 
(Johnson, 2003 apud Idris, 2005: 21) 
 
As a consequence, the Arab and African identities resulting from enslavement during 
the pre-colonial period were thus highly radicalised and given a new legal dimension 
by the colonial powers, with their institutionalisation through practices such as 
indirect rule (Idris, 2005: 20). In 1898, Britain and Egypt regained control of Sudan, 
following the Mahdist revolution of the early 1880s, and struggled hard to establish 
centralized authority in the country.  
The replacement of the Mahdist rule by the Anglo-Egyptian forces in 1898 did not 
change the social and economic reality significantly. In fact, rather than abolishing 
and/or replacing the slavery system in Sudan, the strategy was one of aiming at 
ending slavery without significantly challenging the power of the Northern elites and 
merchants (Idris, 2005: 33) and often tolerating it through practices and policies that 
ultimately reinforced forms of slavery (despite the British moral condemnation 
discourse). In political and administrative terms, the Anglo-Egyptian Reconquest of 
Sudan- or Condominium, as it is also known- assumed different patterns in the North 
and in the South of the country39. In the North, the transition took the form of civil 
administration through the replacement of military governors by British civilian 
elements, in order to get rid of the successors of the Mahdiyya. But the control over 
the Southern Sudan was a more complicated matter. The process of transition in the 
South was different since the Mahdist state had had virtually no control over the 
whole of the region and there was no need to convince people to renew their loyalty 
                                                 
39 Darfur was put under Anglo-Egyptian power in 1916 and Southern Sudan pacified only in 192039, 
later establishing a form of indirect rule known as Native Administration (El- Battahani, 2006: 11). 
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40to the government.  The problems and difficulties faced by Anglo-Egyptian 
administration in the South made it significantly more difficult to develop and 
consolidate a more coherent and effective government in the region, namely until the 
1920s.  
 In order to face the ruling problems in the South, the colonial administration 
implemented a system of native administration in Sudan, meaning the separation of 
one ethnic group from another in order to avoid conflict. However, the strong 
resistance of the Southern Sudanese forced the British to change the policy of 
centralized administration in the country. Indirect rule was thus introduced in Sudan 
in 1921 and later reinforced through the declaration of Close Districts in order to 
preserve the African identity in the South through letting out all Arabic and Muslim 
influences. The ‘Southern Policy’ statement in 1930 declared that the administration 
of the South would be developed along ‘African’, rather than ‘Arab’ lines, and that 
the future of the Southern Sudan might ultimately lie with the countries of British 
East Africa, rather than with the Middle East (Johnson, 2003:12), which was already 
administrative practice, by emphasising local administration conducted through 
indigenous authorities, law and customs, consistent with British conceptions of good 
government.41 There were, therefore, clearly divergent political and economic 
administration practices in the North and in the South, which gave the basis to a 
certain idea of self-government in the South. Besides attempting to tackle and 
minimize the ruling problems, this type of strategy chosen by the British towards the 
South was also an excuse for not adopting a more involved and development-centred 
                                                 
40 The British officers commanding patrols of Sudanese soldiers in the South frequently declared that 
the ‘new’ government was not the same as the ‘old’ government which had burned Southern villages, 
stolen Southern cattle and enslaved Southern people (Johnson, 2003:10). 
41 A practice which was similar to what was then Indirect Rule in other African British territories, but 
was called ‘Devolution’ or ‘Native Administration’ in Sudan. 
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administration, somehow fomenting a sense of neglect among the Southern 
populations. For example, educational needs in the South were systematically 
neglected and, before World War I, the general policy of the native administration 
tended to discourage, rather than encourage, education in some areas of the Southern 
Sudan (Johnson, 2003: 15). Furthermore, at the time of Anglo-Egyptian colonization 
Southern Sudan was not yet considered a strategic area, since it had no significant 
resources available for exploitation and Egypt was particularly interested in 
developing and controlling the Northern areas as a way to achieve and guarantee 
territorial expansion. 
In sum, the policy of indirect rule contributed highly to the fragmentation of the 
Sudanese society along ethnic, regional and tribal lines, preventing the possibility of 
forging a sense of national identity in the post-colonial period (Idris, 2005:39;41). 
As to what concerns religious patterns and relations, Northern Sudan’s law and 
religion were separated with the possibility to adopt different forms of customary law 
and the Shari’a adopted mainly to regulate marriages, inheritances and property 
rights within Muslim communities. Nevertheless, the religious policy in the North 
encouraged the tendency towards a greater uniformity of practice among Muslims, 
while in the South the Native Administration encouraged indigenous religious 
diversity, even though not totally suppressing Islam (Johnson, 2003: 13). 
In terms of development, the progressive commercial opening of Southern Sudan 
was very important for Sudan’s revival, but the trend was one in which the central 
government participated in the exploitation of the South. By the time Sudan was set 
on its path to independence, there were far greater development disparities between 
the Northern and Southern parts of the country as a whole than there had been at the 
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end of the Mahdiyya. However, it must be stressed that in many Northern regions, 
both Muslims and non-Muslims were excluded and subject to economic neglect. As 
in the North, there were some places in the South that were more productive and 
prosperous than others, thus establishing different patterns of agricultural investment 
and creating links that decreased the South’s potential and increased its disparities 
and underdevelopment (Johnson, 2003: 19). The tension between Egypt and the UK 
for the control of the country increased significantly after the end of World War II, 
when Sudan joined the independence wave that affected the North of Africa in the 
50’s (Sosa, 2004: 123). The decision in 1947 that the South would remain a part of 
Sudan contradicted the dominant assumption that it would continue to be under 
British protection or possibly separate administration as an East African colony. 
However, education in the South had been neglected, Northerners dominated the 
emerging political class and few Southerners were actually able to fill administrative 
posts under the ‘Sudanization’ strategies of the early 1950s (El- Battahani, 2006: 11). 
Furthermore, civil service and administration were almost exclusively put under 
Northern hands thus largely excluding the Southern population from government. 
In the 1950s, and fearing marginalisation by more populous North and the denial of a 
federal state in the South, a very powerful nationalist movement- named Anyanya - 
starts developing,. In August 18, 1955, the Equatoria Corps, a military unit composed 
of Southerners, mutinied at Torit – Equatoria province- , forming a guerrilla 
movement and progressively demanding independence. The mutinies were 
suppressed although survivors fled the towns and began an uncoordinated insurgency 
in rural areas, seeking support of the rest of the population. These groups were 
poorly armed and ill-organized and, at least at the beginning of their activities, posed 
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little threat to the outgoing colonial powers or the newly formed Sudanese 
government. However, they progressively assumed a more active role in the struggle 
against power, repeatedly accusing Khartoum of focusing solely in the interests of 
the North. Their aim was to fight against the hierarchical forms of administration and 
rule by colonial powers that had been practiced throughout the years and that led to 
significant neglect of the South and to unequal access to, and distribution of, 
resources to the Southern populations. and of marginalizing the rest of the 
population.  In 1956, Britain granted independence to Sudan, handing over political 
power, control of the army and civil service and management of economic resources 
to Khartoum and Nile-based Northern elites (El- Battahani, 2006: 11). In this 
context, the South also claimed independence but it was refused, a situation that was 
at the basis of a rebellion against the government and the beginning of a particularly 
brutal and long war. Given the past of slavery and colonialism, during the transition 
Southern nationalists argued that the unity with the North, if considered, could only 
be accepted under a federal system (Idris, 2005: 50). 
Ever since independence in 1956, granted by Sudan’s colonial powers, Egypt and 
Britain, various elite-based and fundamentalist governments have ruled the country. 
The pressure exerted by these governments in the North over the population of the 
South through the establishment and perpetuation of excluding political, social and 
economic policies and laws has long been considered to be one of the original causes 
of the conflict. The competition for resources was also considered another important 
source of conflict. In fact, the intensive use of Northern lands, with the aim of 
converting Sudan in Africa’s “great breadbasket” has provoked their overuse and the 
quest for new lands in the South (Sosa, 2004: 125). As we shall see at a later stage, 
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such strategy was further aggravated with the discovery of important oil reserves and 
which led to the implementation of exploitation policies that were clearly based on 
an unequal access and distribution of resources and revenues to the Southern 
population, ultimately leading to significantly different patterns of growth and 
development between Northern and Southern groups.  
Following independence, General Ibrahim Abboud seized power in 1958 instituting 
an aggressive policy of Arabization and Islamization of the whole country, including 
the South. Abboud’s military regime perceived political independence as a tool for 
maintaining Sudan’s territorial ‘integrity’ and removing an artificial barrier to the 
march of Islam and Arab civilization in the South (Idris, 2005: 51). Besides the 
question of identity and political inequality, and somehow following the pattern of 
previous colonial administrations, Abboud’s regime was also one of intense and 
continuous socio-economic neglect of the Southern areas of the country. Islam and 
the Arabic culture were imposed to the Southern populations, but what created more 
opposition and discontent was the exclusion from economic and social life of the 
country to which various populations were subjected. The South was not targeted by 
public economic and social policies and the levels of poverty grew significantly in 
the first years of independence. 
In order to show and secure power and control, this military regime marked a new 
era of violence and discrimination directed towards the South, thus galvanizing the 
Southern leadership to act into various military and political movements, at the same 
time fighting against socio-economic exclusion and claiming increased autonomy. In 
1961, William Deng, a Dinka exiled in Congo, founded the Sudan African National 
Union (SANU), a political movement defending self-determination and, at the same 
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42time, an organized guerrilla force named Anyanya II , which launched the rebellion 
against the central government. Between 1960 and 1963, the Anyanya rebels grew 
numerically by recruiting and training new members. They also attacked strategic 
military targets and influenced political activities throughout the country and the 
government responded by increasing its military presence in the South (Iyob and 
Khadiagala, 2006: 81). In the latter half of the 1960s, as governmental instability 
persisted in the capital Khartoum and the South held firm to its demands, the 
Anyanya guerrillas stepped up their attacks to government positions, increasing 
instability as well as the number of refugees into neighbouring countries (Iyob and 
Khadiagala, 2006: 81). 
From the mid-1960s, the Sudanese conflict attracted regional and international actors 
who began to have stakes in its evolution and resolution. The roles of these external 
actors inevitably deepened with the escalation of conflict and the identification of a 
clear leadership in the South helped giving more amplitude and capacity for external 
involvement and influence in the course of the conflict (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 
91).  
In this context, sectarianism and political instability in the North somehow prevented 
the emergence of a consensus about resolving the many identity issues raised by the 
South. Paradoxically, however, Northern disunity also gave the Northern 
establishment (traditional parties and the military elites) reasons to delay on meeting 
the grievances of the Southern population. The key to this paradox was that 
Northerners were fundamentally in agreement about the two core issues in the South: 
Islamisation and unitarism (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 83). In 1964, though, 
                                                 
42 The Anyanya II was the military wing of the Sudan African National Union (SANU), founded in 
1961 by William Deng. 
 119
Abboud was forced out by popular uprising. A number of Arab-dominated 
governments succeeded each other until the coup in 1969 that led Gaafar Nimeiri to 
power and under who’s regime the Native Administration system was abolished and 
by councils dominated by merchant capitalist Northern elites. 
Despite the many factions present, the Nimeiri government’s first approach to the 
Southern problem was a promise of a political solution that would consider Southern 
uniqueness. This approach also entailed outline plans for future regional self-
government and amnesty for the rebels. The opposition and attempted coup led by 
the communist party against Nimeiri’s government, gave him the opportunity to 
purge them from government and seek other allies to maintain power. At the time, 
Nimeiri found Southern partners willing to negotiate, as well as Ethiopia and 
Uganda, in a process that led to the Addis Ababa Agreement in March 1972. The 
Addis Ababa peace agreement was signed with the rebels, allowing for its integration 
into national army and autonomy for the South. The Addis Ababa peace agreement 
guaranteed a significant autonomy to the South43 and an agreement on the draft of a 
Sudanese Constitution in 1973 (Sosa, 2004: 125). 
The conflict experienced a pause from 1972 until 1983 with the Addis Ababa 
agreements, but it soon erupted again since the demands for political participation 
and economic development by the South were continuously ignored by Khartoum’s 
governing elite – since no action was seriously taken in order to implement the 
provisions of the agreement, namely when it comes to an equal distribution of 
resources between North and South- and due to systematic violation of the agreement 
by the government, combined with increasing Islamic shift in late 1970s and 
                                                 
43 Further and more complete analysis of the content and terms of autonomy provisions under the 
Addis Ababa Agreement will be presented in the next chapter. 
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discovery of oil in Southern Sudan eventually led to resumption of war after a period 
of 11 years of a very unstable peace. Furthermore, the internal proximity between 
Nimeiri’s government and the more sectarian parties (Ummah Party and later 
National Islamic Front) – which coincided with Sudan’s deepening links with the 
United States, playing as a counterweight to Soviet’s encroachment in the Horn of 
Africa44(Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 87)- contributed to the emergence of a different 
approach towards the South. In 1993, and following this closed relation with the 
sectarian powers, Nimeiri decreed the creation of three new Southern regions with 
separate governments – Equatoria, Upper Nile and Bahr al-Ghazal - the annulment of 
the autonomous status for the South and the dissolution of Southern constitutional 
guarantees; it also declared Arabic the official language and the Islamic Shari’a law 
as the sole source for Sudanese law in September 1983, thus abrogating the Addis 
Ababa agreement. Southerners considered this move as a draconian measure by the 
central government to reinforce control over a weak autonomous government and 
responded in clear opposition to the decision. The political translation of this 
opposition was clearly the creation of the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A), led by the charismatic leader John Garang (Iyob and 
Khadiagala, 2006: 88). After that, the SPLM/A announced its intention to fight for a 
‘New Sudan’ of social, economic and political equality and where all Sudanese 
would be able to enjoy access to services and freely develop their cultures45 (Iyob 
and Khadiagala, 2006: 89). Southern grievances crystallised around the SPLM/A and 
Nimeiri ended up being overthrown by popular uprising in 1985 opening the way to 
                                                 
44 Washington repaid Khartoum with economic and military support, increasing its confidence 
domestically and internationally 
45 It also denounced the shared common grievances with the West and the East, which had been 
obscured by the various Northern governments through the attempted construction of a false Sudanese 
identity based on an Arabic language and culture and Islam (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 89). 
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the establishment of democratic government, led by Umma Party’s Sadiq al-Madhi 
in 1986. 
Moves towards a peace agreement between the SPLM/A and the newly voted 
government were made impossible when the National Islamic Front (NIF), one day 
before the bill to freeze the Shari’a law was to be passed, led a bloodless coup in 
June 1989 and General Omar Hasán Ahmed al-Beshir, who fought the Southern 
rebels, took power, proclaiming a fundamentalist Islamic regime – the National 
Islamic Force.  
This succession of coups and change in power clearly reveals the lack of solid, 
accountable and sustainable power structures in Sudan, as well as the tendency for 
concentration of political and economic power in specific political and/or military 
elites who, at times, attempted to control the country and use the resources for their 
own profit. To a certain extent, the maintenance of an insecure and unstable Sudan 
benefited these groups while at the same time undermined the development 
capacities of the whole country, due to the socio-economic neglect of the Southern 
population and of all other peoples who were living in areas that were of particular 
strategic interest for the governing elites and could become a threat to their power 
and control. 
 Illustrating and confirming these strong repressive trends, Al-Beshir’s authoritarian 
regime thus unravelled steps towards peace, revoked the constitution, banned 
opposition parties, and moved to islamize the justice system. The NIF simultaneously 
stepped up North-South war, proclaiming a jihad against the non-Muslim South.46 
                                                 
46 Conflict history: 
Sudanhttp://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=conflict_search&1=1=&t=1&c..., last 
visited in 25.02.2006. 
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The imposition of such measure to the whole population, ignoring and suppressing 
their religious beliefs meant the reinforcement of the war led by John Garang’s 
Sudan Popular Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) against the central 
government.  
Al-Beshir’s move to power and maintenance during the 90s has been closely linked 
to the support by the Muslim religious leader Hasán al Turabi, Beshir’s ideological 
and spiritual mentor and member of the Islamic National Front which was converted 
into the most important political force of the country. 
With the re-emergence of the civil war Sudan, the economic situation of the country 
worsened significantly, as the country’s foreign debt to the international institutions 
converted itself in a heavy burden to the country’s fragile economy, affected by long 
periods of droughts, especially in 86 and 88, followed by floods that devastated the 
farming fields and caused serious famines (Sosa, 2004: 126). The war continued 
throughout the 1990s, despite several attempts to negotiate peace with the 
participation of the Organisation for African Union (OUA). The rebel forces of the 
South resisted the army as Sudan’s foreign policy, characterised by religious 
radicalism, provoked an increasing international isolation which favoured the rebels, 
gaining external support of neighbouring countries like Uganda, Ethiopia and even 
Egypt. Completely rearmed, Sudan’s Popular Liberation Army initiated an important 
attack against the government in the mid-90s and, for the first time since the 1980s, 
regained several areas that passed to its military and political control. At the same 
time, in 1991, two Southern opponents of Garang’s SPLM/A – Lam Akol47 and Riek 
Machar- contested the Movement’s lack of democracy and frequent human rights 
                                                 
47 Later nominated minister of Foreign Affairs of the government of national unity, place he occupied 
from September 2005 until October 2007. 
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violations and tried to mobilized disaffected factions to depose Garang from 
leadership.  They created the SPLM/A- Nasir and pledged to fight for Southern 
independence. This resulted into intense and violent armed confrontation between 
both parties between September and October 1991 with the aggravating factor of 
weapons and ammunitions being provided by the Sudanese government to the 
SPLM/A-Nasir. This ultimately strengthened both the internal fissures in the South 
and the government’s military power and control over Southern territory (Iyob and 
Khadiagala, 2006: 94). The factionalism of Southern guerrillas and their engagement 
in committing atrocities against other Southern civilians clearly shows that unity was 
not deep or linear. Nor did slavery or its legacy alone lead to ethnic hatred and 
rivalries. As Iyob and Khadiagala again mention 
 
Distant memories of injustice and disenfranchisement were woven 
into nationalist or protonationalist ideologies and justified the use of 
violence over groups regarded as opponents. Both intra-Southern and 
intra-Northern violence has been fuelled by a political past, 
fragmented along ethnic lines or ideological rifts that have been 
adroitly utilized by the ruling elites of Sudan [at least] since 
independence. (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 65) 
 
In June 1995, the SPLM/A and Northern opposition groups signed the Asmara 
Declaration, which laid the foundations for political and military cooperation 
between the Northern and Southern groups under the National Democratic Alliance 
(NDA) through federal arrangements in Sudan followed by referendums on self-
determination in Southern Sudan, Abyei, Nuba Mountains and the Ingessena Hills 
after a four-year interim period (Idris, 2005: 72). The commitment of Northern 
powers, however, was frequently subject of high suspicion by the Southerners. 
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At the same time, the regime in Khartoum tried to improve its legitimacy by 
celebrating elections for the National Assembly in March 1996, allowing Al-Beshir 
to regain the presidency while Turabi was elected President of the National 
Assembly, even if these elections were subject to intense criticism and accusations of 
manipulation and fraud.  In the foreign scene, Sudan’s isolation was aggravated with 
its inclusion of the country in the list of ‘terrorism-promoting’ countries.48 In 1996, 
UN imposed international sanctions against Sudan, followed by U.S. sanctions in 
1997 and in 1998, the United States, under Clinton, bombed a pharmaceutical plant 
in Khartoum allegedly producing chemical weapons. 
Although the war in Sudan has in its origin a struggle over land and important ethnic 
and religious differences, its intensity increased significantly with the findings of 
important oil reserves and subsequent exploitation through a one thousand five 
hundred-kilometre pipeline and gushed into a super tanker at Sudan’s new Red Sea 
port in August 1999. The civil war had until then made the development of oil-
located beneath war-torn Southern areas impossible, but when the country began to 
export hydro carburets in 1999, the increased profits allowed the government to get 
new armament, thus multiplying trade relations with countries like China and Russia, 
among others. The International Monetary Fund, which suspended Sudan in 1990 for 
failure to pay even interest on its enormous debt, reinstated it just days before (Sosa, 
2004: 127; Rone, 2003).  It then became apparent that oil would have negative 
effects in the conflict. Indeed, in 1999, oil in the ground became the main objective 
of government military actions intended to run Southern herder populations off their 
land but it also became a target of sporadic rebel attacks designed to scare off foreign 
                                                 
48 In the beginning of the 90s, Khartoum had harboured Osama bin Laden who, in return, financed 
important public structures. 
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oil operators (as was done in 1984 with Chevron). Hundreds of thousands of 
Southern Sudanese whose families had unsuspectingly lived with their cattle on the 
oilfields for centuries have been brutally displaced without any compensation. But 
this developments on the fledging oil industry also coincided with serious peace 
talks. 
In the beginning of 2001, the multiple pressures on Khartoum provoked a rupture in 
Beshir’s alliance with Turabi, who was accused of conspiring against the government 
and arrested. Several supporters of Turabi’s new political party, the National Popular 
Congress and that had signed an agreement of understanding with Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) were also arrested. 
The arrival of George W. Bush to power in the US, in 2000, provoked a significant 
change in the situation and international attention given to Sudan. Washington 
became very much involved in the conflict until Sudan was converted in a central 
piece of American involvement in Africa. Sudan ultimately became a way to 
improve America’s international image and show its role in the fight for human 
rights. The Sudanese government, under stringent unilateral sanctions imposed by 
US presidential executive order in 1997, badly wanted to improve its relationship 
with Washington and that opportunity came with the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001. Khartoum promptly offered counter-terrorism cooperation with 
Washington, including over-flight permission, something not immediately provided 
by many European allies. US State Department personnel had already been allowed 
in to investigate whether the terrorist training camps it harboured when Osama bin 
Laden was living in Sudan from 1990 to 1996 were still in place. In 2001, Bush 
designated John Danforth his Special Representative, responsible for bringing all 
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parties to the negotiation table. Ever since then, diplomatic activity has been quite 
considerable and the USA has played a very important role in the quest for peace in 
the country. While the UN lifted sanctions to Sudan’s government in 2001, 
Washington maintained theirs unilaterally, alleging that the government did not make 
enough to prevent terrorism and human rights violations. Khartoum then announced 
the liberation of around 15000 slaves, mainly Southern Africans. The American 
Administration then agreed on lifting the sanctions if a peace agreement was 
achieved. 
On and off negotiations between the government and the SPLM/A under the auspices 
of neighbouring Kenya and Intergovernmental Authority on Development49 (IGAD- 
an organism composed by some African countries50) derived little progress from 
1994-2001. As mentioned before, upon coming to office in 2001, one of the Bush 
administration’s earliest foreign policy objectives was to secure a peace agreement 
between the Southern-based SPLM/A and Khartoum, allowing Washington to lift 
sanctions. In July 2002, Danforth led an international “Troika” made up of US, 
British and Norwegian officials, reopening peace talks between the Khartoum regime 
and guerrillas of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in 
                                                 
49The origin, development and progressive expansion of IGAD have all been linked to the need for a 
concerted regional response to the environmental, political and development challenges of member 
states within a regional framework. The protracted social conflicts in Sudan, Somalia or Uganda have 
increasingly forced IGAD to develop and implement regional peace and security programmes and 
mechanisms (Omeje, 2008: 83). The organization has been actively involved in attempts to resolve 
various conflicts in Sudan, through the organization of several mediative meetings, which resulted, for 
example, in the adoption of the Declaration of Principles of 1994 (Omeje, 2008: 83). Although IGAD 
was a regional body not normally mandated or equipped to run a mediation process, the two parties 
were persuaded to accept its mediation because it had a clear incentive to see a peaceful solution in 
Sudan, as well as enjoying the full support of the international community. Also, IGAD recognized 
the limitations of its size and experience and welcomed international support in the form of the IGAD 
Partners' Forum (Italy, Norway, the UK and the USA). This reassured both sides that the process 
would be taken seriously and properly funded, unlike the recent Abuja process for Darfur (Ofuho, 
2006). 
50 The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is comprised by Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and was created in 1996 to follow and reinforce the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which was founded in 1986.  
 127
Machakos, Kenya (Dixon, 2004). The involvement and interest of these particular 
countries can be explained by various reasons. The United States have been 
historically involved in Sudan due to intense pressure by American Christian civil 
society organizations who had long considered the war between North and South 
Sudan as a religious war aiming at eliminating Christian and Animists in the country. 
Decades of sanctions against Sudan have progressively been replaced by a more 
intense involvement in the peace process. As for the United Kingdom, the historical 
past of colonial rule somehow explains the direct involvement in the Sudanese peace 
process, which is seen as a sort of catharsis as to what was British contribution to the 
turbulent post-independence history. Finally, Norway basically played an already 
usual role the neutral actor in peace processes and negotiations to solve conflict, 
providing mediation skills and facilitating negotiations among the parties. These 
various involvements, although somehow responding to different interests and 
objectives helped, trough well-succeeded bribes and threats, achieve a declaration of 
a cease-fire between the parties, which constituted a first important step for the peace 
process to endure.  . The subsequent Machakos Protocol, which granted a self-
determination referendum for the South after a six-year interim period, while Islamic 
Shar’ia law was to remain in the North, provided a framework for future 
negotiations. In May 2004, Khartoum and the SPLM/A agreed that government 
revenue from the oil exports from the Southern oil fields would be split between the 
SPLM/A-dominated Southern regional government and the central government in 
Khartoum. Further talks were scheduled to begin on June 22 in order to finalise 
procedures for an internationally monitored cease-fire agreement and a timeline for 
implementing the peace deal. 
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Important accords have then been signed in Kenya by Sudan’s government and the 
rebel Sudan’s People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), clearing the way to a 
comprehensive agreement for ending one of Africa’s longest war, beginning shortly 
after independence in 1956. Under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD), the Sudanese government and the SPLM have reached a 
complex, detailed agreement with real security guarantees which was officially 
signed on January 9, 200551, bringing at least formal peace between the North and 
the South of Sudan for the first time in several decades. 
4.3. Darfur: a spoiler or a promise for peace in Sudan? 
Although the conflict in Darfur is not the primary focus of our analysis, there are 
specific characteristics and trends that deserve being analysed from a more general 
perspective, trying to find common elements between both conflicts. In fact, 
prospects for a peace dividend and the unblocking of aid in the whole country have 
been largely endangered by developments in Darfur. The situation there is not just 
unresolved but getting worse and from a strategic point of view, many assume that 
the regime in Khartoum signed the CPA partly to deflect further international 
pressure over its ongoing military activities and systematic atrocities in the western 
region of Sudan (Prendergast, 2005: 1). In fact, the Darfur province became the latest 
chapter in Sudan’s civil wars when the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice 
and Equality Movement (JEM) rebelled against the government in February 2003. 
These rebel groups claimed years of political, economic and social marginalization 
of the region, and are composed of predominantly African sedentary tribes, such as 
                                                 
51 Further and more complete analysis of the content and terms of autonomy provisions under the  
2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement will be presented in the next chapter. 
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Fur, Zaghawa and Massaleit. The conflict in Darfur is not religious since all parties 
are Muslim but is being called genocide by some parties since the fighting is 
occurring on the basis of tribal affiliation. Once one of the most prosperous Sudanic 
states, Darfur has been progressively subject to historical, economic and political 
neglect, ever since colonial times and by the successive Sudanese governments, in 
particular after the devastating drought in 1984/85, which destroyed a great part of 
the agricultural and pastoral tissue of the region. The social and economic neglect of 
the Darfur occurred mainly through the predictable failure of crops, lack of markets, 
failure to guarantee the populations’ access to natural resources. The political neglect 
of Darfur came with a progressive disinvestments in political negotiations between 
the various factions permanently struggling for scarce resources throughout the 
1990s and not responding to the dialogue attempts called by those who would later 
become the leaders of all rebel movements, the Sudan Liberation Army and the 
Justice and Equality Movement (Ribeiro, 2006: 4). 
In the past three years, attacks by an armed militia called the ‘janjaweed’, reportedly 
supported by the Sudanese government, have driven thousands/millions of people 
from their homes and already killed many, through direct violence or through the 
results of displacement.52 The numbers and widespread locations of the victims 
involved, the poor economic circumstances of the region, and its isolation make the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance extremely difficult. The Sudanese government is 
not making it easy either, continuously attempting to limit international involvement 
in the region and violating ceasefires throughout 2004, 2005 and 2006 despite 
                                                 
52 Throughout months Human Rights groups and humanitarian organisations have documented the 
campaign and the systematic human rights abuses involved in driving more than 2.1 million people 
from their homes and killing about 50 000 others. 
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intermittent peace talks and the presence of an African Union protection force since 
2004. The April 8, 2005 ceasefire signed in N’djamena, for example, turned out to be 
a failure, since shortly after the signature government forces and their proxy 
‘janjaweed’ militia resumed their attacks against rebel and civilian targets in all three 
states of Darfur (Prendergast, 2005: 5). Because the Darfur war has been between 
Muslims, most international observers have seen it as separate from the war in the 
South. But the crisis in Darfur is not unrelated to the war in the South, or to the wars 
in the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile or Eastern Sudan (see map bellow). 
 
 
Source: http://www.sudan.net/government/admnmap.html
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 In fact, there has been a steady escalation of fighting since 1998, and an increased 
polarisation of the conflict around the ideas of race. The decision of the Darfur 
Liberation Front in March 2003 to rename itself the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) in 
order to gain a higher national and international profile was probably influenced by 
the acceleration of the Southern peace talks. The government’s reaction was a 
repetition of its behaviour in the South and the Nuba Mountains: it declared the 
problem to be a ‘tribal’ conflict, mobilised ‘tribal’ militias, denied the evidence of 
the involvement of its air force and regular army units (freed from the Southern 
fronts by the cessation of hostilities agreements), obstructed international relief 
agencies, and tried to confine relief to designated ‘corridors’ of its own choosing 
(Johnson, 2003: xix). To some extent, the violence in Darfur began in 2003 when 
Darfurian rebel groups tried to get it on the carve-up of power and wealth being 
negotiated between the north and the South (Leader, 2005). The rapidity with which 
the Darfur crisis expanded, and the internationalisation of the crisis through its 
impact on Chad, forced much of the world to realise that the twin issues of war and 
peace in Sudan were far more complex than they had assumed (Johnson, 2003:xix).  
Initially, the main international actors involved in the Southern peace process, 
namely the USA and some European countries such Norway and the United 
Kingdom, chose to ignore what was going on in Darfur, Only when violence became 
visible and uncontrolled and the humanitarian crisis was clear did the international 
community threaten to intervene to solve the conflict through political and economic 
sanctions by the United Nations. This international interest in putting an end to the 
conflict – namely by the “Troika”- was clearly related to the fear that the escalation 
of conflict in Darfur could compromise the achievement of a peace agreement in the 
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South. In fact, in 2003 the prospects of peace through a formal agreement between 
North and South were almost guaranteed and some of the external actors involved – 
namely the USA and Norway, were not willing to put it at risk, thus assuming a more 
cooperative and stance also in the case of Darfur (Dixon, 2004). 
Beginning in earnest in July 2004, Washington, backed by the European Union, 
began to ratchet up the pressure on Khartoum to rein in the janjaweed. On July 1, the 
United States Secretary of State Colin Power visited Khartoum warning Sudan’s 
government that “Unless we see more moves soon… it may be necessary for the 
international community to begin considering other actions, to include Security 
Council action.” Three days later, Sudan’s rulers issued a joint communiqué with UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan in which they promised to immediately start 
disarming the janjaweed and other armed outlaw groups, allow the deployment of 
human rights monitors and ensure that all individual and groups accused of human 
rights violations are brought to justice without delay (Plan of Action for Darfur, 
2004) 
The Sudanese government committed itself to ensure that no militia is present in 
areas surrounding internally displaced persons camps and pledged to deploy a strong, 
credible and respected police force in all areas where there are displaced persons as 
well as in areas susceptible to attacks. It was also agreed that an African Union 
military force of 300 troops would be allowed into Darfur to protect AU officials 
there to monitor a cease-fire negotiated in April 2004 between Khartoum and the 
main rebel groups, the SPLM/A and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). In 
mid-July, Powell circulated a draft UN Security Council resolution that threatened 
Khartoum with unspecified sanctions unless it implemented the July 3 UN-Sudan 
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communiqué. Despite the fact that the draft UN resolution did not authorise the use 
of military force and there were no public plans for a UN intervention force in 
Darfur, the British and Australian governments added to Washington’s pressure on 
Khartoum by letting it be known that they were prepared to send troops to the region 
if called upon. Agreement on a Security Council resolution remained stalled until late 
on July 29 when Washington finally dropped specific mention of the imposition of 
“sanctions” from the fourth draft. Eight of the UN Security Council’s 15 members- 
including China and Russia- had opposed the specific threat of sanctions. In its final 
form, the resolution warned that unless Khartoum made progress in implementing 
the July 3 communiqué within 30 days of the resolution’s adoption, the Security 
Council would “consider further actions, including measures as provided for in 
Article 41 of the UN Charter” (which excludes military action but allows economic 
and diplomatic sanctions). The resolution was passed on July 31, by a margin of 13-
0, with China and Pakistan abstaining. At the same time, and through the various 
years ever since the conflict in Darfur was made visible, the role of international and 
local humanitarian organizations and human rights activists became crucial in 
alerting the international community to what these organizations considered to be the 
world’s worst humanitarian crisis. The scale of human tragedy was also reflected in 
these organizations’ capacity to intervene and act in the territory, since important 
limitations of access were put in place. For these organizations, namely the human 
rights activists, this was a conflict that could not simply be considered an extension 
of Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ or a merely ‘ethnic’ war, as many analysts 
claimed. It was rather a conflict that undermined the essence of humanity of the 
various populations in Darfur and that illustrated the repressive policies of 
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Khartoum’s government when it came to allowing for equal access to rights, 
resources and socio-economic security53.  
After four years of significant deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Darfur 
and numerous stalemates in a peace process involving the highest representatives of 
the international community and some of the belligerent parties, the Darfur Peace 
Agreement54 was finally signed on 5 May 2006 in Abuja. Although indisputably 
important in the attempt to put a formal end to the violence in Darfur and promote 
the improvement of bilateral relations with Chad (which had been deteriorating ever 
since instability in the region started due to massive waves of refugees who crossed 
the border), this agreement was implemented with a prudent optimism. First of all, 
because it was signed only by the Sudanese government and one of the rebel groups 
in the region (the majority faction of SLA/M), undermining its implementation and 
risking a very limited impact in the field.55 Secondly, because, like in the CPA with 
the South, both parties ended up giving in significantly to the external pressure, 
making the success of the agreement dependent also on the real and active 
commitment of the international community in making parties comply with the 
                                                 
53 At the time there were several reports mainly from Human Rights organizations alerting for the 
dramatic situation in Darfur. See for example: International Crisis Group 2204, ‘Sudan: Now or Never 
in Darfur’ (Africa Report 80, 23 May 2004, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2765&l=1); Amnesty International, ‘Sudan: Alarming 
increase in executions in Darfur Region’ 
(http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR54/011/2002/en); Amnesty International, ‘Sudan: 
Looming crisis in Darfur’ (Amnesty International, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR54/041/2003/en). 
 
54 Led by the African Union representatives and by the then U.S. Under-Secretary of State, Robert 
Zoellick, and representing a relative success of American voluntarism for Darfur, this agreement 
established, for the first time, the acceptance of a UN force to support the insufficient African Union 
force in the territory. The most important points in the agreement included also restrictions on the 
movements of the Popular Defence Forces, as well as a decrease in their contingents, the integration 
of the leader of the major rebel force (SLA) in the government of National Unity, the establishment of 
buffer zones around the refugee camps and humanitarian corridors.  
55 For example, the Janjaweed militia were not even represented in the negotiation, reinforcing the 
idea that they did not feel compelled or constrained to respect the agreement at all, seriously 
undermining its viability.  
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agreement. However, the continued denial of humanitarian access to the population 
in Darfur by the parties, combined with the collapse of local economies and coping 
mechanisms, but also, and above all, with a complete lack of commitment by the 
parties to seriously engage in peace and ceasefire negotiations are clearly disturbing 
signs that things are getting much worse in Darfur threatening peace in the whole 
country. The North-South agreement can serve as a precedent and a model for a 
political settlement in Darfur based on regional autonomy and participation at 
national level, but the question now, vital for Sudan’s future stability, is to know how 
much room a new power-sharing government will give other political forces from the 
country’s periphery.  
Sudan is now at a stage of increased instability and undefined political situation. 
Rebel groups in Darfur are expanding their guerrilla activities to neighbouring 
countries (like Chad or Central African Republic), at the same time the country is 
preparing for elections next year and important decisions are being played 
concerning the future integrity of the country. Besides that, in the South, relations 
between the central government and the government of Southern Sudan have been 
under enormous tension due to the many divergences related to the administrative 
status of the oil-rich border areas of Abyei, Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile and the 
many unsolved issues such as the creation of institutions in the South, return and 
resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons, among others. Again, the 
perspectives of peace in Sudan become dependent of internal and external factors 
and developments that clearly show the complexities of the country and the many 
conflicts in it. 
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In sum, it seems clear that the recent history of African’s biggest country has been 
characterised by violence and structural discrimination of all those who defy a 
succession of oppressive regime which, ever since independence and especially after 
1989, have defended and applied a strict vision of the state and the society. Such 
discriminatory vision and policy has ignored the multicultural and multiethnic 
essence of the Sudanese society based on an oppressive Arab identity and a very 
radical vision of Islam, imposed over Southern Black populations (and also non-Arab 
Muslims from Eastern and Western parts of the territory). This discrimination has 
been expressed in specific measures, such as the limitation of the access to political 
seats (mainly available to a strict Arab elite), the ‘Arabization’ of administrative and 
educational systems, an unequal legislation that does not recognise the rights and 
equality to all its citizens, and especially a clear and structural economic exclusion, 
in which the benefits of oil exploitation are distributed to Northern areas (Ferreira, 
2005: 43). In such circumstances, attempts to defy and fight against such 
marginalizing policies have resulted in violent confrontations by Southern rebels 
(and other groups throughout the country) claiming equal treatment and inclusion in 
the country’s economic, political and social system. 
 
4.4.Chapter conclusions 
Drawing from several authors perspective, what the previous analysis clearly shows 
is that since Sudan achieved independence, it bore the burden of memories of the 
broken promises of peace, prosperity and justice made by rulers of a distant and more 
recent past. It also shows the failure to create the conditions for equitable coexistence 
that has thus far marked the struggle in Sudan (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 37). 
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In fact, successive regimes have manipulated administrative structures to undermine 
the control of local people and authorities over resources. Identity and ideology, 
especially Arab nationalism and political Islamism have been used to mobilize 
support to compensate failed state policies. Post-independence governments, ever 
since General Abboud took power in 1958 sought to modernize and consolidate state 
and economy through the creation of a Sudanese national identity based on Arabism 
and Islamism, in clear oppression of the Christian and Animist culture dominant in 
the South56 (El- Battahani, 2006: 11). But besides this ideological dimension, these 
trajectories of Arabization and Islamization have been dimensions of a much more 
complex process in which the goal of creating and consolidating a strong central state 
continuously relied on various expressions and languages of collective and identity 
mobilization. The way in which groups have been mobilized ones against the others 
has been a common trend in the Sudanese political, social and economic history. The 
post independence definition of Sudanese nationalism, rooted in Islam and Arabism, 
thus alienated broad sections of the population and it has been contested by secular 
ideologies based on equal citizenship rights. Continuous Sudanese leaders have been 
involved in suppressing uprisings in the Western, Eastern and Southern peripheries 
and have also been waging ideological wars pitting sectarian leaders against 
advocates of secularism and communism (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 13). In this 
context, Africa’s largest country, has been tormented by intermittent war virtually 
since it independence in 1956. Education and health services have been disrupted, 
livelihoods destroyed and much of Sudan’s physical, human and social capital as 
well as development opportunities have been destroyed in the last fifty years (El- 
                                                 
56 Even before independence was officially granted the strategy of transferring Southerners away from 
the South led to a mutiny of Southern troops in Torit in 1955. 
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Battahani, 2006: 10). The most clear and concerning outcome of such historic 
trajectory has been underdevelopment, exclusion and violent conflict (El- Battahani, 
2006: 10) not only of the Southern areas, but also of all the regions outside elite-
ruled Khartoum. That seems to be the reason why John Garang’s vision of a New 
Sudan was based not on an idea of a Southern independent state, but on the 
acknowledgement of the unifying potential of the modern concept of citizenship for 
the majority of the population who had been neglected in their socio-economic 
expectations and demands and repressed by the several hegemonic and ruling elites 
of the capital (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 55). In the case of Sudan, as in many other 
similar contexts, the idea of ethnic, religious or political identity as the main trigger 
of conflict has dominated the contemporary discourses and interpretations of the 
Sudanese North-South conflict. Such an understanding, however, led to 
oversimplifications (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 29) and to limited analyses that 
characterize the conflict simply as a primordial and inevitable opposition between 
Northern Muslims and Southern Christians and Animists. The causes of conflict are 
much more complex and interwoven with ethnic, cultural, religious, resource-based, 
social and economic dimensions all playing a direct and active role, clearly 
underpinned politically by the state’s continuous lack of legitimacy and control by 
oppressive elites (El- Battahani, 2006: 10).  
In this sense, failure to understand the deeper and much more complex and 
intertwined causes and histories of the relations between peoples and the causes of 
the conflict inevitably leads to ill-fitting solutions for conflicts that threat to break the 
society apart (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 30). It also means that failure to go beyond 
the Muslim-Christian dichotomy prevents the analysis of localized sources of 
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violence and counter-violence and ultimately the attempts to resolve conflict and 
build sustainable peace in the whole country. In the next chapter, we will show how 
such simplistic interpretations of conflict and violence have been incorporated in the 
several peace agreements in Sudan up until de Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 
2005 and how these have made the prospects of peace repeatedly more difficult and 
vague. 
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“Not acting is not a choice, but acting incorrectly can be costly.” 
(Yanacopolus and Hanlon, 2006: 314) 
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5. FROM ADDIS ABABA TO THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT: A RECIPE 
FOR PEACE OR A WAY BACK TO CONFLICT? 
 
5.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we have traced back the main lines of evolution of the long 
lasting conflict between Northern and Southern Sudan, attempting to use history as a 
way to grasp the main root causes of the conflict. As noted by the historian Douglas 
Johnson, the civil war in Sudan has been one of Africa’s longest and most intractable 
conflicts (Johnson, 2003). The Sudanese peace process was also long and began in 
the early stages of the conflict, culminating with the signature of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement between both parties signed in Nairobi, Kenya, on January 9, 
200557. This peace Agreement has been considered a very important step towards 
actual peace in Sudan and has been the result of intense pressure by the several 
external powers involved, such as the United States, Norway, United Kingdom and 
Italy. In fact, in the past few years, oil, slavery and the recent “war on terrorism” 
have placed Sudan back in the international diplomatic agenda. With this new 
international interest came the opportunity to address the root causes of this long 
lasting war and construct a comprehensive and sustainable peace. But despite these 
various aspirations it seems that there is yet no general consensus as to what those 
root causes are or as to which should be the best formula to address them. 
As it has been mentioned in the previous chapter, the Sudanese North-South conflict 
has frequently been presented as either the continuation of an age-old confrontation 
between ‘cultures’ defined by blood-lines (‘Arabs’ versus ‘Africans’), or the 
                                                 
57 Also known as the Naivasha peace process. 
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consequence of an artificial division imposed by colonial powers (Johnson, 2003:xi) 
between Muslims and Christians. It is our argument that such simplistic 
interpretations have been present in the various stages of peace negotiations and were 
therefore translated into the provisions of the Agreement thus distorting and 
undermining other fundamental causes of conflict. 
Although the United Nations’ principles of non-interference, sovereignty and respect 
for boundaries, which were also embraced by the Organization of African Union58 
posed clear limits on external involvement to help put an end to Sudan’s conflict 
(Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 79), the truth is that, in a sense, external involvement in 
the period up to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, and the 
parallel ongoing negotiations on Darfur, demonstrate the persistence and resilience of 
external actors in transcending the limits of those internationally defined norms and 
principles (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 79). From the 1960s onwards, the 
internationalisation of the conflict mirrored efforts by external actors to alter the 
international norms and structures that insulated them from playing more active roles 
in conflict resolution. To a certain extent, such circumstances helped guarantee an 
                                                 
58 In 2001 the Organization of African Unity was restructured and renamed as African Union. The 
African Union differs from the old Organization of African Unity in the way in which it envisages its 
role in situations of human rights violations within one country. The African Union does consider the 
possibility to intervene in such situations. Actually, the African Union crystallized the responsibility 
to be involved in the peace negotiations. 
The African Union has been heavily engaged in the Sudanese peace process. The goal was to support 
the peace process, so it could go until the end, through a strategy of active and direct engagement with 
the various actors, namely the population itself. It basically supported the peace negotiations with 
technical and financial assistance (funding projects, meetings, translations). 
The idea was to contribute to find a common ground for the negotiations and update the organization 
on the progress of the negotiations. At the time, a particularly important role was given to the Peace 
and Security Council, and a special attention given to gross violations of human rights. After the 
signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, responding to the constitutive principles of 
the organization, the African Union assumed its responsibility to engage in the implementation 
process, in order to avoid a relapse to conflict. It then assumed its role as a helping bridge between 
both parties in the implementation process and there was also the appointment of a Special High Level 
Representative to the country, and the creation of an office both in Khartoum and in Juba. 
The goal was to support the peace process, so it could go until the end, through a strategy of active 
and direct engagement with the various actors, namely the population itself. 
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external engagement by regional and international actors that has no significant 
parallel in the history of Africa and African conflicts. 
In this chapter, analysis will focus on the main conflict resolution and peace 
negotiation strategies in Sudan, ever since the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement to the 
2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in a way to understand if and how internal 
and external resolution efforts have been effective and sustainable in putting an end 
to the Sudanese North-South conflict. In this case, it will be argued that there has 
never been a full understanding of the root causes of the conflict and of the degree in 
which the denial of economic, social and cultural rights has contributed to perpetuate 
conflict and promote instability in the whole country. This lack of understanding has 
resulted in peace strategies and formulas that may not be enough to prevent the 
resumption of conflict and sustain peace. 
From the beginning we will assume that external participation of the main mediation 
actors presented many constraints to the internal parties, simultaneously offering 
them resources to strengthen organizational capacities and subjecting them to the 
pressures of external dependence (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 91), without paying 
due attention to the main causes and dynamics of the conflict. It is part of our 
argument that there was a persistent and clear neglect of some fundamental 
dimensions of conflict – namely the socio-economic dimension- thus resulting in a 
situation in which effective and solid compromises to sustainable peace have been 
missed along the way. 
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5.2. A long and tortuous peace process 
In the long and troubled period of war between North and South, the Sudanese have 
never stopped talking about peace and working for it (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 
13). 
The first attempt to achieve peace between the central government in Khartoum and 
the Southern rebels took place in the beginning of the 1970s and resulted in  the 1972 
Addis Ababa Agreement. The Addis Ababa Agreement suspended the war 
temporarily recognizing the South as a distinct cultural and historical entity (Idris, 
2005: 52) and providing for autonomy, including the establishment of a Southern 
Regional Government and a National Assembly in Juba (the capital of Southern 
Sudan). Although the Agreement provided for the right to the Southern Regional 
Government to raise revenue from local taxation, most of the revenues remained 
dependent from the central government (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 85) and were 
therefore scarce. On the security area, it provided for amnesty for soldiers and their 
incorporation into the Southern Defence Corps but it left considerable ambiguity 
about the timing of the integration of the armed forces (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 
85). For the Southern elites, the Addis Ababa Agreement allowed for the 
management of quasi-autonomous institutions in Juba, but in reality it presented 
more constraints than advantages mainly due to weak economic resources and lack 
of governance and management skills. President Nimieri took advantage of these 
weaknesses and limitations and transformed the new-built institutions into a 
subsystem of his own presidency (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 86), somehow 
maintaining a policy of neglect and marginalization of the South, without having to 
present itself as the primary responsible for the situation and, therefore, accountable. 
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 Although the Agreement recognized the specificities of Southern Sudanese 
historical experiences, it ended up reproducing the colonial perception about the 
South in terms of a racially different entity thus deserving different and separate 
administrative and political arrangements (Idris, 2005: 52). For some, it was 
somehow a post-colonial version of the British Southern Policy not reflecting any 
considerable change in the central government’s aspirations to continue –now with a 
formal structure- neglecting the Southern populations and territories. 
According to a scholar from the Juba University in Khartoum the Addis Ababa 
Agreement recognised the cultural diversity of the country but lacked the crucial 
reference to socio-economic development of the region. There were provisions to 
silent the guns, but the socio-economic disparities between the North and the South 
persisted (Interviewee 2). 
Despite the inclusion of a notion of limited autonomy, the Addis Ababa Agreement 
was expected to result in an innovative solution to the North-South conflict, but it 
actually continued to reflect the deep regional power and socio-economic imbalances 
(Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 85) thus providing a very fragile and temporary 
autonomous administrative structure for the South. 
According to Francis Deng, the Addis Ababa Agreement gave Southerners a corner 
of the country within which to exercise a limited degree of autonomy while major 
national and international issues were left to be determined by the centre (Deng, 
2005: 6). Furthermore, the Agreement did not provide the South with a financial base 
thus remaining largely dependent on the will of the Northern government. 
After the two Muslim-led coup attempts in 1975 and 1976, Nimieri reached out to his 
Islamist opponents – Sadiq el- Mahdi’s Umma Party and Hassan Turabi’s Muslim 
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59Brothers Islamic Charter Front . The 1977 ‘National Reconciliation’ document 
allowed for concessions to the sectarian parties and ultimately had a very negative 
impact on the provisions of the Addis Ababa Agreement, since it included the 
incorporation of sectarian leaders in government, the possibility of review of the 
provisions of the 1973 Constitution (and which gave Christianism equal status to 
Islam) and a clear opposition to secularism and preference for an Islamic 
Constitution (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 87). In this context, the significant rise of 
the National Islamic Front during the failed implementation of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement raised difficult dilemmas to the attempts to find a successful settlement 
for the conflict, but it also helped clarify the positions and aspirations of the actors 
involved (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 91). 
However, after eleven years of a very fragile peace and the failure of the Addis 
Ababa Agreement, which was followed by the decision to impose the Shari’a in the 
whole country, Sudan relapsed into intensified violent conflict. As it has been 
mentioned in the previous chapter, with the spirit of collective action led by the 
Anyanaya loosing field during the implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement, 
the SPLM/A was the new responsible to translate Southern aspirations into more 
sustainable and effective structures (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 91). 
In 1992, a new peace initiative was launched with the support of the Organization of 
African Unity and of the Sudanese government, which led to the Abuja peace talks 
between May 1992 and May 1993. The first part of the talks committed the parties to 
an agenda that included three phases and issues: dealing with the substantive issues 
of national identity, citizenship and fundamental rights; dealing with power and 
                                                 
59 Later renamed National Islamic Front (NIF). 
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resource-sharing arrangements; and setting up interim arrangements for a new and 
permanent Constitution (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 95). At the end of the talks in 
June 1992, the parties agreed to sign a communiqué referring to Sudan as a multi-
ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious country and calling for efforts to undertake 
institutional and political arrangements to cope with and encourage such diversity 
(Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 95). However, this resulted again in a void and 
meaningless expression of the true will of the parties, and especially of the Sudanese 
government, since it was not enough to end the war and open the way to committed 
peace negotiations. It was in this difficult environment that the Inter-governmental 
Authority on Development Declaration of Principles was presented to the 
government only to be rejected not because it referred to self-determination but 
because it was presented as an ultimatum related to the question of Sudan's 
secularisation and as a precondition to formal talks. In fact, for most Southerners the 
question of self-determination was critical, but it could not be seen as a precondition 
for negotiation. By 1997, the government had negotiated the Khartoum Peace 
Agreement with a number of Southern militias and was seeking to improve its 
relations with the other IGAD member states, so the conditions for talks were more 
open60 (Hussein, 2006). Even then, it was not clear that the SPLM/A was committed 
to finding a peaceful solution, and between 1997 and 1999 little was achieved. The 
language remained hostile and both sides kept their cards close to their chest and 
                                                 
60 There was also more international pressure, stimulated by increased public awareness of the 
'forgotten war.' The government preferred a locally-mediated over an internationally-mediated 
solution, and had been pursuing a strategy of 'peace from within,' demonstrated by then Vice-
President General al-Zubeir's 1995 Political Charter, which paved the way for the Khartoum Peace 
Agreement in April 1997 (Hussein, 2006). 
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maintained maximal positions. However, and according to Hussein (2006) one 
important factor had changed. The people had tasted peace in the form of increased 
freedom of movement and economic activity, and they began to put pressure on their 
leaders not to go back to war (Hussein, 2006).  
 For almost ten years, the Sudanese conflict escalated, increasingly polarizing 
positions also due to the findings and exploitation of important oil fields in the 
Southern regions. At this time, and as long as it managed to guarantee military 
control of the South, the Sudanese government was not at all interested in negotiating 
peace. At the same time, the existence of oil in the South clearly galvanized the 
SPLM/A’s struggle against the repressive tone of the government and towards 
greater autonomy of the South under a restructured Sudan, respecting the principles 
of development and equality. Nevertheless, in July 2002, both parties and the 
external actors involved in the peace process agreed on another document aimed at 
achieving peace with the signature and adoption of the Machakos Protocol61. This 
Protocol recognised the existent historical grievances of the Southern populations 
and was based on the idea that the priority should be the unity of Sudan. This unity 
should be achieved through respect for the free will of its people democratic 
governance, accountability, equality, respect, and justice for all citizens of Sudan 
(Machakos Protocol, 2002: 3 §1.1). In the Machakos Protocol, both parties 
manifested their desire to resolve conflict in a just and sustainable manner, by 
addressing the root causes and by establishing a framework for governance through 
which power and wealth should be equitably shared and human rights guaranteed for 
                                                 
61 As we shall see, the content, provisions and guarantees included in the Machakos Protocol are to a 
great extent replicated in the 2005 Comprehensive Agreement. 
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all. According to the Protocol on Wealth –Sharing adopted within the Machakos 
Protocol,  
“The wealth of Sudan shall be shared equitably so as to enable each 
level of government o discharge its legal an constitutional 
responsibilities and duties” (Machakos Protocol, 2002: 2 §1.2). It 
further mentions that “The National Government shall also fulfill its 
obligation to provide transfers to the Government of Southern Sudan”. 
(Machakos Protocol, 2002: 2 §1.3)  
 
and that  
“The sharing and allocation of wealth emanating from the resources 
of the Sudan shall ensure that the quality of life, dignity and living 
conditions of all the citizens are promoted without discrimination on 
grounds of gender, race, religion, political affiliation, ethnicity, 
language, or region. The sharing and allocation of this wealth shall be 
based on the premise that all parts of Sudan are entitled to 
development”. (Machakos Protocol, 2002: 2 §1.4)  
 
In order to make these principles operational in relation to oil revenues, the Protocol 
established the following sharing formula 
 
After the payment to the Oil Revenue Stabilization Account and to the 
oil producing states/regions, fifty percent (50%) of net oil revenue 
derived from oil producing wells in Southern Sudan shall be allocated 
to the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) as of the beginning of 
the Pre-Interim Period and the remaining fifty percent (50%) to the 
National Government and States in Northern Sudan (Machakos 
Protocol, 2002: 8 §5.6). 
 
As for the non-oil revenues, it was established that 
 
 
[…] Otwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 5.6, 7.1 and 13.1, 
the National Government shall allocate fifty percent (50%) of the 
national non-oil revenue collected in Southern Sudan, as provided for 
herein under paragraph 6.1 above, to the GOSS to partially meet the 
development cost and other activities during the Interim Period. The 
Parties agree to review this arrangement, at mid-term of the Interim 
Period, with the view of the National Government allocating 
additional resources to the Government of Southern Sudan. 
(Machakos Protocol, 2002: 10 § 7.3) 
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It further included the reference to the need to find a comprehensive solution that 
addressed the economic and social deterioration of Sudan through the promotion of 
social, political and economic justice, seeking a balance between the needs for 
national development and reconstruction of Southern Sudan and guaranteeing 
capacity to the government of Southern Sudan to perform basic government 
functions, build up the civil administration, and rehabilitate and reconstruct/construct 
the social and physical infrastructure in a post-conflict Sudan (Machakos Protocol, 
2002: 2 § 1.5), thus respecting the fundamental human rights of all the Sudanese 
people. With the declared goal of making the unity of the Sudan an attractive option 
especially to the people of Southern Sudan, the Machakos Protocol called for the 
establishment of a democratic system of governance taking account of the cultural, 
ethnic, racial, religious and linguistic diversity and gender equality of the people of 
the country (Machakos Protocol, 2002: 3 §1.6-1.7). In the Preamble it also very 
vaguely recognised the historical imbalances of development and resource allocation 
to which the Southern regions had been subjected to, thus calling for sustainable 
reconstruction plans (Machakos Protocol, 2002: 3 §1.9).  
The international commitment to the Sudanese process present in this Protocol was 
also very clearly identified in the guarantees it included concerning the 
implementation process. In fact, the Protocol specifically included the creation of an 
Assessment and Evaluation Commission, composed by an equal representation of the 
government of Sudan and of the SPLM/A, as well as by representatives of the 
member states of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Sub-Committee 
 151
62 63on Sudan , of the observer states  and of any other countries, regional or 
international institutions agreed upon by the parties. This Commission would be 
responsible for monitoring the implementation of the agreed provisions (Machakos 
Protocol, 2002: 3 §2.4.1) but with such vague and limited provisions, it would be 
naïve to believe that it would actually have anything substantial to do in practice. But 
despite the written provisions and principles underlying the Machakos Protocol, 
which were mostly vague and rhetoric, the implementation was a failure and again 
the parties did not fully comply with their obligations. The failure is to a great extent 
due to the non-responsive attitudes of the government of Sudan. As Iyob and 
Khadiagala refer, after the signing of the Protocol, the hopes of peace and stability 
were shaken by the SPLM/A’s capture of Torit in September 2002, resulting in the 
Northern government withdrawal from the negotiations concerning the remaining 
issues and implementation (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 122). During the following 
months, the negotiations focused mainly on the need to agree on a cessation of 
hostilities that could help open the way to furthering the negotiation of a more 
sustainable and comprehensive peace agreement, including crucial political, security 
and wealth-sharing guarantees and provisions. The role of international and regional 
mediators, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development was 
fundamental to create a climate of trust and ownership of the process among both 
parties and allowed for a feeling that the moment was ripe for peace and that there 
was significant will to negotiate it. The momentum finally resulted in the signature of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 9, 2005,which included the various 
protocols signed by the government and the SPLM/A within and since the Machakos 
                                                 
62 Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. 
63 Italy, Norway, UK, and the USA. 
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talks (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 123). Furthermore, as it became clear that both 
parties to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development peace negotiations in 
Naivasha were reaching consensus and that peace was imminent, attention turned 
towards assessing Sudan's reconstruction needs through the organization of a donor’s 
conference under a comprehensive framework for Sudan’s development priorities 
later named Sudanese Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) (Mahjoub, 2006). The goal 
of this Joint Assessment Mission was to define an inclusive exercise in strategic 
planning and economic reconstruction for war-torn Sudan64, organized around key 
themes integral to consolidating peace and facilitating broad-based human and 
economic development in the country and demonstrating the importance of 
inclusiveness at all stages of the peacebuilding process, a shared commitment to 
reconstruction, a thorough preparatory phase and an understanding of the local 
context65 (Mahjoub, 2006). In a scenario of high expectations, the most recent 
Agreement aimed at achieving a comprehensive peace in Sudan was finally signed in 
2005, under intense international pressure and threatened by the increased violence 
in Darfur. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement includes much of what was the 
content of the Machakos Protocol when it comes to the main provisions and 
                                                 
64 Further support was provided by the World Bank's Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) 
fund, which had already decided - before the Joint Assessment Mission was born - to finance 
initiatives in support of the peace agreement, making funding available to joint projects especially in 
the areas of civil service reform, media and youth. Working relationships built up during the talks 
smoothed the formation of a Core Coordinating Group (CCG) for the JAM, which was headed by 
Norway and comprised representatives from the Government of Sudan, the SPLM, the United Nations 
and the World Bank  (Mahjoub, 2006). 
65 Unfortunately, those involved in the mission faced important practical and time constraints, which 
limited the capacity for sufficient consultation at local and state government levels and to develop a 
deeper understanding of local needs, the different expectations of rural and urban communities and the 
root causes of conflict in Sudan. Nonetheless, the Joint Assessment Mission was a statement on the 
importance of poverty eradication and sustainable development in reducing existing and potential 
conflict (Mahjoub, 2006).  
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principles on power and wealth sharing. It stipulated, first of all, the adoption of a 
new Constitution, and then a six-year transition period for the country, with elections 
in the interim and ending with a referendum in 2011 for the South to decide whether 
it will continue part of a united Sudan or choose independence. The provisions on the 
referendum have been a particularly controversial issue. During the peace talks, the 
external actors have supported unity of Sudan as part of the peace deal outcomes. 
The Sudanese government also prefers unity, mainly because the oil lies mainly in 
the South. According to some analysts, the interim period would give the Northern 
National Congress Party government time to convince Southerners - through 
internationally supported development projects and funding- that they would benefit 
from staying within a transformed united country and would no longer be considered 
second-class citizens. As for the Southern parties, the SPLM/A – and especially its 
leader John Garang- never actually fought for independence, and its official goal has 
always been a ‘New Sudan’, in the sense of a Sudan freed from the dominance of 
Islamic sectarian politics, and where the various underdeveloped regions would have 
a greater role in their own administration, greater control over their own resources, 
and a greater share in the nation’s governance and resources (Johnson, 2005). From 
the perspective of the SPLM/A, a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Sudan would 
be achieved through a comprehensive development strategy based on a sustainable 
system of participatory democracy, good governance and on a broad-based civil 
authority. However, these are not at all clear-cut positions. According to an 
anonymous interviewee working in Khartoum, the SPLM has basically been 
simultaneously adopting two agendas: a minimum agenda, that basically means that 
changes and decisions would be made and planned for secession in 2011, after the 
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referendum. This seems to be the agenda driving the policy and action of the SPLM 
today, mainly due to Salva Kiir’s weak position in the government of national unity; 
and a maximum agenda, which implies that the main goal of SPLM is to defeat the 
National Congress Party through free and fair elections and then promote unity. 
However, this is not at all a clear or easy scenario, since the conditions for free and 
fair elections in 2010 are not yet in place66. In the interim period, the objectives 
would involve sharing oil revenues and jobs in government, and the protection of 
Southern Sudanese and the people of the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and 
Abyei from the possibility of being double-crossed by the ruling National Congress 
Party. The regions of Abyei, Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains have a special status 
within the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and were treated in a separate protocol. 
These areas are part of the Northern Kordofan region, mostly composed by the Dinka 
people, and have also been affected by the war. Given the disagreement on the 
definition of borders in this area67, the protocol re-establishes the option of deciding 
                                                 
66The elections also raise the question of who will be entitled to vote in the referendum in the South 
after the interim period of six years, a problem that inevitably raises the question of the future and 
rights of the thousands of displaced Southerners in Khartoum and other surrounding areas. 
Concerning this issue, and according to the historian Douglas Johnson (specialist in Sudanese history), 
there are two different opinions and assumptions: the first one is defended by Southerners and 
SPLM/A officials, who believe that these people will inevitably return to their homes in the South and 
be fully integrated in the political, social and economical life of the region; the second and more 
pessimistic opinion, mostly defended by the government officials defends that these people will never 
return to the South because they have been enjoying services that do not exist in the south (health 
care, education…) and are now used to different living conditions. In Johnson’s opinion, however, 
both views are misplaced. The second claim is absurd because most Southerners displaced in Northern 
areas including the capital are living in refugee camps and dumps without any access to such services.  
On the other hand, there are some services that are actually available in the North for some of these 
displaced persons and that must be made available also in the South, so that these people can return to 
their homes. Otherwise, returnees will be caught in a state of distress and probably consider going 
back to the capital (Johnson, 2008). 
67 This status of the Nuba Mountains, the Blue Nile province and the Abyei region in Southern 
Kordofan is important but still fragile. Although those three regions have Christian majority and black 
African populations, they were allocated to the North in the February 1972 peace agreement that 
ended the first civil war (1955-1972). Backed by the local people, the SPLM/A has long called for an 
agreement to include these regions as constituent parts of the south while Khartoum has always been 
against it (Prunier, 2005). 
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the status of Abyei through referendum (to decide if the people want to be part of the 
South or the North), but it does not define the territory of the Abyei region. The 
protocol also foresaw the creation of a Borders Commission, composed by a group of 
internal and external experts, which would be responsible for elaborating a report on 
the definition of the borders. The report ended up recognizing Abyei as part of the 
South, but the National Congress Party government refused and contested the result, 
thus reinforcing the stalemate on this issue. There has also been great pressure by the 
government not to include or mention the oil reserves that exist in the region in those 
territorial limitations, so they can continue being controlled by the government. 
During the negotiations, the SPLM was confronted with two options: either fight for 
Abyei or agree on issues such as oil transparency, revenues and employment. It 
chose the second option and therefore the Abyei issue, although central, because it 
defines the control of the main oil areas, was not further discussed until the debate on 
the definition of borders was brought up. Ever since the signature of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement there have been no significant developments on 
the drawing and definition of boundaries of this region, mainly due to clashing views 
and ideas. Some even believe that the protocol will never be fully implemented on 
this issue and may actually jeopardize the whole peace process in Southern Sudan 
(Johnson, 2008). This will definitely affect other parts and provisions of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, because without an agreement on the recognized 
boundaries of Abyei, the boundaries of the whole Southern Sudan will also be 
compromised and undefined. The international community involved in the peace 
process clearly did not capture the importance of negotiating these territorial issues 
beforehand and which are now highly compromising the whole prospects of peace in 
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the country. Recently, however, there have been important developments on the issue 
of Abyei since the Permanent Court of Arbitration decided not to accept the 
boundaries drawn up as part of a 2005 peace deal, which were, as mentioned before, 
rejected by the North. The Court ruled that the Eastern and Western borders of Abyei 
should be redrawn, reducing the size of the region. According to some analysts, the 
size of Abyei is crucial in the perspective of the referendum in 2011 and in which the 
population of these regions is likely to opt for a union with the South. The issue was 
referred to the Hague court last year after clashes broke out in Abyei and it ultimately 
decided on where Abyei's borders lie rather than who owns the land. After this 
decision, the main parties in North and South Sudan have pledged to abide by the 
court ruling (BBC News, 2009). The head of the United Nations in Sudan, Ashraf 
Qazi already said that such court ruling on the borders of the disputed oil-producing 
Abyei area was a "win-win decision for both sides" that would aid implementation of 
a 2005 peace deal (Reuters, 2009a). This is a relevant issue for our argument since it 
will impact directly on the access to important resources by the South and therefore 
on the wealth to be shared with and available to, the Southern authorities. The 
revenues from oil resources are crucial for the promotion of development and 
creation of fundamental infrastructures for the population’s socio-economic well-
being and survival. Besides the two important elements of power and wealth-sharing 
which are crucial for Sudan’s development and peace, the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement also includes a security protocol which outlines the main priorities for 
stability of the country based on a collaborative approach to security, providing for 
the existence of two armed forces and joint integrated unites that will constitute the 
core of the future national army (Samasuwo and Ajulu, 2006). However, when it 
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comes to understanding the main priorities of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
as it was defined and designed, these will certainly depend on the position and 
interests of the parties involved. In this case, and according to Jason Matus, the main 
goal for the external and regional mediators was basically the organization of the 
national and local elections. The idea was clearly to give the parties a couple of years 
to demonstrate what they can do and then let them be tested through the elections and 
through a democratic representation of the population. For the SPLM, the Agreement 
was based on the idea of referendum, although giving the opportunity to the National 
Congress Party government to show their intentions to contribute to a united Sudan. 
For the rest of the North, the aim was also the elections and the definition of the 
political and administrative future of the country in terms of federal, decentralized or 
autonomous states68. Basically, the elections are the Agreement and if they fail then 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement will also fail (Matus, 2008). The pressure put 
on by the external actors is also currently very clear with the preparations for the 
elections, since these were to a certain extent imposed by the international 
community. The SPLM may have a very important card in hand now because the 
National Congress Party needs the SPLM to win elections and maintain itself in 
government given that a majority victory in the elections will be very difficult to 
achieve and it could compromise its place in power. The National Congress Party 
could also try to get alliances with other parties, but this would be contrary to the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the South could even resume war (something 
                                                 
68 For the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile regions, the goal was to create federal, secular 
autonomous states in the sense of a government from the people and not outsiders.  The mechanism 
should be the popular consultation, which is based on the elections and then a state assembly who gets 
a second chance to negotiate the Agreement with a post election central government. The Southern 
Kordofan and Blue Nile protocol is not final until it is fully endorsed by the elected assembly (Matus, 
2008). 
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that the National Congress Party obviously does not want) (Van der Laan, 2008). 
Therefore, the ones government in Khartoum know they will have to reach some 
kind of deal with the SPLM for the elections. It is also true that the SPLM is aware of 
this situation and can somehow push the implementation of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement to the limits according to its interests. On the other hand, the 
National Congress Party government has already frequently proven to be, by 
definition, incapable of representing anyone else but the elite in power and incapable 
of making anything attractive, including unity in Sudan (Van der Laan, 2008). In 
fact, internal problems stalemates at the political level have already been experienced 
in the still short period of uncertain peace in Sudan. In October 2007, for example, 
the SPLM decided to withdraw from the national government and decided not to 
operate within the framework of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement until January 
200869. According to the Southern leaders, there were demands of the Southerners 
that had not yet been met by the NPC government in the implementation phase and 
therefore another strategy had to be adopted to comply with the provisions and 
guarantees of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In this context, the political will 
of the two peace partners thus appears to be a key element to resolve all the 
difficulties around the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (oil-
sharing, Abyei, elections, among other issues) (Pronk, 2007) but external actors will 
also have to play a strong and constructive role in the persecution of such goals.  
In the economic and social areas, and in order to attempt to tackle the fundamental 
and deep-rooted socio-economic problems of the South, the Comprehensive Peace 
                                                 
69 According to some analysts, one of the positive aspect of last years’ political crisis is that the 
National Congress Party realised it cannot take the SPLM for granted as an opposition political party. 
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Agreement includes an  [apparently] solid and comprehensive protocol on wealth 
sharing. The wealth-sharing protocol is based on the principles of a just and 
sustainable peacebuilding process, non-discrimination and dignity of all peoples, and 
foresees the fundamental arrangements for equitable sharing the common revenues 
of oil and other national resources, such as land (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 123). 
On the issue of wealth sharing, the protocol states that the equitable division of 
wealth should be the basis of any comprehensive Agreement, aimed at ensuring a 
just and durable peace in the country. Such an endeavour should then stimulate and 
contribute to significant changes aimed at improving the quality of life, dignity and 
living conditions of all citizens without discrimination of any kind. In order to 
achieve such fundamental goals, priorities are defined at the level of (re)construction 
of Southern regions to the same level of socio-economic and public standards as the 
Northern states, by building local institutional, human and economic capacity, 
infrastructures and stimulating even and sustainable economic development. 
Concerning the specific development and reconstruction provisions, the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement follows the same line and spirit of the vague 2002 
Machakos Protocol, namely through the decentralization of power, with power-
sharing at state level in North and South including opposition forces, as well as 
equitable sharing of wealth, bringing Southern Sudan and other war-affected areas up 
to the level of Northern states with the revenue from oil reserves in South Sudan 
being distributed equally between the National Government and Northern states, and 
the Government of South Sudan (Obe, 2008: 12).  There were various modalities70 
defined to ensure these goals: a Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development 
                                                 
70 For further and detailed information on the modalities of implementation of the wealth-sharing 
Protocol, please see pages 173-206 of annex VIII. 
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Fund (SSRDF) to solicit, raise and collect domestic and international funds for 
reconstruction and rehabilitation of the South, for the resettlement and reintegration 
of the refugees and displaced and to address past imbalances in regional development 
and infrastructure (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2005: 61 § 15.1); a National 
Reconstruction and Development Fund (NRDF), established by the Treasury to 
develop the war affected areas and the least affected areas outside Southern Sudan 
(Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2005: 61 § 15.4), and two Multi-Donor Trust 
Funds aimed at supporting the costs of rehabilitation and reconstruction, capacity 
building and institutionalisation strengthening (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 
2005: 62 § 15.5). A monitoring and evaluation system71 was also foreseen and 
established to ensure accountability, transparency, efficiency, equity and fairness in 
the use of resources for reconstruction and development. Furthermore, and to ensure 
transparency and fairness both in regard to the use and allocation of resources and 
funds to the various regions and the government of Southern Sudan, a Fiscal and 
Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commissions was also established. As 
mentioned before, and in order to create and contribute to social and economic 
development in the South, the main external actors, namely the World Bank, adopted 
and implemented the Multi Donor Trust Funds72. The Multi-Donor Trust Funds were 
a creation of the World Bank as a way to materialize its increased focus on 
eradication of poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa73 and were also implemented in Sudan. 
                                                 
71 Such a system was materialized in the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, which was already 
designed and created within the guarantees of the 2002 Machakos Protocol. 
72 For information on the structure of the Multi Donor Trust Funs please see Annex III. 
73 These Funds were also an attempt to contradict the many criticism to the World Bank’s traditional 
approach of dictating and imposing conditions contrary to the principles of sustainable development, 
which should be people-centred, responsive and participatory. The goal was to guarantee that 
sustainable poverty elimination would be achieved only if external support focuses on what matters to 
people, understands the differences between groups of people and works with them in a way that is 
congruent with their current development strategies, social environment and ability to adapt. It also 
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According to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement there were to be two Multi Donor 
Trust Funds, one for the government of Sudan and another for the government of 
Southern Sudan. These Multi Donor Trust Funds aimed at immediately supporting 
priority areas of capacity building and institutional strengthening as well as 
development programmes. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement gave the Multi 
Donor Trust Funds the responsibility and the right to solicit, raise, collect and 
manage funds from the Sudanese government and other foreign donors. Since Sudan 
is still a country that does not yet allow for bilateral cooperation, because there is not 
yet a clear and established political and administrative situation, the Multi Donor 
Trust Funds were –and still are- an attempt to create a procedure through which the 
government in Sudan deals with only one partner, in this case the World Bank 
(Soares, 2008). For example, according to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the 
flow of foreign funds for Southern Sudan would be disbursed through a special 
account at the Bank of Southern Sudan and attributed to the Southern government74. 
The Multi Donor Trust Funds are linked to several programs and projects such as 
investment in social areas, community development funds, livestock projects, 
decentralization projects, agricultural extension services, etc. The main goal is to 
push up for governmental involvement through pro-peace and pro-poor funds in 
order to address socio-economic and regional disparities and to harmonize and 
balance the various development projects and funding (Soares, 2008). According to a 
World Bank officer in Khartoum, the advantage of the Multi Donor Trust Funds is 
                                                                                                                                          
means that poor people themselves must be the key actors in identifying and addressing development 
priorities and outsiders need processes that enable them to listen and respond to the poor (Lupai, 
2007). 
74 Nevertheless, and although the ownership of the Multi Donor Trust Funds for Southern Sudan was 
with the government of Southern Sudan the World Bank seemed to have taken hold of them (Lupai, 
2007). 
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the inclusion of a principle, although a bit vague since it is not written anywhere, 
according to which the budget would consist of one third of funds provided by 
external donor and two thirds provided by the local governments. This basically 
means that the great part of the burden is on the government and should be directed 
to priority social areas. In this sense, and since the focus should be on primary 
services, such as health, education or agriculture, through governmental investment 
and support you tend to break the monopoly of the government and other political 
and economic elites in certain areas, somehow contributing to tackle the root causes 
of poverty, underdevelopment and violence (Soares, 2008). In the South, the choice 
was for a program approach because there were no partners and no institutions with 
whom to work with in terms of implementation of projects. On the other hand, in the 
North there was a project approach, targeting social and economic priority areas, 
such as agriculture, in the various areas affected by the war, such as Nuba 
Mountains, Blue Nile and even the East75 (Soares, 2008). It is important to underline 
that these are not funds from the World Bank but primarily governmental and donor 
funds which are managed by the World Bank76. Therefore, the main problem of 
these funds is inevitably the lack of political will by the government to define and 
implement development and/or reconstruction projects and programs (Soares, 2008). 
According to the First Progress report of the Multi Donor Trust Funds 
 
As of December 31, 2005, twelve donors had pledged $558.5 million 
to the MDTFs for 2005-2007. Donor commitments (formalized 
                                                 
75 The Darfur is out of these projects since the goal was to define a specific reconstruction programme 
for the region. 
76 One of the reasons why the Multi Donor Trust Funds are managed by the World Bank is because 
there was to be a clear separation between humanitarian and reconstruction programs and 
development projects (the latter would be the task of the World Bank) (Soares, 2008). 
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through signed Administration Agreements) stood at $494.7 million. 
Of this, pledges for the MDTF-N amount to $194.2 million, with 
donor commitments at $188 million. For the MDTF-S, pledges total 
$304.4 million, with $306.3 million in commitments. In terms of 
deposits (actual paid-in amounts), $49.8 million has been paid into the 
MDTF-National and $100.7 million paid into the MDTF-South. 
(Sudan Multidonor Trust Funds First Progress Report, 2005: 14)77
 
As noted in the first Progress Report, the Multi Donor Trust Funds were set up 
relatively quickly (4 months elapsed time from Oslo to the first funds paid in). By 
December 2006, nearly 90 percent of the funds pledged in Oslo were firmly 
committed by donors through Administration Agreements. Of the cash-paid into the 
funds, an average of 67 percent has been committed to projects approved by the 
Oversight Committees to date (79 percent for the Multi Donor Trust Fund-North and 
60 percent for the Multi Donor Trust Fund-South). Of those Multi Donor Trust 
Funds project commitments, disbursements have been picking up and represented 35 
percent of grant commitments at end of December 2006 (Sudan Multidonor Trust 
Funds Second Progress Report, 2006: 2-3). Details can be found in the tables bellow: 
 
 
 
                                                 
77 So far, the Netherlands has been the largest donor to the Multi Donor Trust Funds, with 38% of the 
total commitments ($185 million). Norway, the UK, and the EC were the next three largest donors, 
with 21%, 18%, and 12% of total commitments, respectively. In addition to donors (Sweden, 
Denmark, Iceland, Greece, Germany) who have already committed or are in the process of 
committing funds to the Multi Donor Trust Funds, other donors have expressed interest in 
participating. A non-traditional donor, Saudi Arabia, also pledged $50 million to the Multi Donor 
Trust Funds after the Oslo Conference. The World Bank has recently committed $10 million from its 
net income to the Sudan Multi Donor Trust Funds for 2006 (Sudan Multidonor Trust Funds First 
Progress Report, 2005: 15). 
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Table 1: MDTF – N: Pledges, Commitments and Deposits, 2005-2007 
          
 
Source: Sudan Multi Donor Trust Funds First Progress Report (July 1- December, 2005). 
Khartoum/Juba: Multi Donor Trust Fund – National Technical Secretariat The World Bank. February 
26, 2006. 
 
Figure 1: Funding and Disbursement Status for the MDTF-N and MDTF-S 
(December 31, 2007) 
 
Source: Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Funds, Third Progress Report (January 1-December 31, 2007). 
Khartoum/Juba: Multi Donor Trust Fund – National Technical Secretariat The World Bank. April 23, 
2008. 
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Table 2: MDTF-S: Pledges, Commitments and Deposits, 2005-2007 
Source: Sudan Multi Donor Trust Funds First Progress Report (July 1- December, 2005). 
Khartoum/Juba: Multi Donor Trust Fund – National Technical Secretariat The World Bank. February 
26, 2006. 
Table 3: Total Investments for Projects Supported by MDTF-N and MDTF-S in 
Phase 1 (December 31, 2007) 
 
Source: Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Funds, Third Progress Report (January 1-December 31, 2007). 
Khartoum/Juba: Multi Donor Trust Fund – National Technical Secretariat The World Bank. April 23, 
2008. 
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As mentioned in the 2007 assessment report, the implementation of Multi Donor 
Trust Funds projects has taken place in a difficult and unfamiliar context for both the 
Governments and the Multi Donor Trust Funds Technical Secretariats. In fact, it is 
clearly stated that  
 
The key constraints relate both to process and substance. The process 
issues related to the need for the Technical Secretariats (managed by 
the World Bank) not to be involved in the design, preparation and 
implementation of projects if they were also subsequently responsible 
for appraisal and supervision. The substantive issues revolved around 
different policies and standards used by the Bank and the United 
Nations with respect to procurement, financial management and 
institutional reform, and the unfamiliarity of the Governments with 
Bank policies, procedures and standards. (Sudan Multidonor Trust 
Funds Third Progress Report, 2007: 29) 
 
The three main pillars of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement thus consist of trying 
to make unity attractive during the interim period, through the establishment of new 
political, economic, social and legal structures, the establishment of a democratic 
Sudan through general elections and the right to self determination for the people of 
Southern Sudan These principles require the SPLM and the allies who converted to 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement’s principles to respect and implement them 
(Yoh, 2008). The Comprehensive Peace Agreement stipulates that general elections 
must aim at establishing a democratic and transformed Sudan, where a peace agenda 
should be worked for in the whole country. In this scenario, one of the objectives of 
the UNMIS78 has been to make unity the most attractive option for the people of 
Southern Sudan, because as soon as you get separation you may get two problems: 
                                                 
78 In the Sudanese context, the political sphere is the UNMS’ sustaining pillar since it is within this 
sphere that the SPLM must satisfy the interests of the Southern region, including in the national 
decision-making process. It is also at the political level that the declared most sensitive issues not 
included in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement will be discussed (border demarcation in the oil-rich 
areas) (Ide, 2009: 12). 
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first, not everybody will accept separation; second, and according to some Sudanese 
academics, if secession wins, the South will probably face itself with a lack of the 
necessary internal conditions to guarantee development and peace. There will be 
grievances and problems, and the South - which is a land-lock and will have to 
compromise with other countries and regions- will probably never be economically 
viable, although it has the resources, especially oil (Interviewee 4). 
Furthermore, the government of Southern Sudan is now threatened by severe 
problems including cash-shortages and growing tensions among the population and 
according to some Southerners these problems have been exacerbated after the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement and mostly fed by the national ruling party, which 
appears to be determined to see the South fail (McCrumen, 2009). According to John 
Prendergast, such incidents and structural problems are indicative of the ruling 
party’s intention - through the use of proxy-armed militias to destabilize the region- 
to sabotage the referendum in 2011 (McCrumen, 2009) that will determine unity or 
secession of the South.  But there are also responsibilities being attributed to the 
Southern government itself, increasingly accused of corruption and disinvestments79. 
Peace agreements should, then, be reconceptualised in a way that enable every 
element of the multinational Sudanese society to come to terms with both the 
grievances of the past and the promises of the future (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 
                                                 
79 Therefore, the 2010 elections and the political results in terms of organization of the government are 
seen as the crucial and the most important issue in Sudan’s current scenario, since these may well be 
decisive for the result of the referendum in 2011. If the SPLM gets important seats and power, 
secession may be postponed or paused; if not, secession will be, according to many, the natural 
outcome.  Still concerning this issue, however, the perspectives are not very optimistic since the 
elections will no longer take place in 2009 – and as planned in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement- 
but probably only in early 2010 due to continuous delays on the census process and to disagreements 
on the composition of the electoral commission and procedures. Such delays and disagreements will 
certainly affect negatively the persecution of the political goals defined within the post-conflict 
reconstruction process and ultimately the other dimensions, namely the socio-economic one. 
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16), something that appears not to have been made possible by the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement. 
 
5.3. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement: a critical analysis  
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement is undoubtedly a step forward in the struggle 
for peace in Sudan, but the there are still reasons to be sceptical or at least a bit 
apprehensive about Sudan’s peace prospects since it did not lead, in our view, to a 
real and actual capacity to tackle the root causes of conflict, namely the continuous 
lack of  fulfilment and respect for the economic and social rights of the population, 
especially in the South. The first reason for continued concern is that both the 
government based in the North and the SPLM/A, based in the South, have made 
peace before and then resumed fighting. The feeling of the general population is that 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement cannot therefore properly be described as 
‘comprehensive’ in the sense of resolving all the issues between North and South. 
Despite the strict implementation timetable and deadlines and benchmarks, it still 
relies overwhelmingly on the goodwill and commitment of the two signatories. The 
CPA left much to be done between 2005 and 2011, including border demarcation, 
security sector reform, resource-sharing, a national census, subsequent elections and 
the referendum. The agreement identified the end points that should be reached but 
the potential for derailment remains high if either party is, or appears to be, less than 
fully committed (Ode, 2008: 4). Any peace pact or agreement between them is thus 
by nature fragile and will definitely require important international support.  
Another striking aspect of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is that there are 
hardly any clauses aimed at removing the structures of totalitarianism and military 
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dictatorship that have been in place for so many years and that have been a major 
source of oppression of the whole population. Related to this and equally 
controversial is the absence of any provision for human rights accountability, a fact 
that ends up undermining and questioning the real content and scope of the 
Agreement, since one of the main causes of the war has actually been the persistent 
and continued violation of the basic rights of the Southern population, but also the 
practice of other human rights violations by both parties. In this context, rights 
continue to be abused and denied, power abused, and the majority of the population 
marginalized and kept aside from decisions. Therefore, and despite the existence of a 
formal peace agreement, there is still an urgent need for legislation and legal reform 
as well as deep rooted and constructive social practices aimed at transforming Sudan 
into a democratic and plural state, which respects the diversity of its society.  
At the same time, and given its ambiguity and fragility in certain aspects, the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement has been seen by many actors in the region as a 
bilateral Agreement between the National Congress Party and the SPLM/A, which 
has failed to take into account the instances of the many different groups living in the 
Sudan. Many people emphasised that the title ‘comprehensive’ is highly 
inappropriate for an Agreement that has been, in practice, so exclusive (Pantuliano, 
2006). In fact, as mentioned by Obe 
 
The agreement also appeared to be less than comprehensive in 
relation to the wider Sudanese public. Although it was signed between 
the SPLM and the NCP government, its ramifications do not only 
concern those two groups. It was intended to be a comprehensive 
agreement for all of Sudan. However, […] its contents were not 
widely known or understood by the Sudanese public. The feeling that 
it was the sole property of the NCP and SPLM might have created a 
sense of exclusion and alienation for other Sudanese groups. This had 
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the potential to leave many people feeling unrepresented in the 
developing peace process and could lead to rejection of the agreement 
at the time of the elections, or, more worrying, a return to arms by 
certain groups. (Obe, 2008: 5) 
 
 
As a result, ‘smaller’ issues, such as local-level conflict over access to land, have 
been put aside or dealt with superficially without considering that these can just as 
likely to provide triggers for a return to conflict as major political disagreements. 
Managing such local-level conflicts should thus have deserved more attention in the 
Agreement (Obe, 2008: 4). On the other hand, and according to Jan Pronk, former 
United Nations’ Secretary-General Special Representative to Sudan, the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement can actually be considered a very good 
Agreement, especially because there was a lot of time to negotiate it and because it is 
actually comprehensive in content. This apparent comprehensiveness, however, does 
not prevent him from also identifying some problems with the Agreement.  First of 
all, there was some urgency in signing the Agreement since the actors involved – 
both internal and external- could no longer drag the process; therefore, some 
essential elements were only discussed in terms of procedure, but not in terms of 
substance and implementation. The idea was that after the signature, the not yet 
concluded items would be put in the hands of the President and the Vice-President 
and the authorities of Southern Sudan also in order to undertake fundamental 
decisions. The second problem is that any Agreement has to be implemented and 
institutions must be built in order to guarantee implementation, but in the case of 
Sudan not all them work and many have not even been created yet.   
Despite all these questions and uncertainties, it must be referred that there has been 
some important follow-up to the Agreement and by October 2005 a new Constitution 
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had been ratified, a new government took place (52 percent executive posts for the 
ruling National Congress Party and 28 percent for the SPLM), and South’s 
autonomous legislature and government made operational. A number of institutions 
have also been established on the basis of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, such 
as the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee, the National Petroleum Commission or 
Assessment and Evaluation Commission, although the latter has been severely 
undermined and should play a much more active role in the process in the 
implementation process with the decisive responsibility to evaluate and control the 
rigorous implementation of the various provisions and protocols, especially in the 
one concerning wealth-sharing, crucial for the sustainable and equitable development 
of the war affected areas as well as of the least developed areas. 
However, and in this scenario of mixed feelings about the real contribution of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement to sustainable peace in Sudan, one needs to 
question if the deeper and more structural root causes of the conflict have been 
tackled in the Agreement in general and in the wealth-sharing protocol in particular, 
and if the socio-economic plans and guarantees are enough to assure that the 
Southern population is actually economically and socially included. On this issue, 
there have been some very pessimistic opinions. Corina Van Der Laan from the 
Embassy of the Netherlands in Khartoum, for example, argues that although the 
wealth sharing protocol attempts to actually tackle the root causes of inequality and 
marginalisation aiming at structurally changing the situation in terms of allocation of 
resources, the fact is that it is not working properly and it seems not to be enough to 
guarantee equal inclusion of all. According to this analysis, the national budget has 
changed dramatically in its structure and the South is not getting enough and is also 
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not being efficient way in terms of allocation. Furthermore, socio-economic 
structures are not being built and that is very problematic; in agriculture, for 
example, people have lost the routine of growing crops and are now extensively 
depending on food aid80. To a certain extent, people rather expect to get a job in the 
government apparatus than wait for the so-called peace dividends. In principle, the 
resources are there, but they are not properly spent or distributed. Therefore, the 
situation is still very problematic and people in general have the feeling that the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement is being dragged without actually changing thinks 
significantly (Van Der Laan, 2008), when that should have been the main priority. In 
the view of one of our interviewees 
 
[…] the fulfilment of economic and social rights are crucial for the 
effective and successful implementation of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement, but there are still huge impediments to it, first of all 
because there are no real changes on the ground. There are no social 
services or infrastructures being created in the South, so the 
population can go back and therefore people are not enjoying any 
peace dividend at all. (Interviewee 3) 
 
For others, the principles of equity in development, crucial to sustain peace in Sudan, 
are to a certain extent entrenched in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement but the 
implementation problems are huge impediments that be attributed mostly to the main 
parties and the international community, since it is their inaction or lack of political 
will that helps explain the lack of real practical and considerable results so far. Matus 
points out several reasons for the delays and the wrong-doings, namely the extensive 
use of money and resources to pay large, multiple and mostly unnecessary armed 
forces, the increasing corruption among political forces both in the National 
                                                 
80 For some statistic data on this issue, please see annex V. 
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Congress Party government and the Southern government, the lack of solid statistics 
and information to measure and highlight inequalities that need to be tackled, the 
higher costs of working in poorer areas, where roads are lacking and urban or rural 
areas are isolated and also the lack of skilled human resources in the South (Matus, 
2008).  
Concerning the Multi Donor Trust Funds, for example, it is clear that the various 
delays and shortcomings stated above negatively impact the prospects of socio-
economic development both in the South and the Northern regions and ultimately 
undermines the capacity to promote and guarantee the economic and social rights of 
the population. According to an interviewee working at the United Nations Mission 
in Sudan, the Multi Donor Trust Funds were a very good idea, but the tool and the 
timing were also not the most appropriate for the goal of immediate recovery of the 
infrastructures and for the peace dividends to be given to the population. It was a 
good plan for long-term development but a bad one to short-term recovery and 
reconstruction, which was actually – or at least should have been - the main priority. 
That is why, four years on the line, the population did not really get the peace 
dividend they should have got. Concerning the international involvement and 
support, there has also been some neglect on the multilateral approach to donor ship 
and funding, and a lot of bilateral relations that do not really help in getting a 
coherent and coordinated approach to post-conflict reconstruction. In fact, and given 
the still fragile social and economic situation of the region, the President of the 
government of Southern Sudan already expressed the population’s frustrations on the 
slow progress in the release of the cash from the Multi Donor Trust Funds for the 
provision of basic services and stated that the government’s ambitions and pledges to 
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81achieve the Millennium Development Goals  by 2015, are severely compromised, if 
not impossible to achieve. 
All this contributes to a scenario in which infrastructures and basic medical, social 
and education services, although crucial for sustainable development and peace, are 
still lacking in the South thus decreasing confidence and expectations on the part of 
the population. Although there was some concern and thinking about the social and 
economic dimension, with a recognition that peace should be based on equal 
development and share of resources, the reality has proved to be much more complex 
and the results in these priority areas are, in our view, still far from significant and 
satisfying. In fact, four years after the signature of the Agreement poverty  has 
increased, the rights of the Southerners vis a vis the North – such as right to food, 
water, health care or education have not yet been fully guaranteed and although 
formally there is no war, a state of peace is still very questionable since there have 
also been conflicts within the South, which will persist even if the population 
chooses to separate.82  
                                                 
81 These Millennium Development Goals include eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, achieving 
universal primary education, promoting gender and equality and empowering, reducing child 
mortality, improving maternal health, combating HIV, malaria and other diseases, ensuring 
environmental sustainability, developing a global partnership for development. Status of execution 
and accomplishment of the Millennium Development Goals in Sudan are further explored in the 
following chapter.  
82 Across the South there have been massive cattle raids in the past few months, increasing tribal 
tension. According to some sources, in February 2009 some militiamen from the Lou Nuer tribe have 
captured an entire town, displacing at least five thousand people. According to local officials, more 
than 700 people were killed in the accident. According to the same sources, a counter-attack led by the 
Murle tribe against the Lou Nuer killed more than 250 people last April (McCrummen, 2009). These 
are only a few examples of how peace is still fragile in Southern Sudan and of how invisible 
inequalities may actually compromise peace in the region. This issue will be further discussed and 
analysed in the following chapter. 
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The following tables and numbers compare the Southern reality with the reality in 
Khartoum and the wider national picture and are, in our view, illustrative of these 
disparities83. 
 
 
 Southern Sudan Khartoum and 
Northern Areas 
National 
Chronic hunger in 
Khartoum and 
Northern Areas 
stands at 9%. 
Countrywide estimates 
on poverty are in the 
range of 50-60%. 
More than 90% of the 
population in Southern 
Sudan currently live on 
less than 1 dollar a 
day.
Poverty 
Chronic hunger 
nationwide stands at 
11.3%. 
84
Although chronic hunger 
in Southern Sudan  has 
reduced, it still stands at 
13.5%.
 
85
 
1.2 million vulnerable 
people in Southern 
Sudan are facing food 
insecurity and are in 
need of food aid during 
2008. 
One out of seven women 
who become pregnant in 
Southern Sudan will 
die.
70% of all deliveries 
in Khartoum and 
Northern Areas are 
attended by any 
skilled personnel. 
49% of all deliveries 
countrywide are attended 
by any skilled personnel.  
Maternal 
Mortality 
86  
 
Only 10% of all deliveries 
in Southern Sudan are 
attended by any skilled 
personnel. 
 
Child 
Mortality 
Although the infant 
mortality rate in Southern 
Sudan has decreased, it 
stands at 102 per 1000 
live births. 
Although the under-five 
mortality rate has 
decreased, one out of 
every 7 child will die 
before their fifth birthday  
The infant mortality 
rate in Khartoum and 
Northern Areas 
stands at 70 per 
1000 live births. 
Countrywide, the infant 
mortality rate went down 
from 143 in 1990 to 83 in 
2006. 
The under-five 
mortality rate in 
Khartoum and 
Northern Areas 
stands at 104 per 
1000 live births. 
 
The countrywide under-
five mortality stands at 
117per 1000 live births. 
 
 
                                                 
83 Additional statistic data is available in annex IV. All data unless referenced are from the Sudan 
Household Survey (SHHS) 2006 
84 SSCSE 2004 
85 Chronic hunger as measured by the prevalence of underweight children under-five years of age, 
Sudan Household Survey 2006. 
86 WHO 2008 
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Southern Sudan has one 
of the lowest routine 
immunisation coverage 
rates in the world.  
56% of all children in 
Khartoum and the 
Northern Areas are 
fully vaccinated. 
41% of all children 
countrywide are fully 
vaccinated.
Immunisation 
 
Only 17% of children are 
fully vaccinated.87   
 
Water and 
Sanitation 
More than 50% of the 
population in Southern 
Sudan does not have 
access to improved 
drinking water. 
 
Only 6.4% of the 
population use improved 
sanitation facilities. 
42% of the 
population in 
Khartoum and the 
Northern Areas does 
not have access to 
improved drinking 
water. 
44% of the population 
countrywide does not 
have access to improved 
drinking water. 
 
 
41% of the 
population use 
improved sanitation 
facilities. 
31% of the population 
use improved sanitation 
facilities. 
 
Primary 
Education 
Less than 50% of all 
children in Southern 
Sudan receive 5 years of 
primary school 
education. 
 
While 1.3 million children 
are enrolled, only 1.9% 
completes primary 
school education. 
95% of all children in 
Khartoum and 
Northern Areas 
receive 5 years of 
primary school 
education. 
90% of all children 
countrywide receive 5 
years of primary school 
education. 
 
 
85% of adults in 
Southern Sudan do not 
know how to read or 
write.88
 
44% of adults in 
Khartoum and 
Northern Areas do 
not know how to read 
or write. 
64% of adults 
countrywide do not know 
how to read or write. 
Gender 92% of women in 
Southern Sudan cannot 
read or write.
 54% of women 
nationwide cannot read or 
write.  89  
 
Only 27% of girls in 
Southern Sudan are 
attending primary 
school.90
 
A 15 year old girl has a 
higher chance of dying in 
childbirth than 
completing school. 
Source: Adapted from the United Nations Sudan Information Gateway 
(http://www.unsudanig.org/docs/081125%20Comparative%20Scary%20Statistic%20Sudan%20DRA
FT.doc). 
                                                 
87 WHO 2008 
88 Alternative Education Systems Unit in the Ministry of Education (MOEST), UNESCO 2008 
89 Ibidem 
90 SSCSE 2004 
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In terms of implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in general, there 
are also some important issues to be considered. In fact, the manner in which this 
Agreement has been and will continue to be implemented carries enormous 
consequences for peace prospects in the region and it may be rendered more difficult 
for two reasons. First of all because a few months after the signature of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, historical SPLM/A leader and recently nominated 
Vice-President, John Garang was killed in a helicopter accident, an event which has 
cast serious doubts on the future viability of the Agreement91.  Secondly, and most 
importantly, because Khartoum seems to have multiple agendas but one overriding 
goal which is maintaining power at all costs through a divide and conquer and 
confuse strategy that has helped keep this isolated government in power for so long 
(Prendergast, 2005:3).  
There is also some fragility associated with the way the terms of the Agreement were 
negotiated in the first place. In fact, one of the main controversies is that only the two 
main fighting forces are party to the talks and neither was chosen in free and fair 
elections. In fact, as some authors put it, this Agreement is seen by many Sudanese 
groups as no more than a pact between “two dictators”- which they are not obliged to 
recognize. The main reason for including only the government and the SPLM/A was 
the recognition of Sudan’s enormous diversity and the associated fear of 
undermining and bringing the Agreement to a stalemate if all the groups were called 
to the negotiation table (Rone, 2003). There was, therefore, a deliberate choice to 
only include the government of Khartoum and the SPLM in the negotiation process. 
However, the SPLM/A was not the only movement in the South, since there was also 
                                                 
91 John Garang was the South’s most charismatic leader and many believed and still believe that his 
successor and current President of the government of Southern Sudan, Salva Kiir will not be able to 
maintain and secure the goals and aspirations of the Southern population. 
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92the South Sudan Defence Force  (SSDF), but Garang deliberately chose not to have 
them on his side of the table because he did not trust them. And this meant that the 
internal problem within the South was postponed until the signing of the Agreement. 
Therefore, that can also be a source of instability that has been used and 
instrumentalised by the government. There are thus some groups that can become 
spoilers because they were not part of the peace process. Finally, it must be 
acknowledged that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan was clearly and 
extensively externally driven and that may be also be a substantial implementation 
problem. In fact, in this matter, although the United Nations Mission in Sudan is 
willing and wanting to assist and create these conditions to the population, the 
obstacles are immense since these greatly depend on the resources made available by 
the international community. In fact, the role of the international community has 
been important to some extent, namely in putting the issues on the agenda, but it 
should have been more actively involved in pushing changes forward, especially at 
the implementation level and in terms of making resources available and effectively 
allocated. The international community in general– and the UN and the International 
Financial Institutions in particular- need an approach whereby they can help manage 
the conflict in the field and at the same time collect and gather the necessary 
                                                 
92 The SSDF, under the command of Paulino Matip, represents one of the many armed groups, 
referred to as Other Armed Groups (OAGs) in the text of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 
Estimated to be between 10,000 and 30,000 fighters at the time of the agreement, the SSDF comprised 
more than 30 militias that were somehow aligned with the government.  
Its origins can be traced back to the formation of several key southern militias including the SPLM/A, 
who formed at the end of the first civil war in 1972. However, differences in goals of self-
determinisation for Southern Sudan led to a split in the SPLM/A and new groups formed including the 
SPLM/A-United of Riek Machar and Lam Akol, and the Equatorians who formed the Equatorian 
Defence Force, EDF. These forces collectivised under the organisation of the SSDF with the signing 
of the Khartoum Agreement in 1997. However, after the Juba Declaration in 2006, the SSDF has 
become a divided unit with individual groups supporting either the SPLM/A or the GoSS/SAF 
(AfDevInfo Organisation Database, last visited on June 30, 2009, available at 
http://www.afdevinfo.com/htmlreports/org/org_55676.html 
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resources to improve education, access to water, to land, employment creation, food 
security, and other priority tasks in the aftermath of conflict. However, and according 
to some interviewees, the overall international willingness to get actively involved in 
this type of endeavour is often very limited. One of the interviewees even affirmed 
that there is not real commitment by the international community, despite the various 
good intentions being outspoken after the signature of the CPA (Interviewee 2). 
Another went further and even affirmed 
 
I think the United Nations agencies are not very interested in 
intervening in failed states or in states in need of substantial economic 
and social support and reconstruction. They are only able to deal with 
instability issues; not with economic and social rights needs. 
(Interviewee 1) 
 
These are several of the areas of concern in the implementation of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which relate directly to the lack of understanding 
and will to actually address the persistent socio-economic problems that have been 
feeding and accentuating inequality and violence in Sudan (Sudan Consortium, 
2006). According to our view, these are crucial issues for future peace in Sudan that 
have been underestimated in the aftermath of the signature of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement and that illustrate a trend in current studies and strategies in 
peacebuilding and conflict resolution elsewhere. There is a problem with the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement since it is basically a compromise that has been 
pushed and written mainly by external actors that have been looking at the conflict in 
very basic and simple terms as well as by elite groups in the North and in the South 
that have proved to be crucial allies and partners in the solutions implemented. It 
must be understood that starting a peacebuilding mission in Sudan (and elsewhere) 
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and not continuing it with resources to meet the consequences of peace and to 
address the root causes of a renewal of conflict will always be a bad approach.  
External actors tend to impose order in contexts of internal disorder and this 
somehow gives them various degree of legitimacy. This may happen because these 
are usually contexts in which there is no internal legitimacy nor rule of law or simply 
because there are clearly hegemonic interests from the part of the intervening actors.  
The problem with most peace processes in post-conflict scenarios, however, is that 
the resulting peace Agreements are almost always about bargaining on political 
issues and not about other fundamental issues goals, such as the promotion and 
protection of economic and social rights (Francis, 2007).  
In fact, and although the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is seen as an ambitious 
document in the framework of the long Sudanese peace process since it has, for the 
first time given the South the economic right to generate its own economic revenue, 
the reality has proven to be quite different with the social economic aspects of 
reconstruction being highly neglected or under-resourced. 
According to more critical authors, such as Susan Woodward, this somehow reflects 
a perverse tendency of current peace processes and reconstruction programmes. In 
Woodward’s argument, peace Agreements are often very weak on economic aspects 
and that is problematic because the success of the first stages of implementation of 
peace Agreements are often largely dependent on three main economic factors: rapid 
economic revival to generate confidence in the peace process, adequate funding to 
implement crucial aspects of the peace agreement, and funding to create and 
establish government institutions to support the transition period to a peace-time 
economy and stimulate a sustainable development structure (Woodward, 2002: 2). 
 181
In this context, Woodward also identifies five important lessons that have been 
drawn from experiences in the area of peace implementation and all of them make 
sense considering and incorporating in our critical analysis of the fragile peace 
process in Sudan since the entering into force of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement. The first lesson is the need for broad –based impact assessments in terms 
of the contribution of aid and development projects for sustainable peace. In the 
absence of such assessments, important adjustments and opportunities to readjust 
priorities may be missed and compromise the whole peace process in the future. The 
second lesson consists of an early emphasis on employment. In a post-conflict 
scenario, peace depends highly on the capacity to create, promote and maintain 
employment policies that allow the population to have resources and access to basic 
social and economic services (Woodward, 2002: 2). The neglect of this dimension 
has been identified in the case of Sudan, especially in the South, where employment 
opportunities still lack for the majority of the population, thus contradicting 
expectations of peace dividends and creating frustration that may ultimately lead to 
tensions and violence.  Thirdly, it is important to invest in building institutional and 
social capital. According to Woodward, traditional post-conflict strategies tend to 
emphasize macro-economic stability instead, and at the expense of, economic and 
social infrastructures, often ignoring that in such precarious and fragile scenarios, the 
institutions are either lacking or weak (Woodward, 2002: 2). Priority should thus be 
given for the creation and reinforcement of such institutions and capacity at the local 
level. The fourth lesson is awareness that donor decisions about whom to assist and 
what projects and areas to fund have lasting political impacts (Woodward, 2002: 2) 
and these impacts should thus be consciously assessed. The fifth and final lesson 
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pointed out is that international presence tends to introduce significant economic 
distortions (Woodward, 2002: 2) that may not be the most appropriate or necessary 
and may end up compromising the prospects of sustainable peace and development. 
Despite the importance international attention and support in peacebuildin processes, 
specifically in the case of Sudan, it is important to guarantee that opening the way to 
external investors does not lead to an uncritical embracing of the neo-liberal 
development strategies that regard the state as an obstacle rather than a facilitator of 
development (Samasuwo and Ajulu, 2006). It is therefore crucial that governments 
and political leaders understand that the main priority must be the protection of the 
interests and rights of the population. 
In the context of Sudan, the political will of the two peace partners thus appears to be 
a key element to resolve all the difficulties around the implementation of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (oil-sharing, Abyei, elections, among other issues), 
although external actors will also have to play a stronger and more constructive and 
conscious role in the persecution of such goals. 
The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 was considered a 
landmark moment in the long and tortuous peace process in Sudan. Of course it been 
acknowledged that this was not the first time that an agreement had been signed and 
ignored, but after such a long and devastating war, it seemed that the grievances of 
the Southern populations had finally been dully acknowledged, opening the way for a 
real and effective resolution of the conflict (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 61. 
However, and although the Comprehensive Peace Agreement did help to formally 
put and end to the formal state of war between the Sudanese government and the 
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Southern rebels, the truth is that country became – somehow paradoxically- merged 
into conflicts and violence in the Western93 94 and the Eastern  parts of the country.  
In this turbulent scenario, implementing Sudan’s complex, six-year transition 
Agreement may well be far more difficult than negotiating it. There is ample 
evidence that Sudan’s government and the SPLM/A may be less than fully 
committed to the Agreement, having signed it partly to avoid blame for a breakdown 
of the peace process, and partly to seize the opportunities they were expected to 
enjoy during the prolonged transition phase (Crocker and Crocker, 2004). On another 
tone, Peter Woodward has also been very critical of how the peace process, which 
has culminated with the peace agreement in 2005, has been conducted in Sudan. He 
argues that 
There are worries that perhaps the whole process was one imposed on 
Sudan by the international community […]. The danger might lie in 
the parties feeling a lack of ownership of the Agreement, and with the 
international community turned away, one or another of the 
signatories might seek to disown aspects of it and pursue a different 
course of action. (Woodward, 2004 apud Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 
125) 
 
                                                 
93 The peace process in Naivasha between the government and Southern rebels, sponsored by the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development, may have played a significant role in the emergence of 
the conflict in Darfur, since the protocols on autonomy and power and wealth sharing with the 
SPLM/A may have worked as catalysers of revolt and hope within other rebel movements in the 
country (Ferreira, 2005: 40). It must be reminded that it was internal tensions of the regime and 
divisions within SPLM/A that somehow motivated the emergence of other anti-governmental 
movements in Darfur. In fact, the Justice and Equality Movement has historical ties with the Islamic 
regime but the Sudan Liberation Army is linked to the SPLM/A which had already, although 
unsuccessfully, tried to expand its movement to Darfur in 1990 (Ferreira, 2005: 40). 
94 Darfur may well be not an isolated case in the immense Sudanese territory, since the regime’s 
discriminatory policies have contributed to a reinforcement of other rebel movements. In the East, the 
Beja and the Raschaida tribes have also complained about continuous economic marginalization and 
cultural suppression for a long time and have recently resorted to violence to contest the policy of 
neglect implemented by the government, demanding a more equal distribution of the country’s 
resources. Eastern Sudan is especially rich in oil, gold and fertile land, also having good access to the 
main ports in the Red Sea and to the many of the pipelines that cross the country coming from the 
South. The Beja Congress is leading this opposition and is a political organisation created in 1985 to 
represent the biggest tribal group in the region, the Beja. In 2005, the Congress was associated to a 
smaller insurgent group know as Rashaida Free Lions. The Beja Congress, the SLA and the SPLM/A 
are part of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which congregates a platform of dozens of 
opposition movements to the regime, of various regions (Ferreira, 2005: 41).  
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In fact, and similarly to what happened during the conflict, external presence and 
mediation also shaped the North-South peace process in ways that somehow 
redefined the objectives of the Southern rebels and of the government of Sudan 
during the negotiations (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 14). 
It is true that the international community has been quite a lot involved in the peace 
negotiations that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, financing the meetings 
and pushing the Agreement’s provisions forward, especially during the negotiations  
(Interviewee 4). According to many voices in the field, without this involvement 
there would probably be no agreement at all (Interviewee 6). However, in the 
implementation process the role is not being very active and that has contributed to a 
certain extent, to a loss of momentum for real change towards comprehensive and 
sustainable peace in Sudan. 
According to some more pessimistic specialists, the external actors involved in the 
peace process have failed a lot in their responsibilities Furthermore, the international 
community has proved to be very much divided in Sudan and the diversion of 
attention to the Darfur problem is not helping either, since it is actually undermining 
the effective and timely implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 
Adding to that, one may argue that there are three other problems with the 
implementation in the South, namely the lack of accountability and a local basket of 
power to the government of South Sudan, the diversion of funding and increasing 
corruption in the private and governmental sector, and finally – and most important-, 
the lack of a real and sustainable recovery plan for the South (Interviewee 6) dully 
supported by the international community and the Sudanese authorities. In this sense, 
and since the parties succumbed significantly to external pressure, the success of the 
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Agreement, and ultimately of peace in the whole country, will depend not only on 
the respect for the Agreement the Sudanese but also on sustained and continued 
international attention. Furthermore, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement can only 
be a source of peace and economic development and equality if and when there is 
good will on the part of the Northern government. According to many interviewees, 
however, it does not at all seem interested in implementing the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement, being solely interested in buying time and disarming the SPLA.  
Despite the breakthrough achieved with the signature of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in 2005 it is still too early to determine if it can in fact be the basis of the 
transformation that Sudan demands and needs. As El-Battahani puts it, peace 
processes are a product of politics, and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the 
interim Constitution can be seen as a product of the government’s need to bring a 
powerful rival into its coalition, while dealing with other rivals within other peace 
Agreements and negotiations (El-Battahani, 2006: 13). For many authors and 
researchers in this area, it thus became even more urgent at this point to examine the 
gap between the official discourse of peace and the unofficial pursuit of war. 
According to Iyob and Khadiagala, one must look beyond the signing of 
proclamations to the hidden socio-historical and political factors that militate against 
the achievement of peace as a reality rather than as a distant mirage (Iyob and 
Khadiagala, 2006: 13). 
 
5.4.Chapter conclusions  
As it has become clear from the previous analysis, economic marginalization and 
neglect are at the root causes of the violent conflicts throughout the Sudan, namely of 
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the North-South conflict. Ever since the Machakos Protocol in July 2002 there have 
been some signs of important development in some areas of the South and there is 
actually great potential for further development and peace, especially in the areas 
controlled and governed by the structures of the SPLA/M. However, in Northern and 
government-controlled areas, this development is less evident, due to too a clear lack 
of will as well as to much bureaucracy and obstacles limiting people’s access to 
resources and full participation in the political, social and economic life of the 
country. Therefore, some of the priorities to resolve conflict and rebuild the country 
– and especially the South- should be more peace, more rights and less poverty. Less 
poverty, in particular, to give people the feeling that there are prospects for 
improvement and also address political and socio-economic marginalization and 
inequalities. This would require that both the Northern and Southern governments 
spend their own resources in a fair manner toward poverty reduction and regional 
development and toward transparency and good economic governance instruments. 
Such a priority certainly implies the inclusion of human rights guarantees, and 
demands an holistic and comprehensive approach to conflict resolution and peace 
building. 
The 2005 peace Agreement does include a language that talks about citizenship 
rights and equality of rights, but the question is if the structures of government are 
really in place, allowing citizens to participate and enjoy those rights. The evaluation 
until now does not seem to be very optimistic. 
In fact, the picture of Southern Sudan today is one of clear underdevelopment and 
poverty. While some pockets – like the regional capital of Juba and the biggest towns 
of Rumbek and Wau- have experienced a small economic revival since the signing of 
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the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the majority of the South remains mired in 
abject poverty  
Locals live in meager huts, eating peanuts with perch fished out of the 
contaminated Nile. There is no electricity. A Swiss charity provides 
healthcare. An American aid group flies in food and mosquito nets. 
Most children do not go to school. There is no work to be found. 
(Harman, 2007) 
 
According to Harman, the pictures of underdevelopment are not unusual in the 
South. Furthermore, the lack of funds and human and civil resources is also an 
obstacle to a proper and sustainable reconstruction and development process 
 
There are also issues related to the money given by the international 
community and that is not coming in. After the death of John Garang 
many countries stopped giving or limited the contributions and that 
money could be crucial to be used for development, reconstruction, 
infrastructure. Another thing that obstacles the proper development 
and reconstruction process is the lack of local human resources, civil 
resources and technocrats that are not there. So, it’s difficult to make 
real progress. (Interviewee 4) 
 
In fact, the bulk of the services in the South are held by international staff or ex-
soldiers who don’t know anything about development, reconstruction or planning 
(Interviewee 4). Concerning the international presence, it is also our perspective that 
this has not been working as a factor aimed at helping the economic and social rights 
agenda become a priority in terms of Southern peace and reconstruction. In the 
particular case of the UNMIS, for example, the objectives have been focused more 
specifically on supporting the parties in the implementation of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement, on coordinating the voluntary return of the refugees and displaced, 
and on guaranteeing security arrangements, as well as the demilitarisation, 
demobilization and reintegration programmes  (Ide, 2009: 11). Reality in the South 
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does not yet show significant impact and/or change on the lives of the population 
since basic services, infrastructure, economic and employment opportunities have not 
been provided. Therefore, at the community level, no significant amelioration of the 
living conditions has been achieved and the well-funded expectations of the 
population have clearly not been met (Sudan Consortium, 2006). To a certain extent, 
these limitations and shortcomings reflect the criticism to which the liberal 
tradition95 of dominant peacebuilding and conflict resolutions strategies and models 
being applied, also at the economic level, has been subjected. According to Roland 
Paris, this type of missions do not pay sufficient attention to the longer term need to 
build the kinds of institutions that are required in order to underpin a functioning 
market democracy and will ultimately experience mixed results and failures96 
(Menocal and Kilpatrick, 2005: 773). As he argues 
 
 [I]nternational efforts to transform war-shattered states have, in a 
number of cases, inadvertently exacerbated societal tensions or 
reproduced conditions that historically fuelled violence in those 
countries. The very strategies that peacebuilders have employed to 
consolidate peace – political and economic liberalization – seem 
paradoxically, to have increased the likelihood of renewed violence in 
several of those states. (Paris, 2004: 6) 
 
As an alternative he defends what he calls the ‘institutionalisation before 
liberalisation’ thesis, which would respond to the immediate post-conflict needs and 
minimise the destabilising effects of liberalisation. According to this thesis 
 
[…] what is needed in the immediate post-conflict phase is not quick 
                                                 
95 As mentioned before, in the political realm liberalisation means democratisation and the promotion 
of elections and respect for basic civil and political liberties, whereas in the economic realm, it implies 
a movement towards a market-oriented economy (Paris, 2004: 5).  
 
96 His fundamental criticism is based on the premise that democratisation and marketisation are 
inherently tumultuous transformations that have the potential to undermine an already fragile peace 
(Paris, 2004: 7). 
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elections or economic ‘shock therapy’ but a more controlled and 
gradual approach to liberalisation, combined with the immediate 
building of governmental institutions that can manage these political 
and economic reforms97. (Paris, 2004: 7-8) 
 
To conclude, what comes clear from this analysis is that peace agreements in general 
and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in particular, tend to pay way less attention 
to sustainable socio-economic reconstruction than to political, justice and security 
arrangements (Woodward, 2002: 3) and that may not be the most effective approach 
to peace and conflict resolution, especially in contexts where conflict was to a large 
extent fed and aggravated by deep socio-economic disparities and inequalities, such 
as the case of Sudan. In fact, economic conditions tend to worsen in the aftermath of 
conflict and growing inequalities and hardship may indeed compromise stability and 
peace (Woodward, 2002: 3), in the absence of a sustainable, coherent and realistic 
socio-economic recovery plan based on the fulfilment of the basic economic and 
social rights of the population. 
Current economic strategies do not focus directly on the above-mentioned tasks of 
revitalizing economy and building the economic foundations for peace, and are even 
frequently in contradiction with such priorities (Woodward, 2002: 3). In the socio-
economic sphere, Paris also argues that economic reforms proposed within the 
liberalisation project may actually worsen income inequalities and can ultimately 
work against the consolidation of peace in countries with a history of civil violence 
arising from distributional grievances (Paris, 2004: 204)98.  This has clearly been the 
                                                 
97 The main elements of this strategy include: postponing elections until moderate political parties 
have been created, designing electoral rules that reward moderation instead of extremism, encouraging 
the development of civil society organisations that cut across lines of social conflict, promoting 
economic reforms that moderate social tensions, developing effective security institutions and a 
neutral and professional bureaucracy (Paris, 2004: 188). 
98 According to Paris, however, and contrary to the assertions of the World Bank and the International 
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case of the Sudanese peace process. The international involvement in the Sudanese 
peace process – as in many others- has mainly been characterized by a strong 
emphasis on the civil and political dimensions of rights and priorities when it comes 
to peace and reconstruction. Democracy, elections, equal political participation and 
political institutions to support the democratic process have clearly been the main 
goals when it comes to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. However, the Sudanese 
conflict and post-conflict experiences also tell us that such goals prove to be void and 
ineffective if defined in the absence of a clear definition of the main socio-economic 
priorities, according to the identified root-causes of a conflict. Despite the adoption 
of important protocols on wealth-sharing and economic priorities, the 
implementation phase shows us that the development programs lack a clear 
understanding of the role socio-economic inequalities play in conflict and violence, 
resulting in a scenario where the need to promote and respect the fundamental 
economic and social rights of the Sudanese population has not yet been fully 
acknowledged, let alone accomplished.  
Although many claim that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is a landmark 
Agreement for the simple reason that it stopped the war, the truth is that the crucial 
part of equitable socio-economic reconstruction and development is still far from 
happening since there are few if any perspectives of improvement in access to 
education, social, health or housing services. It thus seems that a lot was invested in 
the peace, but very little is being invested in the follow-up to the peace. Managing 
these problems and limitations in the context of peacebuilding [and conflict 
resolution] therefore requires reordering funding priorities and redirecting some of 
                                                                                                                                          
Monetary Fund, doing more to promote income equity in such countries need not to involve a trade-
off with economic growth (Paris, 2004: 204). 
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the external (and internal) resources away from traditional adjustment projects in 
order to provide expanded support to redistributive programs such as safety net 
funds, public education and health care services and job-creation programs (Paris, 
2004: 205).In such circumstances, the crucial element to prevent the resumption of 
violent armed conflict is to build political and economic confidence in a way that 
guarantees that every community and every group enjoy equal opportunities. This 
will ultimately lead to the institutionalisation of power-sharing mechanisms and 
mechanisms for the transfer of development resources from the centre to the 
peripheries, thus ensuring equity in their allocation and providing resources for the 
basic human needs, such as education, health care and employment (Nhema and 
Zeleza, 2008: 72). 
In sum, a sustainable development and peace agenda should be based on the 
existence of a political leadership and a civil society both committed to sustainable 
social and economic transformation and growth and with the capacity to stand above 
the demands of specific groups, fulfilling the demands of the general population, in 
terms of their civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. 
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“In today’s increasingly interconnected world, the ‘haves’ cannot 
ignore the suffering of the ‘have-nots’. Whether or not we choose to 
care, we cannot pretend that we do not see.”  
(Brainard and Chollet, 2007: 1) 
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6. RENDERING INVISIBILITIES VISIBLE IN SOUTHERN SUDAN: ADDRESSING 
COMPLEX INEQUALITIES AS A CRUCIAL STEP FOR PEACE 
 
6.1. Introduction 
From the previous analysis, it becomes clear that a deeply unbalanced development 
has been one of the most important causes of the Sudanese North-South conflict and 
that the conflict itself contributed to the exacerbation of such unbalances, directly 
affecting the population and aggravating poverty among the Southern populations. It 
has also become clear that the traditional and dominant models to resolve conflicts 
and build peace, with their limited agenda and priorities, have tended to obscure 
much more complex dynamics and inequalities that have sustained and reproduced 
conflict. 
Throughout the years, several attempts to negotiate agreements and end violence 
have been put in place in Sudan in an attempt to stimulate peace. According to our 
analysis, however, these peace strategies have been and, to a large extent, still are 
based on general and flawed assumptions that end up reproducing and perpetuating 
more invisible and complex group inequalities in Sudan and that render peace in 
Southern Sudan extremely fragile. In this context, and since the deep socio-economic 
inequalities and harsh living conditions of the population have not always been 
considered and addressed in prevention and peacebuilding strategies, it is part of our 
argument that unresolved disputes and patterns of exclusion seriously undermine the 
implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  
 In this chapter, and drawing from a more accurate analysis of the Sudanese post-
conflict reality and challenges, we aim to argue that effective and sustainable peace 
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strategies imply recognising and addressing the more complex - and often invisible - 
inequalities at stake, suggesting the need for deconstructing simplistic views of 
ethnicity, religion and of the multiple actors involved in the violent conflict. Despite 
the common tendency to describe Sudan's conflicts in simplified terms - North versus 
South, Arab versus African, Muslim versus Christians-, the North-South conflict was 
rather one part of a broader web of conflicts involving competing claims to land, 
water, social and economic rights, political power and cultural identity by various, 
shifting groups99 (Simmons and Dixon, 2006). 
Furthermore, Sudan’s civil war drove hundreds of thousands of people from their 
homes to encroach on others’ resources, often sparking conflicts also within and 
between Southern communities100. At the same time, traditional methods of 
governance and arbitration of communal disputes were severely weakened and 
progressively abandoned (Murphy, 2005: 36). According to the very lucid 
perspective of the Sudanese reality by a consultant of the ‘Three Areas’, the main 
root causes of the North-South conflict are not at all about ethnic, religious or 
cultural differences, but mainly structural and deeper causes of economic and social 
neglect and inequality among the Sudanese population (Abdelgadir, 2008). 
As shown before, the economic [and social] development of the various Sudanese 
regions has been uneven since at least the colonial era, but post-independence 
regimes have deepened existing regional disparities and marginalisation, by 
favouring Northern regions and elites when allocating development policies and 
                                                 
99 Southerners were also mainly presented as victims of predatory Northern Arab-Muslim 
governments, a view that neglects the numerous feuds and wars fought between the many Southern 
communities that have confronted each other and engaged in resource wars, leaving behind the 
legacies of grievances, slavery, cattle raids and loss of territory to stronger groups (Iyob and 
Khadiagala, 2006: 49). 
100 The various groups in Sudan have stressed the importance of access to natural, economic and 
social resources, expressed in terms of justice, fairness and equitable resource-sharing and 
development (El-Battahani, 2006: 13). 
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investment (El-Battahani, 2006: 13). Progressively, however, the South itself saw the 
emergence of its own elites and favoured groups, which became the main actors both 
in the conflict and in the peace initiatives.  
It is our argument, though, that the peace process in Sudan has, to a large extent, 
neglected and undermined these important variables and therefore hides important 
aspects of this much more complex conflict and violence reality. The Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement does not reflect the full complexity of the ongoing conflict in 
Sudan since it does not fully address the various conflicts throughout the country, 
related human rights abuses and the various existing ethnic and religious divisions, 
which make reconciliation and transition to peace very difficult (Abusharaf, 2005: 
44). Given this, it becomes extremely fragile, aggravating old and creating new 
forms of exclusion and animosity within the various Sudanese communities, namely 
in the Southern regions and especially after the end of the conflict.  
In this context, the question of invisibilities can also be linked to the existence of a 
multiplicity of peace processes that end up not being viable or comprehensive. 
Peacemaking in Sudan, rather than being based on complementary and coordinated 
processes that promote the inclusion of a full range of groups in the Sudanese 
society, has served divisiveness, based on the government's 'sequencing policy' of 
tackling 'rebellions' piece by piece, and armed groups' failure to look beyond their 
own factional interests and commit to a national democratic project. The resulting 
arrangements are hard to manage since Sudan is, as Matus says, one country with 
many systems (Matus apud Simmons and Dixon, 2006). If we add this limitation to 
the existence of many different agreements for the various different areas then we 
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have important obstacles to an effective implementation of the peace agreement and 
that may be a problematic issue in itself. 
Therefore, it is also our argument that compartmentalising and treating interlinked 
issues separately is never a good strategy for peace, since it reinforces those same 
invisibilities. And this has clearly been the case of Sudan. A common and frequent 
mistake and misunderstanding in the context of peacebuilding and conflict resolution 
processes is the assumption that settling conflicts and building peace basically means 
agreement on mechanisms for sharing power and resources.  
This was an assumption that also characterized the various and more recent 
negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A), namely in Machakos and Naivasha - but also in other 
conflict scenarios such as Angola, Mozambique, Kenya, Burundi, Liberia or Sierra 
Leone, where power-sharing mechanisms were put into practice as the main 
institutional arrangements aimed at reducing the threat of conflict by giving the 
belligerents a stake in positive cooperation and a set of mutual guarantees of security 
and basic interests. However, and according to Itto, this approach neglected other 
constituencies and the fact that a just and sustainable peace, based on good 
governance, equity, justice and democracy, requires an environment where every 
citizen has the opportunity to contribute to decision-making, [peace] and 
development (Itto, 2006) of its own society. 
Any peace process or peace strategy should be based on two fundamental questions: 
what is necessary to achieve peace?; and what does then have to be done to sustain 
and maintain peace? At the same time, it should be based on the direct consultation 
of the various sectors of the population (political parties, local and traditional 
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authorities, women, civil society). However, in the Sudanese peace process, the 
general feeling is that none of these voices was listened to at the negotiations and did 
not count to the final agreement. Also for a scholar from the University of Khartoum, 
the peace Agreement cannot be considered comprehensive in the sense that it was 
signed between two minorities; the majority of the Sudanese population and its 
political representation did not take part in the process. For example, other political 
parties (such as the Ummah Party or the Communist Party101) were absent from the 
political process and there was no place for the different opinions (Interviewee 5)102. 
Since the peace process focused largely on an equitable share of power and resources 
between political and military parties, neither mediators nor drafters seem to have 
given much thought to other constituencies or dimensions along which power and 
wealth could be shared. There was clearly a lack of understanding – or unwillingness 
to understand – that the conflict in Sudan was never only a matter of political rivalry 
but was triggered by many forms of [social and economic] marginalisation (Itto, 206) 
that affected several groups and sectors of the population. 
Due to these limitations, for many authors, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is 
neither the beginning nor the end of the story of peacemaking for Sudan. Along with 
the interim national Constitution, it represents not an inclusive settlement, but one 
element – albeit for many the most significant one - in a larger piecemeal approach to 
making peace. It presents a useful and tenable framework for resolving the North-
                                                 
101 The Ummah Party, the Democratic Unionist Party and Hassan Al Turabi’s Popular Congress Party, 
all share the vision that they did not have the opportunity to participate in the negotiations of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Ide, 2009: 22). 
102 Some political leaders say that all groups would need to sit down and discuss the content and the 
implications of the peace agreement in Sudan and find a way out to sustainable peace. The leader of 
the Umma party, for instance, now wants to have a meeting with other elements from society and 
opposition and evaluate the implementation of the agreements and come to a consensus of what has to 
be done in order to achieve a more inclusive process (Interviewee 5). 
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South conflict, but it failed to see the conflict as a product of the unequal centre's 
relationship with the periphery and did not include participation from other parts of 
Sudan (Simmons and Dixon, 2006).  
In this sense, the process leading to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement itself has 
been characterized by important elements of exclusion - the exclusion of certain 
regions, interests, constituencies, concepts and themes and the result is that there is 
no ownership on the part of the population. 
According to some anonymous interviewees in Khartoum, it is clear that if you go to 
the streets, people do not know anything about the peace agreement and the majority 
of the citizens have been largely alienated from the content and implications of the 
Agreement. There are various groups in Sudan who could and should have played a 
more active role in the peace process, but that have been excluded from it and are, 
therefore, very critical of the whole process. This is clearly the case of women and 
civil society and grassroots organizations, whose demands and grievances have also, 
to a large extent, been made invisible not only during the conflict but also during the 
peace process and in the post-conflict phase. This can be illustrated and proved in 
various ways.  
In the case of women, for example, and despite the particularly active role of women 
in the North-South conflict in Sudan - especially within the South’s liberation 
struggle freedom, democracy, equity, rights and a more dignified life in response to 
the marginalisation and neglect strategy that the various Southern communities were 
subjected to-, the Southern leader John Garang did publicly recognize women as the 
'marginalized of the marginalized’ (Itto, 2006). Also in the aftermath of conflict, and 
especially during return and resettlement, women face specific challenges including 
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increased burdens as female heads of households, little access to basic services such 
as healthcare or education, and very few economic opportunities (Abusharaf, 2005: 
44). 
However, and despite a few exceptions that show the importance of women in 
negotiating, keeping and building peace in their communities103, Sudanese women 
have generally been a particularly neglected group in their demands within the 
framework of the peace process and especially in the latter stages of peace agreement 
implementation104. As mentioned by Itto, there are a few articles in the final 
agreement that recognize customs, traditions and religion as sources of moral 
strength for the Sudanese people, but it is never assumed or recognized that many of 
these customs and traditions have for long contributed to the marginalisation of 
women (Itto, 2006) in the Sudanese society and have also served as important 
sources of violence within and among communities, namely in the South. In the 
implementation phase, there have been some attempts to overcome these problems 
and render more visible both the way in which women have traditionally been 
excluded from political, economic and social life and the role women play in society 
and politics. In fact, and even though many individual Sudanese men resist the so-
called gender mainstreaming, the Southern government has been favourable to 
                                                 
103 In some circumstances, women have also taken a leading role in creating links and forums for 
resolving inter-ethnic conflict, leading to many grassroots peace accords. Examples include the 
people-to-people processes, such as the Wunlit Covenant between the Nuer and the Dinka and the 
Lilir Covenant between Nuer groups. Also in order to effectively address social, economic and general 
problems of war facing women, many women organized themselves into groups, networks and NGOs 
on both sides of the political divide. These activist networks (including the Sudanese Women's Voice 
for Peace, New Sudan Women's Federation, and New Sudan Women's Association) went all over the 
world advocating peace and drawing attention to what was then referred to as 'the forgotten war.' In 
Washington DC, the UN Headquarters in New York, the Hague and Beijing, women lobbied the 
international community to pressure Sudan's warring parties to end the war (Itto, 2006). 
104 According to Itto, the absence of women at the negotiating table in Naivasha or Abuja was not due 
to lack of experience and capacity, but to the perceptions of their role  (Itto, 2006). 
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women's equality and empowerment. Consequently, the Interim Constitution in 
Southern Sudan establishes a twenty-five per cent quota for women's representation 
in the legislative and executive powers, making it unconstitutional for any 
government institution not to have women in decision-making positions105. 
However, at the level of the Government of National Unity and the National 
Congress Party, however, there has been clear opposition – including from women- 
both to a quota for women in the government and to ratification of the UN 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women106. 
Instead they chose to focus on a language of  'women's empowerment,' a vague term 
which, according to various human rights activists, does not effectively tackle the 
fundamental issues of rights and freedoms (Itto, 2006). Since Sudanese women in 
general still have little or no legal access to land or resources due to continuous 
discrimination, addressing the root causes of conflict in Sudan and attain sustainable 
peace must then imply the adoption of active measures and policies aimed at the 
promotion of women’s socio-economic inclusion, participation [and visibility in 
society] (Abusharaf, 2005: 44). Women play a central role in the Sudanese society, 
in physical and psychological welfare as well as conflict prevention, [resolution] and 
peacebuilding and therefore deserve a full and active participation in the various 
solutions to violent conflicts (Itto, 2006).107
                                                 
105 For example, The President of the Government of Southern Sudan has appointed women as 
chairpersons for the Human Rights Commission and the Anti-Corruption Commission, and has 
officially refused any list of appointees for State and Government of Southern Sudan positions that 
does not include women (Itto, 2006). 
106 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1979. Currently 185 countries are party to the 
CEDAW. 
107 There are several examples of organisations composed and led by groups of women working for 
peace in Sudan at the various levels of society. The Women Building Peace group, for example, 
engages in pro-active peacebuilding initiatives through cross community-level reconciliation, 
participating in peace processes at local, national, regional and global levels, involvement in 
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In this context, the promotion of gender equality, participation and the empowerment 
of women in peace times become more urgent as women now demand more 
responsibility, particularly in the rural areas108. For example, one key objective in the 
longer run should be to eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary 
education. The differences of access to education between boys and girls are bigger 
in poorer and less developed countries like Sudan. The same goes for the access to 
health services or water and sanitation infrastructures. This is of particular 
importance and concern when we analyse the execution process of the Millennium 
development Goals in Sudan. According to the United Nations Development 
Programme, while progress has been made towards several of these Goals, such as in 
the area of education, infant and child mortality, access to water and sanitation, 
Sudan’s performance against the Millennium development Goals indicators 
                                                                                                                                          
reconstruction, demobilisation, disarmament, reintegration & development programs, involvement in 
lobbying and demonstrating activities to promote peace and coping strategies concentrating on day to 
day basic needs and holding communities together (Women Building Peace, www.international-
alert.org/women/new2.html). The Sudanese Women Association, based in Nairobi, works to 
consolidate and enhance the unity among all Sudanese women living in Nairobi and Kisumu and 
sensitize them for patriotic and national consciousness rather than factional one, to empower women 
economically, socially and politically through education and skills training for job creation, and to 
develop a comprehensive human rights education program for raising awareness about women and 
children’s rights as Sudanese nationals. Its main issues for action are literacy, economic opportunity, 
political participation, human rights, violence against women, among others. The Ahfad University 
for Women, a private university in Sudan is dedicated to educating women, strengthening women's 
roles in national and rural development, and achieving equity for women in Sudanese society. These 
are just a few examples of how groups of women work for the promotion of peace, development and 
equal participation in society (Ahfad University for Women, www.ahfad.org/). 
108 The Women Empowerment for Peace and Development (WEPD) was founded in 1997 as one of 
the working committees as part of an initiative to facilitate the participation of Sudanese women in the 
peace process in Sudan. WEPD is a non-governmental, a-political, and non-profitable institution. This 
network is working steadily towards the recognition of the important role that women play in the 
peace movement and towards facilitating women’s work towards their own agenda and increasing 
actual participation of Sudanese women in the peace processes of the country. The goal is to enabe 
environment for the empowerment of women in Sudanese civil society is created. Women participate 
in international, regional, and local relevant events, such as the Oslo Civil Society Forum and Gender 
Symposium as well as Donor Meeting in March 2005. The network also aims at improving 
cooperation among women in political and peace processes, organising training on peace, conflict 
resolution and human rights issues in Darfur, Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile state, Kassala and Red Sea 
(http://sudan.ded.de/cipp/ded/custom/pub/content,lang,2/oid,13211/ticket,g_u_e_s_t/~/WEPD_-
_Women_Empowerment_for_Peace_and_Development_Network.html) 
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demonstrates big inequalities with respect to gender, rural-urban residence, and at the 
regional and sub-regional level.  
Estimated poverty rates remain high with up to 90 percent in Southern Sudan and in 
the so-called Protocol Areas which are Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei. In 
addition, barely 1 in 5 children complete primary school; clean water is available to 
only 1 in 4 in some regions and maternal mortality ratio in Southern Sudan is among 
the highest in the world. Opportunities from economic growth as well as a transition 
from a humanitarian context to recovery and development are, however, apparent 
(UNDP, 2008)109. This means that in Southern Sudan, government will have to make 
a special effort to attain this goal. Beyond education, the goal of promoting gender 
equality and empowering women should be extended to other crucial social and 
economic areas, in order to reduce and ultimately eliminate gender disparity in 
literacy, in the labor market, social services and participation in power and decision-
making (Bure, 2005). 
But besides women, the same exclusionary strategy has been applied to the various 
civil society and grassroots organizations. Without significant and legitimate trade 
unions and political parties110, civil society organizations have long been active in 
trying to promote a peaceful settlement to the conflict in southern Sudan111. Most of 
                                                 
109 Fort detailed information and numbers on the status of the Millennium development Goals in 
Sudan see Annex VII. 
110 Until the 1980s, Sudan had a relatively strong and well-developed civil society based primarily in 
the north of the country. However, politically engaged civil society organizations like trade unions 
have increasingly been restricted by the state or supplanted by new welfare-based or issue-based 
organizations encouraged by the regime or by international development and relief agencies. These 
new organizations do not have the political role or power once held by trade unions and their capacity 
for influencing Sudan's peace process has been relatively weak (Atti, 2006). 
111 Localized peacebuilding initiatives have been put in practice through the war years, but were 
mostly fragmented and vulnerable to political affiliations related to the wider war resulting in a 
situation in which agreements rarely lasted. This reinforced external perceptions that with peace, local 
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these organizations have defended that a comprehensive settlement to Sudanese 
conflicts should based on the conviction that cultural diversity is the basis for 
national unity and on tackling the main root causes, namely the unbalanced 
development approaches, the absence of political participation and representation, 
and inequalities in the distribution of wealth. However, the actual influence of the 
Sudanese civil society on the Naivasha process that led to the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement was very limited, being highly undermined and marginalized112 (Atti, 
2006). The population in the South has repeatedly been accused of having a very 
passive attitude towards the peace process, but this can be explained mainly by the 
way in which the peace negotiations took place, clearly neglecting the population’s 
expectations and demands, without actively including existing and important civil 
society groups. In fact, although the so-called grassroots and civil society 
peacebuilding initiatives have been increasingly considered fundamental to 
sustainability of peace, these have had, so far, a largely overlooked impact in the 
transition to peace in Sudan. Despite these limited involvement, it was expected that 
during the peace process leading to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement – and 
                                                                                                                                          
conflicts would subside, in a view that, according to Murphy, clearly overlooked the effect of the 
tactics of war on the civilian population and how local disputes were manipulated and entangled 
within the broader war strategy (Murphy, 2006). 
112 According to Atti, little space was given to civil society organizations (CSOs) in formal peace 
initiatives, though it should be remembered that the first significant high-level talks involving the 
SPLM/A, the Koka Dam talks in 1986, were rooted in an initiative by University of Khartoum staff 
associations and trade union associations, who started the initial talks in Ambao. In more recent years 
CSOs have found ways to contribute to the broader peacemaking process through public lectures, 
workshops, newspaper articles and training sessions on peace. Fuelled by the prevalent war fatigue, 
the initiatives included, among others, Sudan First Forum, Nadwat al-Ameed (Ahfad), Women's Peace 
Network Initiative, the Group of 10, the el-Sheikh el-Gaali Initiative, and the Sudanese Initiative to 
Resolve Sudan's Governance Crisis. Peace organizations like the Sudanese Women's Peace Network 
[and the Women Empowerment for Peace and Development Network] and the National Civic Forum 
were among the first to establish direct contact with CSOs in the SPLM/A-held areas and in the 
diaspora. Many received external support, for example through Justice Africa's Civic Project, the 
Dutch government, the Heinrich Böll Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation or the United 
Nations Development Programme (Atti, 2006). 
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especially through the increasingly active involvement of the international 
community- a distinct 'peace movement' would emerge, in which grassroots 
initiatives would join up institutionally, be represented transparently and produce the 
critical mass necessary for wider change. According to Murphy 
Trends reported include less violent cattle raids or revenge killings, 
more cattle returns and compensations offered, and improved trading 
relations. Communities affected by or addressing conflict showed 
greater awareness of the causes of conflict and their potential roles as 
peace actors, developing confidence in their ability to influence events 
and the ability to exact greater responsiveness from their authorities to 
manage conflict and maintain peace. Overall, local peace initiatives 
and pro-peace constituencies expanded and became more 
institutionalised, though all observers emphasized how fragile the 
environment remained”. (Murphy, 2006) 
 
Nevertheless, progress at the strategic level - where local initiatives are collectively 
steered and their potential harnessed - has not significantly accompanied the pace 
with local developments towards peace (Murphy, 2006). However, and according to 
Atti, civil society organizations and grassroots initiatives can actually contribute to 
building sustainable peace in many ways 
[…] by encouraging dialogue and promoting peaceful coexistence 
and cooperation between ethnic and religious groups; promoting civic 
education, democratic values and a culture of peace and human rights 
at the community level; assisting community planning and drawing 
attention to local, national and international problems; promoting 
regional and local development and more equal distribution of wealth 
and opportunities between regions and social groups; promoting 
transparency and accountability, and monitoring the use of 
rehabilitation and reconstruction resources; providing education on 
the environment, resource use and management, and promoting 
economic alternatives to reduce the pressure on resources and the 
likelihood of conflict, among others. (Atti, 2006) 
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In order to safeguard against a return to conflict in the near future, improve the 
foundations for Southern Sudan's new governance systems and address the legacies 
of decades of conflict and promote stability and justice, the recovery process thus 
also depends largely on a sustained and sensitive support for bottom-up and civil 
society initiatives (Murphy, 2006), as well as on a strong and committed involvement 
of the main political parties in a comprehensive and sustainable process.  
After the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the formation of the 
government of Southern Sudan and of the government of national unity, the SPLM 
was expected to speedily implement a comprehensive development programme, 
particularly in those marginalized areas, where its power and support were based 
(Yoh, 2007). Despite these expectations, there is a general consensus that the 
implementation and reconstruction has been severely delayed113 and limited. For 
example, Juba and most capitals of the Southern Sudan states, Southern Blue Nile 
and Nuba Mountains have not changed in terms of development and instead there 
seems to be no interest among the stakeholders that things should move ahead (Yoh, 
2007). At the same time, development projects are not being effectively defined and 
coordinated and the various ministries and administrations do not coordinate their 
activities related to housing, education, health, and infrastructures. But when it 
comes to assessing responsibilities for the delays, opinions tend to differ. Some 
suggest that the National Congress Party has been intentionally delaying release of 
the oil funds allocated to the South while simultaneously continuing to manipulate 
parties in the South feeding inter-southern hostilities between SPLA and other armed 
                                                 
113 For example, the National Congress Party has been accused of delaying the political transition 
process, the implementation of the Agreement, the census and the organization of elections in order to 
gain time (Interviewee 5). 
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114groups that refuse to disband .  On the other hand, others consider that the leaders 
of the government of Southern Sudan and the SPLM have the biggest share in the 
blame, because as the main beneficiaries and representatives of the South, they 
should be the ones pushing for things to change and projects to be completed on 
time, making sure that funds are not wasted on unnecessary issues (Yoh, 2007). In 
fact, the SPLM as for long been regarded as the custodian of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement and, like the National Congress Party, it is one of the main 
responsible for its implementation and from time to time it suspends the participation 
in the government of national unity in a way to impose some pressure on the 
National Congress Party. At the same time, the Southern political spectrum is very 
much divided when it comes to support and mobilisation115. Since 1994, the 
SPLM/A has gained the support of a great majority of Southerners inside and outside 
Sudan, but such support was not yet turned into a unified political identity that could 
cut through ethnic or racial differences116. At the same time, and although the SPLM 
                                                 
114 The newly established government of Southern Sudan was expected to reform its fighting forces 
into a legitimate security sector accountable to civilian oversight and authority. The Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement also determined that all armed groups not aligned to the Sudan’s Armed Forces or 
SPLA be disbanded and absorbed into either. The challenges of developing a legitimate army in the 
South and integrating renegade groups was never going to be straight-forward. As in many other post-
conflict contexts, the peace agreement did not lead to an immediate cessation of armed violence (SAS 
2006; Young 2007a, 2007b). 
115 After John Garang’s death there has been a progressive lack of leadership in the SPLM and Salva 
Kiir, currently Vice-President of Sudan does not really have power in the so-called national unity 
government (Abdelgadir, 2008). 
 
116The war has not only widened fractures throughout Sudanese society, beyond the old divisions 
between North and South, Arab and African, Muslim and Christian or non-Muslim, but also within 
the South. During the earlier years of the movement, the majority of people from the Equatoria region 
did not support the SPLM/A, since it was perceived as an attempt to restore the Dinka hegemony in 
the region (Idris, 2005: 70). Many have pointed out that the military ethos underpinning the SPLM’s 
civil administration has also been a source of past and present internal ethnic tensions and divisions, 
particularly between the non-Dinka groups (such as the Nuer) and the Dinka who still dominate the 
SPLM’s leadership and command (Samasuwo and Ajulu, 2006). The Dinka, Southern Sudan’s largest 
tribe, are predominantly pastoralists, but many of the displaced sought refuge in Equatoria region, 
which is primarily dominated by farmers. As a consequence, tension followed their arrival, aggravated 
by the fact that the internally displaced came under a separate administrative structure from that of 
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as claimed to be trying to define a new and consolidated set of priorities for 
reconstruction and development, the reality is that those priorities and projects are 
mostly benefiting the centre of the region and its main cities such as Juba and 
Malakal (Interviewee 6). Another of the often mentioned criticism to the peace 
process in Sudan is that the SPLM/A remains a military outfit attempting to reinvent 
itself as a credible civilian political organization and this may be a problem for the 
future stability of Southern Sudan, regardless of its territorial status. Although 
progressively moving from a rebel movement to a political party, the SPLM/A is 
often accused of not being representative of the whole Southerner population and 
there are in fact various groups that do not recognise it as such. Furthermore, its 
practical performance in the Southern government and as part of the government of 
national unity has been very much questioned and accused of not really complying 
with the promises made to the population (Interviewee 3). In addition, the South has 
not sufficiently decentralized power structures (at the decision making and finance 
levels, especially) and continuous delays at the political process level as well as little 
progress in creating institutional structures of governance have resulted in a growing 
frustration since the expectations of peace have not been met (Baldo, 2005: 26). In 
fact, and although the SPLM’s fight was never for independence or separation but 
rather a fight for a ‘New Sudan’, united and equal, the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement as been progressively used as an instrument in itself to mobilise the 
population. Using many of its provisions ideologically, the government of Southern 
Sudan does not seem to be worried about reconstruction, but rather with the 
conditions to be independent (Interviewee 5).  
                                                                                                                                          
their hosts and maintained their own customary laws without consideration for local traditions 
(Murphy, 2005: 36). 
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6.2. A fragile peace: the various ‘Souths’ within the South 
From what has been analysed before, the Southern Sudan reality after 2005 has, in 
our view, been characterised by a fragile peace stimulated and aggravated by 
development and reinforcement of various forms of invisibilities, division and 
inequality within the South itself. We also argue that the Sudanese peace process 
contributed to the existence of various invisible ‘Souths’ within Southern Sudan with 
the formation and crystallisation of political and economic elites. There is a rising 
negative canvassing and division engendered by different political affiliations, as 
well as increasing accusations of corruption and clientalism especially around access 
to resources, service delivery, employment linked to affiliation and that can become 
potentially violent117 (Pact Sudan, 2007: 27).  
As referred before, there are some Southern elite groups - especially the ones with 
seats in government following the peace agreement- who have gained a lot from their 
recognition as the main representatives of the Southern population, namely an 
important share on wealth and power in post-conflict Sudan. However, these political 
and economic forces and agendas linked to oil and power have proven not to be up to 
their responsibilities when it came to negotiating peace and sharing the peace 
dividends. This basically means that these elites both in the North and in the South 
                                                 
117 Given this situation, Lam Akol Ajawin, the former senior member of the Sudan People Liberation 
Movement broke away to form his own party on June 6 – the SPLM-DC -saying he wants to save the 
SPLM from the ‘abyss’ and said that its leadership are ‘bankrupt’ and ‘undemocratic’. Critics have 
long been accusing the governing SPLM leadership of being responsible for the current deteriorating 
economic situation and increasing of corruption (Garang, 2009). Furthermore, and still concerning the 
South-South relations, the legacy of war still persists with increased polarisation of Southern groups’ 
positions and personal relationships and rivalries between Southern leaders still unresolved. There is 
increased reaction and opposition over Dinka dominance in Government or unequal representation in 
governance (Pact Sudan, 2007).  
There is a general feeling that there is nepotism within the SPLM leadership, favouring specific 
groups. For example, the Atoro Nuba feel very marginalised after the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement despite the fact that they sacrificed the most during the war and are now not getting the 
expected dividends (Pact, Sudan, 2007). 
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118who have been called to negotiate the Comprehensive Peace Agreement  may have 
been satisfied with the results achieved, but there are different social groups in the 
South who have not been, and continue not to be, considered or included as targets in 
terms of improvement of their basic living conditions, remaining amongst the poorest 
communities and groups119. In this sense, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement has 
not been capable of creating the conditions for effective and sustainable inclusion 
and participation of the poorest and most neglected and marginalised groups in the 
South, thus ultimately resulting in a void attempt to build sustainable and long term 
peace in Sudan in general and in the South in particular.  
It is a given that the overall economic, social and human situation in Sudan is far 
from satisfying and poverty is widespread120, a picture that has been well illustrated 
                                                 
118 It was noted that, for the purposes of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the National Congress 
Party was taken to represent the ‘North’ and the SPLM the ‘South’. But these designations 
oversimplify a much more complex picture. Real questions remain to be answered: ‘who or what is 
the North?’ and ‘who or what is the South?’ To equate the North exclusively with the National 
Congress Party runs the risk of undermining the legitimacy of the CPA. Likewise the SPLM is not the 
only political voice of South Sudan and elections can be expected to show that it is not the only, or 
perhaps even the most popular, Southern organization (Obe, 2008: 5). According to al-Mahdi, the 
agreement offers other political [or other] forces only token representation, compelling them to accept 
the privileges and political hegemony of the National Congress Party-SPLM/A ‘diarchy’ or be 
disenfranchised (al-Mahdi, 2006). 
119 According to analysts, the SPLM led by Salva Kiir seems to give preference to some areas in the 
Southern region and does not aim at representing the marginalised groups of the remaining areas and 
regions, as envisaged by John Garang. Furthermore, many SPLM leaders have established strong 
connections with some elite groups in Khartoum, thus allowing them to have access to part of the oil 
revenues and to national political power and clearly showing that the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement has turned into a pact between elites, leaving the civil population aside of the process 
(Lijn, 2008: 9 apud Ide, 2009: 23).  
 
120 At independence in 1956, Sudan’s GDP was estimated as amounting to US $795 million. Per 
capita GDP amounted to about US $78, classifying Sudan among the poorest countries in the world. 
The South fared much worse than the Northern regions with a per capita GDP of about US $39, 
reflecting years of neglect and marginalisation ever since the colonial period. Also at independence, 
educational attainment in Sudan was very low, even by African standards, with average years of 
schooling at just 0.4 years; educational attainment in the South was significantly lower than the 
national average (Ali et al, 2005:204). In 2008, the GDP was of around US  $US $ 57.9 billion and is 
expected to be around US$ 52.2 billion in 2009. Past growth was not sufficiently broad-based. 
Investments and services are concentrated in and around Khartoum state and to a lesser extent Juba. 
The significant disparities between urban and rural areas and between regions contributed to growing 
inequalities (UNDP, 2008).  
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in the recent Human Development Reports, in which Sudan figures in the countries 
with some of the lowest human development index. The UNDP Human 
Development Report in 2007/2008 ranked the country 147th among 177 countries 
compared to position 141 in 2006 and 2005, as illustrated in the tables below: 
 
Figure 2: Sudan in the Human Development Index, 2005 
 
Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2005  
 
 
Figure 3: Sudan in the Human Development Index 2007/2008  
 
 
Source: UNDP Human Development Report 2007/2008 
 
But although the national situation is far from the ideal, the situation in Southern 
Sudan is even worse with decades of violent armed conflict and marginalisation 
contributing to a gloomy picture when it comes to economic, social and human 
development, even after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005.  
According to a 2007 joint World Bank-United Nations Development Programme 
mission, around 60 to 75 percent of the population in the North and 90 percent in the 
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South was estimated to be living below the poverty line of less than US$1 a day 
(UNDP Sudan, 2009). The ones hit most by poverty are people living in rural areas, 
in particular women and internally displaced people121 who constitute more than 12 
percent of the population. Outside Khartoum state, in the North, infrastructures such 
as roads, railways, electricity and water is either non-existent or underdeveloped 
across the country (UNDP, 2008) and especially in the South. Infrastructure is 
virtually non-existent, with no paved roads outside the main urban centres, and a 
civil service and infrastructures for service delivery must still be built from scratch.  
There is, therefore, an undisputable regional disparity in government expenditure that 
is also mirrored in significantly different health and educational levels. This pattern 
of regional exclusion stems significantly from deliberate government policy and a 
charged political discourse. The fragility of peace in Sudan can thus be seen in the 
failure to provide for the human rights of citizens and in the evidence of an 
apparently systematic undercutting of the human development opportunities of the 
majority of citizens in the most marginalised regions (Poskitt, 2009: 46)   
In Southern Sudan, key education and health indicators, such as child mortality and 
primary enrolment, are among the worst in the world. According to recent data from 
the United Nations Development Programme, the lack of formal schooling and high 
levels of youth unemployment is turning the potential of the young generation from 
an asset into a challenge for the future (UNDP, 2008).  The scenario is therefore a 
concerning one: Southern areas also have some of the highest maternal mortality 
                                                 
121 Several international organizations have even identified a number of constraints to the reintegration 
of the returnees into the resident population, mainly related to lack of cultivation knowledge, lack of 
food and food assistance and also lack of access to health services, employment and housing. 
According to the research made, constraints to employment were caused mostly be limited 
employment opportunities, low salaries and delayed payments, while no access to health care, poor 
quality of health and unavailability or cost of medicines led to health constraints. Shortages of tools 
and building materials, the limited availability of temporary shelters, and the high cost of building 
materials were reported to have led to housing constraints (WFP South Sudan, 2009: 20). 
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rates in the world and some of the lowest routine immunization rates. More than 90 
percent of women cannot read or write; only 25 percent of the population ever uses a 
health facility, and less than half of all children attend school (WFP South Sudan, 
2009: 1). Food security in Southern regions and among the poorest communities has 
also continued to be highly compromised, without infrastructures or conditions being 
created in order to guarantee their self-subsistence, resulting in an increasingly high 
dependence on foreign aid. The World Food Programme, for example, is planning to 
increase by 25 percent its food assistance distributed to Southern Sudan this year, 
since the number of people facing severe food shortages has now risen to 1.3 million, 
and there is a worsening food security situation. According to people working in the 
South, few people can afford to buy what is available in the markets, leaving them 
and their families in need of assistance (Almagro, 2009). 
Table 4: Estimated Food Assistance Requirements in Southern Sudan in 2009 
 
Source: WFP South Sudan (2009) South Sudan Annual Needs and Livelihoods Assessment, 
2008/2009, 40. 
 
Socio-economic disparity throughout Southern Sudan is also very high, with poor 
households ranging from 50-65 percent, medium households from 19-29 percent, and 
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122better off households from 10-25 percent  (WFP South Sudan, 2009: 32). Data 
obtained at community level interviews shows that the top five priorities for the poor 
were food aid/other food assistance, health assistance, security and peace, drinking 
water, and education services. As illustrated in the table below, food aid and other 
food assistance were particularly high in Eastern Equatoria, Lakes, Northern Bar el 
Ghazal, and Warrap States123. 
 
Table 5: Priorities for the Poor 
 
Source:  WFP South Sudan (2009) South Sudan Annual Needs and Livelihoods Assessment, 
2008/2009, 33. 
 
 
 
In this scenario, the social and economic status of the non-elite and most invisible 
groups continues among the lowest levels and living conditions remain poor and 
                                                 
122 Eastern Equatoria and Northern Bar el Ghazal States were reported to have the highest number of 
poor households ranging from 62-62%, followed by Unity, Jongelei, Western Bar el Ghazal, and 
Warrap States with 51-55 percent, and Lakes and Upper Nile States with 48-49 percent (WFP South 
Sudan, 2009: 32). 
123With reference to the above socio-economic graph, in households which were considered to be 
medium comprised between 19-29 percent across all States and the top five priorities for the middle 
socio-economic group were health assistance; food aid and other food assistance; education services; 
drinking water; and security and peace. As found with the poor socio-economic group in Eastern 
Equatoria State, food aid and other food assistance was high, albeit being ranked second most 
important after health assistance (WFP South Sudan, 2009: 33). 
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highly undermined. In Southern Sudan, the poorer and lower class groups’ demands 
have been largely ignored not only during the conflict years but also during and after 
the negotiations of an agreement that aims at bringing long-lasting peace to the 
country. This underdevelopment situation and the increasing inequality among 
Southern groups remains a source of potential renewal of violence in the South due 
to frustrated expectations and the inability of a great majority of the population to 
enjoy and experience the announced and promised peace dividends.  
The disappointment in relation to the lack of peace dividends so far is well present in 
several voices in Southern Sudan 
[The South has seen] the influx of many thousands of people – with 
all the challenges that brings - either moving in to take up government 
positions, to protect those government officials, or to find work and 
services. Rehabilitation has been underway for some time though 
services are still basic and the roads still not good. The town is filthy 
and the demand for bottled water and plastic bags means Juba is filled 
with rubbish. The lack of sanitation is pronounced and it is even 
worse in the rainy season with puddles and mud replacing the dust 
and dirt of the dry season. (Pact Sudan, 2007: 22) 
 
 
The increasing social and economic constraints in the South are also frequently 
pointed out not only by the population itself but also by some of the many 
organisations working in Southern Sudan. Unemployment in the South, especially in 
Juba is growing, as well as slums and the number of urban poor. There is also the 
perception and reality of the widening gap between the [relatively] rich and the poor 
(Pact Sudan, 2007: 29) 
 
Bad governance and corruption are unfortunately the mantra on 
everybody’s lips in Juba now. The Government of Southern Sudan is 
visible to the people not in the form of services such as clean drinking 
water, schools and hospitals but only in form of land cruiser vehicles 
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and airplanes flying thieves in and out of Juba, while children run on 
the streets, begging and exhorting foreigners to clean their cars or 
shine their shoes for money. (Sudan Today, 2006) 
 
This increasing perception of poverty and inequality amongst the population affects 
the ordinary citizens and can have a role in breeding conflict. In fact, the inequality 
gap is widening and, as mentioned previously, has already led to several episodes of 
violence and fragility as groups feel continuing marginalisation and neglect. 
In Southern Sudan, inequality has, at times, been caused by discriminatory policies 
against certain groups and, at other times, by non-inclusive, equity-blind policies that 
do not benefit all groups in society (Poskitt, 2009:2). The crisis does not lie therefore 
in the mere differences of identity, but rather in the implications of the distorted 
mechanisms for allocation and distribution of power, wealth, resources, services, 
employment and development opportunities to the various groups and classes in the 
South. Disadvantaged groups—poor people, women, rural populations, indigenous 
communities—are disadvantaged partly because they have a weak political [social 
and economic] voice, and they have a weak political [social and economic] voice 
because they are disadvantaged (UNDP, 2005: 53-54).  
Even though there is now the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in place many of the 
structural conditions that threaten security and violence still persist in Sudan and are 
well reflected in the following statement 
 
The more proximate tactics used to foster instability have mutated and 
adapted to take into account the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and 
many negative practices are more nuanced and hidden (at least to the 
external observers) but they are still very much present. What 
heightens tensions today is that ordinary people judge that there is no 
desire to properly address the structural issues behind the conflicts in 
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Sudan. It is not only the failure to implement to the letter – but the 
blatant lack of willingness to implement according to the spirit of the 
CPA. It is this failure of political will that most signals to the people 
that this war may well not be over yet – that there is more to come if 
they are to secure what is rightfully theirs. (Pact Sudan, 2007: 82) 
 
Corrective measures are therefore required to promote an inclusive sense of 
belonging as citizens who enjoy all the rights of citizenship on equal footing 
(Kameir, 2008). 
As it has been mentioned before, one of the main weaknesses of the peace process 
and hence of the peace agreement has been the prevailing logic of limiting the 
negotiation parties to the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, leaving various 
other groups aside, partly on the grounds that this would simplify an already 
complicated process (African Security Analysis Programme, 2004: 10). However, 
the process must not be restricted to groups that have long dominated the various 
governments, but must also include the new forces from the peripheries and the 
disenfranchised that are increasingly challenging their marginalisation (African 
Security Analysis Programme, 2004: 10). Wealth sharing [as well as power sharing] 
must be based on the requirements of development and not upon opportunistic trade-
offs between the main elites gaining from peace (al-Mahdi, 2006). 
In this context, the existence of various ‘Souths’ within the South allied with the 
absence of specific measures to address inequality and poverty thus renders 
sustainable peace an increasing illusive goal. 
One should not forget that one of the pillars sustaining the Southern struggle has 
been the determination to establish a country where ordinary Sudanese who have 
been deprived of all kinds of development opportunities could enjoy equal treatment 
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and respect (Yoh, 2007) in their rights and needs. Following this spirit, John Garang 
once said 
For many years politicians have raved, cried, shouted and threatened 
about inequalities between the North and the South. But they never 
understood that these inequalities cannot be overcome except by the 
economic and social development of the Southern provinces and the 
lifting of the Southern masses out of centuries of backwardness and 
superstition. (Garang, 1973: 83) 
 
It is essentially the problems of socio-economic neglect and uneven development that 
constituted the objective roots of the Southern movement against the Northern rule 
which reflected the need for social progress in the area, for a redress of the condition 
of uneven development and therefore the need for respect and improvement of the 
social and economic rights of the Southern population. This should be done through 
drawing and defining a new political, social and economic contract to enable more 
equitable governance in the whole country (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 17), without 
any kind of discrimination and by stimulating inclusive policies. 
In post-conflict Sudan, however, it is clear that there are still fundamental and urgent 
economic and social challenges that imply reconstruction, resettlement and job-
creating projects and that must ultimately result in the development of the South as 
part of the Sudan as a whole. To a large extent, and has mentioned before, this 
challenges have already been felt and experienced, namely in the South. In the case 
of Sudan, the Joint Assessment Mission framework for Sudanese Peace, 
Development and Poverty Eradication signed with the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement, clearly specified that by 2007 a basic transport infrastructure networks 
involving road, river and aviation should be in place in the Southern region. 
However, almost at the end of 2009 it is still not clear whether basic infrastructures 
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and adequate capacity for planning and management of infrastructure are even half 
way in place in Southern Sudan (Lupai, 2007). At the local level, economic and 
social services and needs have been further challenged by the influx of refugees and 
internally displaced persons returning to their homes and to communities where 
informal coping mechanisms have been exhausted, access to safe water is limited and 
land tiled by the ones that stayed during the war. All these realities put further 
pressure on existing mechanisms to solve disputes and increase the need for 
reviewing customary laws and practices to integrate them in a judicial system able to 
respect the international human rights norms and, at the same time, the country’s 
diversity (Klugman and Kallaur, 2005: 17). There can be cooperation against 
marginalisation but it is a very difficult task, because the elites in Sudan have never 
had much interest in poverty reduction. It therefore requires a lot of international 
pressure and guidance. 
At this level, priorities in post-conflict reconstruction phase must be addressing 
reintegration124 challenges such as ownership of livestock, access to grazing and 
governance of resources, through providing opportunities for the various 
communities to meet and settle views and guaranteeing inclusion of community-
based institutions and groups (Murphy, 2005: 36). 
Key immediate needs include security, reconciliation and peacebuilding, meeting 
food requirements and enabling the sustainable return of displaced persons. This 
requires the establishment of basic infrastructures and institutions and respect for 
human rights. Access to land, reorientation of resources from the military towards 
investment in crucial economic areas like agriculture or livestock, as well as 
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establishment of social services and infrastructures should be priorities (Bennett, 
2005: 9). Other priorities should include improved access to basic social services for 
all vulnerable populations, increasing the participation and protection of rights of 
disabled, women and children, increased local economic capacity and activity in 
marginalized communities (Malik, 2005: 32). Relief should be made available to all 
the needy regardless of whether they are internally displaced or returning refugees 
(those who stayed and never left their home areas), as well as opportunities for 
employment to support the reintegration of former combatants, returnees, and 
displaced persons into productive activities. In achieving political and social stability 
during post-conflict transition, adequate funding is required for successful 
implementation of the measures negotiated in the peace agreements (Jeong, 2005: 
134).  
At this moment in Sudan, promoting and protecting economic and social rights of all 
groups are one of the biggest impediments to an effective implementation of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, because there are no real changes on the ground. 
There has been a lot of money poured to the South but no real structural and long-
term planning (Interviewee 6). There are no social services or infrastructures being 
created in the South, so the population can go back and experience the peace 
dividends. According to a Southern Sudanese activist, the war has formally ended 
and the guns were shut but no real positive peace is actually being built or on the 
way. Real reconstruction must still take place, so that people can actually go back 
and live in peace and justice.  
Understandable as it is to concentrate on the most immediate violent problems, a 
broader and longer-sighted approach is essential in any conflict situation (Simmons 
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and Dixon, 2006). A long-term vision on Southern Sudan is needed as the basis for 
the relief, reconstruction and development efforts undertaken.  
A reconstructed South within the framework of a more democratic and tolerant 
Sudanese state based on power and wealth sharing would relieve the country of many 
problems and also enhance the development of the North. According to some 
specialists, a well-prepared combination of the so-called ‘Quick Impact Programs’ and 
long-term development programs would help in transforming Southern Sudan, 
enhance material and socio-cultural development, and solidify peace. A ‘Quick Impact 
Program’, as envisaged by the donor community, international organizations, and UN 
agencies, will have to take into account complicating factors of a political nature that 
will continue to have their effect. Quick Impact Programs should not focus exclusively 
on ‘technicalities’ of relief and reconstruction nor be naive about the political context 
in which it is implemented (Abbink, 2004) 
While this type of solution is intended to capitalize on the ‘peace dividend’, it should 
not focus too much on short-term issues and neglect the wider concerns of good 
governance, democratisation, accountability and people’s participation in Southern 
Sudan’s reconstruction. Even if this kind of programs are geared to quickly make a 
difference and enhance people’s confidence in a better future, their execution should 
thus be embedded in longer-term structures of partnership and visions of a democratic 
political order (Abbink, 2004). 
Another important challenge in post-conflict Sudan is defining and consolidating the 
structures and principles of government aimed at stimulating and guaranteeing 
democratic and equal access to citizenship rights by the marginalized groups, 
especially in the Southern regions. In fact, the continuous barriers to equal 
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citizenship and equitable peace in Sudan have been hidden in the interstices of the 
historical processes through which large sectors of the population were curtailed 
from their rights and freedoms, as well as from their land and their labour (Iyob and 
Khadiagala, 2006: 62). 
As Idris mentions: 
 
[…] the recent debate on citizen and subject in African Studies is very 
significant for understanding the root causes of the civil wars and 
political conflicts in the region. (Idris, 2005: 19) […] Throughout 
history, Sudan has had two categories of populations: citizens and 
subjects. The state was involved in the process of incorporating 
peoples of Southern regions into its boundaries forcefully125. (Idris, 
2005: 19) 
 
Furthermore, and as argued by Said Adjumobi, the colonial structure and 
construction in Sudan 
 
[d]e-individualize[d] citizenship and [made] it more of a group or 
community entitlement. Rather than the state providing a common 
bond for the people through the tie of citizenship, with equal rights, 
privileges, and obligations, both in precepts and practice, people’s 
loyalties are bifurcated. (Adjumobi, 2001 apud Idris, 2005: 11) 
According to Idris, this resulted in ethnic and racial community, rather than 
citizenship, becoming the basis for political and economic entitlements. The outcome 
was often increasing claims of marginalization, exclusion and domination among 
individuals and groups (Idris, 2005: 11).  
                                                 
125 Those subjected to slavery were excluded, eliminated or assimilated into the mainstream culture, 
thereby reinforcing the myth of a ‘unified state’. The legacy of slavery by the Northern traders has 
been deeply rooted in the Southern Sudanese political consciousness, making it hard for the central 
government to impose its authority in the South on the basis of a unitary political arrangement (Idris, 
2005: 45). 
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In the post-colonial period, and in a wave of escalating tension and political violence, 
the various marginalized groups have continuously attempted to challenge this 
dominant racial and political identities, as well as dominant concepts of citizenship in 
multicultural contexts (Idris, 2005: 19), claiming the same rights as the other citizens 
in the country. In Sudan, where the various governments legally reinforced this kind 
of discrimination, the unintended result was a major political violence between those 
who ruled through the mechanism of exclusion and those who demanded either 
inclusion in the state, or the exercise of right to self-determination (Idris, 2005: 12). 
As referred by Yoh 
 
[…] all biases and political-religious extremisms that the country had 
witnessed during the past fifty years can be attributed to competition 
between those political forces who espoused the war agenda to keep 
power abreast and those who espoused peace and unity agenda, 
through reform and transformation of the country into a nation that 
accommodates all its citizens and their aspirations. (Yoh, 2008) 
 
Bearing this historical context in mind, contemporary political experiences in Sudan 
suggest that although crucial, political democracy is not necessarily enough – in the 
context of contested histories and identities – to guarantee and maintain the civil 
rights of citizenship or to sustain a democratic rule of law (Idris, 2005: 10). And the 
same goes for economic, social and cultural rights.  
In this context, many authors suggest that democratic citizenship, implying access to 
equal political, civil, social and economic rights, requires a transformative political 
discourse that goes beyond race and ethnicity126 (Idris, 2005: 107). 
                                                 
126 For many years, for example, Southerners were also mainly presented as victims of predatory 
Northern Arab-Muslim governments, a view that neglects the numerous feuds and wars fought 
between the many Southern communities that have confronted each other and engaged in resource 
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John Garang once said 
 
The Southern [struggle] belongs to all those who work in the factories 
and earn so little...to those who wash cars...to those forgotten citizens 
who crowd under very difficult conditions... and in all the slums of 
our cities...to those in the North who have been callously displaced 
from your ancestral homes, to you the Hadendowa and the Ingessana 
who never know of schools in your villages, to you the Nuba and 
Baggaras of the Centre, to you the Fur, Zeghawa and Masalit of the 
West, to you all, the SPLA is yours. (Garang, 1987:61 apud Iyob and 
Khadiagala, 2006: 56) 
Suppose we solve the problem of the South, we will soon have to 
solve the problem of the Jebels [the Nuba Mountains] because the 
Nuba can also take arms; after that the problem of the Beja; and so 
forth. It is a national, not a Southern problem that we must address. 
(Garang, 1987:67 apud Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 56) 
 
 
These words of Garang clearly relate to the need to address the historical past of 
inequalities and subaltern relations between the many groups in Sudan when crafting 
the peace agreements and new citizenship laws to be applied, in order to ensure equal 
participation of all in the Sudanese political and socio-economic systems (Iyob and 
Khadiagala, 2006: 56).  
As Sudan emerges from a long war and moves forward towards a political 
settlement, the country remains affected by violence and by weak governance and 
rule of law institutions. The peacebuilding process must seek to empower national 
stakeholders to actively engage in preventing and bringing an end to human rights 
violations (Sherif, 2005: 29). At the same time, in order to be effective and contribute 
to sustainable peace and stability, peacebuilding [and conflict prevention] needs to be 
broadened and redefined as an integrated social process for an associative 
                                                                                                                                          
wars, leaving behind the legacies of grievances, slavery, cattle raids and loss of territory to stronger 
groups (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 49). 
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engagement with the overall aim at creating a mutually accepted framework of rules 
and institutions (Pugh, 2000 apud Jeong, 2005: 21). 
Therefore, it seems clear that the only way out will be the establishment of an 
effective, accountable and democratic civil authority that has the capacity and 
responsibility to empower both civil society and all those groups ho have been 
marginalised and persistently made invisible in the South (Samasuwo and Ajulu, 
2006).  
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement is usually referred to as marking a significant 
step in overcoming the long struggle among Sudan's culturally diverse inhabitants. 
According to Murphy, however, the scepticism many share about its outcome is 
understandable since the causes of the North-South conflict are deep and any 
enduring solution necessarily entails difficult and lengthy processes of compromise 
and reconciliation. Therefore, a flexible formulation of a multinational state in 
Sudan, with equality and dignity guaranteed for every citizen regardless of ethnicity 
or religion carries the promise of a peaceful resolution of Sudanese conflicts in the 
future (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 20). 
Since maintaining peace and stability and accelerating development in the aftermath 
of conflict requires resources, peace agreements tend to create high expectations for 
economic improvement. However, continuing gaps between these expectations and 
existing realities become a major source of social unrest and instability (Jeong, 2005: 
123). This is clearly the case of Sudan four years passed since the formal end of the 
North-South conflict. In the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, one of the 
guiding principles was the promise of an equitable sharing of common wealth and 
resources between the parties that would confirm their strong and constructive role in 
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promoting post-conflict reconstruction especially in the least developed areas. 
However, the current scenario, especially in the South, is far from being one of self-
sustained reconstruction and peace. The lesson to be drawn is clear: as important as 
they are, peace agreements should not be seen as an end in itself; they should rather 
be seen as the starting point of a long and complex peace process aimed at tackling 
the main and intertwined root causes of conflict. The Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement could actually have been an important starting point to peacebuilding in 
Sudan but even though the peace agenda that was put forward was very 
economically-focused, it ended up only benefiting some and cannot therefore be 
sustainable or effective in the longer term. 
The increasing international business presence in Khartoum that followed the 
beginning of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, for 
example, may end up having a positive impact in terms of employment creation and 
some economic investment; however, the general feeling is that it has been quite 
negative since resources and benefits are being made available only for those who 
already lived on the positive side of the poverty line and it is not investing in the 
poorer groups nor helping to reach more equal socio-economic development in the 
country (Pronk, 2006). Such and unbalanced investment and development strategy 
ends up creating resentment and violence among those who continue to be excluded 
and if things do not change significantly, namely in the access to social and 
economic needs, and people continue to resent inequality, then Sudan will probably 
experience some very difficult times again. 
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6.3. Chapter conclusions 
As it has been mentioned before, the Sudanese conflict is not simply about ethnic, 
religious or cultural differences. The ethnic and religious card, played so many times 
during the war by both belligerent parties is only one of the many instruments used to 
justify violence and delay sustainable peace initiatives according to the various 
political, military and economic agendas. In our view, the North-South conflict is 
better explained by the structural and deeper causes of economic and social neglect 
and inequality that have been targeting large sectors of the Sudanese population127. 
In this context, there are also particular socio-economic and ideologies that have 
rendered peace efforts quite elusive in Sudan. According to Iyob and Khadiagala, the 
several post-1956 governments have failed to rectify the deep structural inequalities 
perpetuated by previous exploitive and discriminatory regimes, despite the many 
declarations and requests of equality for all Sudanese (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 
15).  
Given this continued neglect, people in the Southern regions [as well as in others 
sharing the same grievances and demands] complain consistently and incessantly 
about the lack of services – such as education, health and water-, lack of job 
opportunities, barriers to access to natural resources, a general state of 
underdevelopment, extremely high rates of maternal and infant mortality, poverty, 
food insecurity, vulnerability and morbidity as well as other  (Pantuliano, 2006). At 
the end of the day, therefore, our perception is that it is the population who is 
loosing, not gaining anything from the peace process since deep inequalities and 
                                                 
127 As El-Battahani suggests, violent conflict has many causal factors, each one a strand in a complex 
web of causes that both individually and collectively precipitate, aggravate and prolong fighting. 
Unequal access to resources or population pressures may not by themselves cause conflict, but may 
react with ethno-cultural prejudice or political manipulation to fuel fighting (El-Battahani, 2006: 13).  
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living conditions of the population have not been considered in the implemented 
prevention and peacebuilding strategies. Furthermore, there is no clear reference in 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to mechanisms aimed at effectively 
transferring and channelling peace dividends to the population (Interviewee 5) and 
this can be explained by the incapacity or unwillingness of the international 
community to care about transformation of conflict based on the civil society level. 
Furthermore, many Sudanese consider that the international community is not up to 
its required responsibilities and it is, to a large extent, responsible for the delays and 
failures in the post- agreement phase. The various hidden agendas and invisibilities 
have also been referred to as playing a crucial role in the sustainability of peace in 
Sudan and in the future of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the sense that the 
goals and priorities of the various internal and external actors involved in the peace 
process may actually change throughout the implementation years. 
But despite the problems and limitations, it is not too late for a comprehensive 
peacemaking effort in Sudan, but the main Sudanese parties and international actors 
must support inclusive and coordinated peacemaking and peacebuilding initiatives if 
this is to become a reality (Simmons and Dixon, 2006). This obviously implies a 
very important responsibility by the international community in terms of making 
political, economic and social conditions available, but not with imposed conditions, 
policies and models128. Therefore, following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 
the immediate challenges lay in effective peacebuilding and development 
transformation, carefully meeting and balancing immediate needs with structural 
                                                 
128 It is fundamental that we overcome a very common and concerning trend at this level of 
international involvement related to the fact that when we don’t know how to solve a problem we tend 
to create, invent and apply concepts and models without necessarily considering their direct 
implications and impacts in the field. 
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change and long-term programming. In this sense, and since poverty and inequality, 
sustained after internal violent conflict, continue to undermine peace by breeding 
discontent and anger, sustainable and conscious development policies should be 
made integral part of any peace process. Overcoming the structural forces that create 
and perpetuate extreme inequality is one of the most efficient routes for overcoming 
extreme poverty, enhancing the welfare of society and accelerating progress towards 
a more effective accomplishment of the Millennium Development Goals (UNDP, 
2005: 5). Development and social rehabilitation measures must thus be designed to 
help reduce insecurity and volatile socio-political situations that usually follow post-
agreement phases (Jeong, 2005: 28)129. Owing to a lack of human capital and the 
destruction of physical infrastructure, it is a challenging but priority task to reinitiate 
economic and social development halted by violent conflict (Jeong, 2005: 123). 
Neglecting social and economic development contributes to an inadvertent return to 
the origin of conflict and disarmament and demobilization efforts alone do not 
decrease the danger of re-escalation (Pugh, 2000). According to Jan Pronk, there are 
some conditions for peace to be possible and sustainable in Southern Sudan in the 
aftermath of conflict. First of all, people must feel and believe that the security 
situation is better than six years ago, namely with no violence; secondly, if there is 
less poverty, if on the basis of peace you can start to build and enjoy from social and 
economic development; and thirdly, if rights are guaranteed - rights of the South, of 
the tribes, land rights, women’s rights and that make it possible to stay together 
                                                 
129 Of course development cannot easily be disentangled from political transition and security. While 
economic growth is not sustainable without a lasting peace, economic stability is one of the main 
obstacles to democracy. Peace cannot be durable without equitable development that benefits the 
majority of people in the society, combined with income-creating opportunities for the poor. Thus, 
development activities must be aimed at mitigating economic hardships and reintegrating the society 
across ethnic, religious, racial and any other divisions (Jeong, 2005: 124). 
 
 229
(Pronk, 2007).  In sum, no violence, less poverty and more rights will result in more 
peace. Following this reasoning, and as Iyob and Khadiagala correctly affirm 
Peace, if it is to be sustainable, cannot simply provide for the larger 
and well-known communities but also nurture the expectations and 
aspirations for social justice and equity of those whose histories have 
been rendered illegible, illegitimate [and invisible] by elite groups 
aspiring to consolidate their hegemony in Sudan. (Iyob and 
Khadiagala, 2006: 26) 
 
In this context, civil society organizations in Sudan, for example, can bridge the gap 
between what the Sudanese people want, and what the negotiating parties and the 
international community perceived was their goal (Atti, 2006), thus contributing to 
rendering more visible the various issues neglected and obscured both by the conflict 
and the various political parties involved in, and responsible for, the peace 
implementation process130. There is probably no ‘one fit all’ solution for conflicts of 
this protracted and complex nature, but an important part of the solution should 
always be addressing the deeper and more structural forms of exclusion and 
inequality, regardless of the ethnic, religious or cultural identities. However, the 
dominant and more frequent ways to respond to conflict and build peace are defined 
and implemented without considering these factors and often end up reproducing or 
reinforcing those same inequalities and even creating new forms of exclusion. The 
episodes of communal violence that are currently ravaging Southern Sudan131 and 
                                                 
130 According to Atti, it is of particular concern to see that economic deterioration, debt, political 
instability and ongoing conflict tend to contribute to diverting the civil society’s efforts towards 
addressing symptoms rather than causes, at the expense of influencing policy and legislation. In fact, 
he argues that since their work is reactive and vulnerable to external influence by the state or donors, 
the regime has sought to divert civil society attention from important issues such as human rights 
violations in southern Sudan and Darfur, while oil production and revenues form a 'no-go area' for 
these organizations’ activity (Atti, 2006).  
131 According to local sources, in early August 2009, more that 160 people (100 women and children, 
50 men and 11 SPLA soldiers) have died after a raid led by armed Southern tribal fighters on a rival 
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affecting the peace prospects, for example, are in our view a reflex of a ill-planned 
conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction process which undermined both 
the way in which visible and invisible forms of inequality and discrimination have 
also been created and reinforced throughout the war years and the multiplicity of 
factors that rendered violence in Sudan so long and protracted and. In this sense, and 
since the goal of [sustainable and enduring] peace demands a much more 
comprehensive transformation process beyond the limits of the traditional bilateral 
political peace brokered under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, it is crucial that 
attitudes, behaviours and [policies] change (Murphy, 2006) towards more balanced 
and equitable human development in the whole country, and especially in the South. 
Human development gaps within countries reflect unequal opportunity with people 
being held back because of their gender, group identity, wealth or location. Extreme 
inequalities in opportunity and life chance have a direct bearing on what people can 
be and what they can do, that is, on human capabilities (UNDP, 2005: 51). Such 
inequalities are unjust as well as economically wasteful and socially destabilizing. In 
this chapter we have argued that inequality in Southern Sudan, especially the one 
made invisible, matters because it is a fundamental obstacle to the fulfilment of 
human development of the various communities and groups 
                                                                                                                                          
group. Salva Kiir, the president of the autonomous government in the south, has blamed political 
agitators who he said want to show that the south cannot run itself ahead of a promised 2011 southern 
referendum on separation from northern Sudan (Al-Jazeera, 2009). Escalating rates of armed violence 
are increasingly being attributed to intertribal clashes and tribal militia. During the civil war a variety 
of tribal groups – including the Nuer, the Murle and the Dinka – competed for territorial and resource 
control in various ‘states’ of southern Sudan including Lakes, Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria. In some 
cases, communities armed themselves to protect their communities and families: one such group was 
the ‘white army’, which consisted of young Lou Nuer males who otherwise raised cattle and raided 
neighbouring tribes. Although not fully organised or politicised, the group was increasingly drawn 
into civil war owing to tacit support from Khartoum. The white army was also ill-disposed toward the 
SPLA who were in case dominated by the Dinka, a traditional enemy of the Nuer (Muggah et al, 
2008). 
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 (…) disadvantaged opportunity is wrong for intrinsic reasons: it 
violates basic precepts of social justice. There are also strong 
instrumental reasons for a concern with inequality. Deep disparities 
based on wealth, region, gender are bad for growth, bad for 
democracy and bad for social cohesion. (UNDP, 2005: 51) 
 
Consolidating a still fragile peace, as the one currently being experienced in Sudan, 
thus demands a rapid, effective and visible redress of the underlying and structural 
causes of conflict, poverty and underdevelopment. According to Bennet, 
redistribution of wealth must be accompanied by building and consolidation of the 
governance apparatus (Bennett, 2005: 9). Without these issues dully addressed 
neither the donor community nor the domestic actors will be able to build and 
guarantee sustainable peace in the longer-term in Sudan. Recognizing and 
guaranteeing equal rights and opportunities to all peoples in Sudan, as well as 
respecting their multiple identities, is a fundamental step to achieve such an idea of 
peace. 
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“If peace is not to elude twenty-first century Sudan, the country’s 
legacy of inequities must be addressed and a more equitable and 
dignified future charted out.” 
 (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 21) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The multiplicity of violent armed conflicts especially after the end of the Cold War 
has made the study and practice of conflict resolution and peacebuilding particularly 
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important fields. This is especially true in the context of the increasing intra-state 
conflicts that characterized the international system after 1989, both between 
different socio-ethnic and cultural groups within a national territory, and between 
groups who feel excluded and marginalize from existing power structures and the 
central authority (Omeje, 2008: 68). 
The result has been a frequent classification of violent internal conflicts as ‘ethnic’ or 
‘resource’ wars that are attributed simplistically, uncritically and a posteriori, with 
the consequence that they will ultimately neglect and undermine the development of 
more accurate and effective conflict resolution or peacebuilding options (Porto, 
2008: 57). 
In fact, in the current study of conflicts, priority is often given to interpretations that 
underline the crucial, if not decisive, role of primordial ethnic or religious identities. 
For the primordialist approach, ethnicity is taken for granted as a fixed characteristic 
of individuals and communities, as an inescapabable and inevitable essential 
extension of the bond that unites kinship. Such characteristics basically render ethnic 
identity a distinct and superior form of identity. In this sense, primordialists see 
conflict as [always] flowing from ethnic differences and, thus, not necessarily in 
need of [further] explanation (Lake and Rothchild 1998 apud Porto, 2008: 58). 
This primordial view, however, is a very limited one since it takes attention away 
from other multiple causes and dimensions that contribute to the emergence and 
perpetuation of conflict, namely the existence of deep rooted socio-economic 
inequalities among groups. Alternative interpretations of conflict thus contributed to 
recognising the instrumentalised and constructed nature of those identities by some 
actors, towards others.  
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Instrumentalism, on the other hand, tends to approach the ethnic identity variable in a 
different way, conceptualising ethnicity as a tool used by individuals, groups, or 
elites to obtain some larger, typically material, end (Porto, 2008: 58). According to 
Timothy Sisk, ‘ethnic identity is socially constructed, often created or de-emphasised 
by power-seeking political elites in historically determined economic and social 
arrangements (Sisk 1996: 12 apud Porto, 2008: 58). In this sense, the potential for 
violent conflict basically stems from both these ideas: the role of elites in mobilizing 
groups and the existence of economic or social arrangements (Porto, 2008: 58). In 
this context, and according to Porto, the ‘tyranny’ of the single cause has seen 
permutation across what David Singer called the ‘usual suspects’, namely territory, 
ideology, religion, language, ethnicity, self-determination, resources, markets, 
equality or revenge (Singer 1996 apud Porto, 2008: 57).  
In response to this reinterpretation of conflict dynamics and their more 
multidimensional nature, a more multidimensional type of response was also put 
forward, mainly characterised by specific tools and priorities geared to conflict and 
post-conflict scenarios in order to achieve long –lasting peace. Despite helping create 
awareness for the multiple and more complex causes of conflict, these strategies and 
models ended up crystallising a very unbalanced agenda of priorities, clearly 
favouring civil and political rights and institutions and neglecting economic, social 
and cultural guarantees. As a result, the application/implementation of such models 
and strategies in developing countries experiencing violent and enduring conflict has 
had mixed results and became under intense criticism due to their apparent 
ineffectiveness in achieving sustainable peace.  
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In fact, and as suggested by Woodward, the main debate concerning peacebuilding 
and statebuilding missions today is not so much regarding the failure to intervene but 
rather the failure to intervene successfully (Woodward, 2007). 
Departing from this scenario, the aim of this thesis was twofold: first, to identify and 
discuss the dominant explanations on the origins of violent armed conflict; secondly, 
to critically analyse the changes and evolution in the traditional and dominant models 
to resolve conflicts and build peace, by stressing their limited agenda and priorities 
and the way in which they tend to obscure much more complex inequalities and 
dynamics that sustain and reproduce conflict. With this analysis, we aimed to argue 
that effective and sustainable strategies imply recognising and addressing the more 
complex inequalities at stake, suggesting the need for deconstructing simplistic views 
of ethnicity, religion and of the multiple actors involved in conflict. 
For this purpose, we focused on the North-South conflict in Sudan where the 
traditional narratives evolved from a simplistic interpretation of conflict based on 
religious differences between a Muslim North and a Christian South to one that 
added the importance of more structural and visible inequalities of the Southern 
population and where resolution efforts culminated with the signing of a 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. According to our analysis, however, these 
strategies are still frequently based on general and flawed assumptions that end up 
reproducing and perpetuating more invisible and complex group inequalities in the 
South and that render peace in Southern Sudan extremely fragile. 
 
Sudan is a nation composed by 175 major ethnic and linguistic groups and other 325 
smaller groups belonging to various religious traditions and making it one of the 
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most ethnically and linguistically diverse countries in Africa. Currently, it is 
estimated that thirty percent of the South’s eight million people are Christian, five 
percent are Muslim and sixty-five percent profess other local worship systems. The 
North is over ninety percent Muslim but around two million of the displaced 
Southerners currently live in Khartum and are, in their majority, Christian (Jok, 
2007: 158).  
According to Sudanese scholar Francis Deng 
 
The civil war that has raged intermittently in the Sudan since 
independence in 1956 is a conflict of contrasting and seemingly 
incompatible identities in the Northern and Southern parts of the 
country. 
But although the North is popularly defined as racially Arab, the 
people are a hybrid of Arab and African elements, with the African 
physical characteristics predominating in most tribal groups. This 
configuration is the result of a historical process that stratified races, 
cultures, and religions and fostered a "passing" into the Arab-Islamic 
model that discriminated against the African race and cultures. The 
outcome of this process is a polarization that is based more on myth 
than on the realities of the situation. The identity crisis has been 
further complicated by the fact that Northerners want to fashion the 
country on the basis of their Arab-Islamic identity, while the South is 
decidedly resistant. (Deng, 1995: 4) 
 
Although conflict in Sudan has frequently been presented and explained as a war 
between an Arab Muslim North and an African Animist and Christian South due to 
existent religious and ethnic differences, we have argued that these are not enough to 
explain such violent and prolonged civil conflict.  
In this context, and even though acknowledging the Sudanese ethnic and religious 
diversity, underlying this analysis is the rejection of the common premise that 
violence and conflicts in Sudan have simply and inevitably been a result of deep and 
ancient hatreds or loyalties. In fact, when attempting to apply the primordialist 
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framework to the long lasting conflicts in Sudan, a more accurate analysis tends to 
demonstrate that this is not a sufficient tool to understand and analyse the underlying 
conditions that have created and sustained the major episodes of violence in the 
history of Sudan. On the contrary, in our perspective and following El-Battahani’s 
view, the popular assumption that African violent conflicts naturally and inevitably 
emanate from ethnic, tribal, religious or cultural differences is seriously flawed132. 
Contrary to what people believe, Sudan is not racially or culturally divided into 
clear-cut Arab-North and African-South factions (Ahmed, 2008: It is true that 
describing the long civil war in Sudan simply as a conflict between the Muslim and 
Arab North and the Christian, Animist and African South, would facilitate the 
understanding of the conflict, since it would merely have fulfilled the normal 
expectations of being faced with a conflict among civilizations133 (Ribeiro, 2006: 2). 
Although the idea of ethnic conflict has been developed for a long time both by 
academics and practitioners in the area of conflict prevention and conflict resolution, 
consensus on to what extent ethnicity does play a primordial role is yet to be found. 
Therefore, one of the first assumptions of the thesis has been that the so-called ethnic 
conflicts may not be truly or merely ethnic in their nature, but rather highly complex, 
with multiple causes and therefore less easy to prevent or resolve.  
During the past twenty years, an estimated one million people in Sudan died because 
of the combined effects of brutal war, forced relocation, disease, and famine due to 
crop destruction, raiding and bombing of civilian targets and livelihood sources 
                                                 
132 In El-Battahani’s opinion, most ethnic dichotomies appear to be a consequence rather than a cause 
of violent conflict (El-Battahani, 2006: 13) and that the longer a conflict persists, the more these 
factors come to play a role as a principle of political solidarity and mobilization (El-Battahani, 2006). 
 
133 The same would be repeated in Darfur in a superficial reading seeing it as a conflict between Arabs 
and Africans or, following other social and economic parameters which also have some ethnic 
features, between farmers and herders, nomadic and sedentary populations (Ribeiro, 2006: 2). 
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(fields, cattle herds), and the prevention of people from farming the land (Abbink, 
2004). The United Nations also estimates that conflict and drought have left 6.7 
million Sudanese displaced, including some 550.000 refugees and displaced (Malik, 
2005: 31)134.  
As it has been mentioned above, it is our assumption that the ethnic and cultural 
dichotomies that characterize Sudan do not necessarily explain in full the conflict 
that arose between North and South. According to Abdel Ghaffar Ahmed, it is only 
when these factors are combined with resources and wealth differentials or the 
perceived sense of group inequalities, or other socio-economic conditions, that they 
account for, and may actually cause violent conflict (Ahmed, 2008: 74). Sudan is, in 
fact, an example of deep group inequalities (with Southerners being heavily deprived 
from access to resources and rights), historically characterized by a flawed political 
economy largely dependent on cheap and unfree labour, and in where those 
categories of ‘unfreedom’ have been continually reproduced, not only by the 
government itself, but also by the various international aid models and agencies 
(Keen, 1994). In this sense, understanding the North-South conflict and violence 
demands a broader analysis of the socio-economic inequalities derived from 
                                                 
134 In addition to the human and material costs of violent conflict, violence introduced variables of a 
psychosocial nature, which require extensive and long-term peacebuilding and reconciliation in the 
societies in question long after the formal conflict has ended (Porto, 2008: 47). The task of peaceful 
reconciliation is extremely difficult but of fundamental importance for long-term peace. In this sense, 
and following the work of Paul Murphy, during the next few years, sensitive, informed and 
appropriate external [and internal] support for grassroots peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts 
should be stimulated and reinforced. The next phase of support for community peacebuilding and 
reconciliation initiatives must intensify the organization and institutionalisation of the process and 
engage the various government levels and grassroots representatives in dialogue over the collaborative 
roles and responsibilities of government, customary institutions, civil society, churches, [local 
population] and external actors in a people-led peacebuilding framework and around a common vision 
for security and peace (Murphy, 2006). 
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culturally and regionally imposed political marginalisation and its economic effects 
leading to grievances and instability. 
As Joseph Hanlon has suggested, Sudan’s recurring civil wars are a product of 
various intertwined factors (Hanlon, 1996). First of all, he points out the patterns of 
governance which developed in the Sudanic states before the nineteenth century, 
establishing and exploitive relationship between the centralising power of the 
government in Khartoum and its hinterlands or peripheries, mainly through the 
institutions of slavery and slave raiding, creating groups of peoples with a lastingly 
ambiguous status in relation to the state; secondly, the introduction of a particular 
form of militant Islam in the late nineteenth century which further sharpened the 
divide between persons with and without full legal rights within the state (and which 
was particularly acute towards Southerners); thirdly, the creation and aggravation of 
inequalities in the economic, educational and political development within the 
colonial state of the twentieth century (which often built upon earlier patterns); and 
finally, the reluctance to address these disparities and guarantee the conditions in the 
South for the safeguard of their interests, rights and resources (Hanlon, 1996). 
What comes clear from this analysis is that there is no single and isolated cause for 
the North-South conflict, since a complex set of interrelated factors drove the war for 
more that two decades. Historical grievances, feelings of exclusion and 
marginalization, demands for an equitable and fair sharing of power between 
different groups, inequitable distribution of economic resources and benefits, 
underdevelopment, the absence of a genuine democratic process and other 
governance issues are all interlocking factors to the conflict, but none of them is a 
sole or primary cause.  
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But even despite this multiplicity and complexity of factors, our argument has been 
that social and economic factors play a crucial triggering role in the emergence of 
violent conflict, especially when these are associated with continued patterns of 
horizontal discrimination between groups. In fact, and as it has been demonstrated in 
previous chapters, unequal access to resources and services and disparities in 
resource distribution, which have been exacerbated by the long standing failure of 
national leaders to address the grievances stemming from the South ever since 
independence, did play an active role in feeding and aggravating this conflict 
(Pantuliano, 2006). 
Furthermore, the perception by some groups that there are strong inequalities of 
economic opportunities and access to resources, as well as significant differences in 
the living standards between groups does in fact contribute to a sense of grievance 
(Porto, 2008: 64) and contribute to the deterioration of inter-group relations, 
increasing the propensity for [violent] conflict (Porto, 2008: 65)135. 
Despite this multiplicity and complexity of causes of violent conflict, it has generally 
been agreed that the international community has made progress in recent years in its 
capacity to address internal conflict and plan and implement the appropriate phases 
and strategies of a peace mission. According to some authors, for example, the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement actually attempted both to heal a deeply divided 
and unequal society by addressing the root causes of violent armed conflict and to 
resolve issues that could not be decided by military means (Stiansen, 2005: 24). 
However, and without wanting to diminish the importance and value of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in putting a formal end to the conflict between 
                                                 
135 These patterns of discrimination are also important at the cultural level, through the limitation of 
the access to education, recognition of minority languages or religions, social stereotyping, among 
others (Porto, 2008: 65). 
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North and South, it seems clear that the fundamental issues of socio-economic 
inclusion and equality have not been effectivey tackled and/or incorporated in the 
external and internal peace efforts in Sudan. There has been a focus on short-term 
crisis management rather than long-term development and insufficient attention to 
building capacity. Simultaneously, there has also been near-complete lack of long-
term economic investment for development in the South. Such weaknesses will need 
to be minimised or eliminated if peace is to be successfully implemented in Sudan 
(S¢rb¢, 2005: 14). 
Despite the many expectation, and according to people involved in the peace process, 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is not really comprehensive in the way that it 
does not include the perceptions and reality of all the Sudanese population, its 
different sectors and groups and it does not take into account the rest of the national 
peace and conflict dynamics (for example in the East or in Darfur) (Abdelgadir, 
2008). Also it seems that no significant efforts have been made in order to transcend 
the existent [and often constructed and instrumentalised] racial identities in a way 
that could have institutionalised equal and universal citizenship guarantees instead of 
ethnic, racial or religious entitlements (Idris, 2005: 111). 
For example, political and socio-economic ideas that were advanced to allow for 
alternative options to deal with the deliberate socio-economic and political 
marginalisation of some communities and regions due to cultural and identity biases, 
were ignored or made vague in the word of the Agreement and as a result, ultimately 
contributed to several limitations and fragilities both in content and in the 
implementation phase. The scenario is thus one in which peace remains extremely 
fragile. Therefore, and as argued by Iyob and Khadiagala, peace agreements that are 
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comprehensive in name but only partial in their [provisions] and applicability, such 
as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, will never be enough to tackle the deep-
rooted causes of conflict and the grievances of Sudan’s multiple communities (Iyob 
and Khadiagala, 2006: 16). 
While due note has been taken that conflict is a part of human existence and can 
manifest itself both negatively and positively, there is evidence that mechanisms can 
be put in place to prevent violent conflicts through resort to peace building and 
conflict resolution instruments, in order to facilitate peaceful coexistence among the 
various groups and peoples living in the same country. However, according to 
Chabal et al, conflict prevention efforts are too often dominated by reactive policies 
and very few interventions are designed and implemented with a prophylactic, 
precautionary or protective purpose (Chabal et al, 2005: 223). 
Furthermore, the priority given to demands at the level of civil and political rights 
and the neglect of social and economic rights guarantees to all the Southern 
population within the negotiation agenda by most external actors involved also did 
not help achieving an outcome more favourable to the creation of sustainable socio-
economic structures in the South. The adoption of a liberal peace agenda focused on 
the political pillars of conflict to peace transitions in post-conflict scenarios has 
actually been a common trait in the various external interventions in peace and 
peacebuilding processes. In our view, however, and despite the importance of 
sustainable and solid political guarantees in peace efforts, limiting the agenda of 
priorities to neo-liberal goals of democracy, power-sharing, political participation 
and security in contexts where socio-economic inequalities are deep and persistent is 
a strategy that does not promote peace nor fulfills the legitimate expectations of the 
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population in the aftermath of conflict. If the goal is not merely the restoration of an 
old order, promotion of peace should lead to facilitating change and empowerment of 
the most marginalized, rather than a return to status quo. Therefore, simply providing 
order does not guarantee the right to justice and dignity, especially if it does not 
allow the expression of needs and grievances in a constructive manner. In Sudan, for 
example, the experience of the past few years has underscored the view that without 
stability [and structural peace] at the local level, any peace achieved only at the 
political level remains extremely unsafe (Murphy, 2006). Peacebuilding efforts 
should rather be based on the expectation that long-term security interests are served 
by the consolidation of a just and equitable society (Jeong, 2005: 21). 
As Sambanis wisely puts it, not all civil wars are the same and that each war is as 
different as the society that produced it (Sambanis, 2001: 259). There are different 
types of internal conflict and such difference must be taken into due account when 
serious analysis of their causes is to be undertaken. Quoting Michael Brown 
 
The search for a single factor (…) that explains everything is 
comparable to the search of the Holy Grail- noble, but futile (Brown, 
1997: 4).  
 
Being serious about this is crucial if one is to be serious in our effort to help prevent 
and resolve conflicts and therefore overcoming this limited view of things should be 
the primary aim and challenge for all researchers.  
Bearing this in mind, and taking Sudan as the case-study, this analysis thus attempted 
to contribute to a broader and deeper understanding of the origins of the country’s 
multiple and recurring civil wars. Throughout this analysis, we have attempted not 
only to shed some light on the true impact of ethnic diversity on the emergence 
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conflict, but also and above all on the crucial role played by other variables, such as 
socio-economic inequality and discrimination of particular groups and on the crucial 
task of addressing them effectively. 
Our focus was clearly on the underlying causes and factors that are not usually 
addressed, such as socio-economic inequality and marginalisation among different 
groups, and which may undermine the achievement of a definitive and lasting peace 
in the country. The goal was not to develop a general and universal panacea for 
conflicts sharing some of these characteristics, but rather to draw attention to the 
need for a better and deeper understanding of the complex and multiple dynamic 
causes behind apparently indisputable ‘ethnic wars’, an understanding that goes 
beyond simplistic and limited approaches to conflict. Of course it may always be 
easier to label certain conflicts as ethnic and therefore inevitable and impossible to 
prevent or resolve, since it does saves the necessary effort to go deeper in the field. 
The assumption that ancient hatreds will always breed barbarian wars in which 
nobody should or could effectively interfere is a dangerous one, especially in an 
international scenario that is already so highly polarised. The ethnic label is also a 
beneficial and very handy instrument for many groups and individuals profiting from 
conflict, since it gives them the perfect excuse to resort to violence in defence of an 
inalienable historic identity that must be preserved at all costs. 
At the end of the day, however, it is the common and poorer people who suffer the 
most with primordial and/or instrumental view of the conflict, having their basic 
rights curtailed, often irreversibly. It is against this state of things that a new 
approach to conflict with both an ethnic and socio-economic component becomes 
fundamental. 
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Throughout the war years, there were voices in the South that considered these 
North- South political, cultural and socio-economic dichotomies and differences as 
part of the Sudanese reality, but as something that could be righted and corrected 
with equal, just and correct national policies that emphasized equal citizenship and 
opportunities (Jok, 2007: 184). 
The Sudanese people, especially in the South, have proved to be resilient in their 
demands for peace, but unless the historical grievances of oppressed sections of the 
population are redressed, a new social contract is negotiated within a framework of 
political restructuring, and a conducive environment created for a just political and 
economic system which accommodates the interests and rights of all, the 
perspectives of peace will continue to be very fragile (El-Battahani, 2006: 13). 
In Sudan - as in many other contexts- such an approach entails immense challenges 
and obstacles. 
As Margarida Calafate Ribeiro has written elsewhere, without having ever know 
peace or democracy, with a six-year period to implement the peace deal with the 
South, shadowed by a possible division of the country after the referendum to 
confirm or not the union of the country in 2011, with a humanitarian crisis in Darfur 
which will prolong its devastating effects for years to come, with a non-democratic, 
Islamist and militarised government, now modelled to share power with a former 
rebel group, mainly Christian and authoritarian, with a financial sector dominated by 
the so-calling ‘religious economy’, moved by the great Islamic banks and in need of 
international and regional stability, Sudan will continue to challenge political 
analysts (Ribeiro, 2006: 9). 
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But despite the challenges, and as Iyob and Khadiagala argue, it is of crucial 
importance that those seeking to understand and resolve the conflicts in Sudan and 
the obstacles to peace must adjust their analytical lenses to include the socio-political 
grievances of past centuries with the contemporary demands for economic redress 
and political enfranchisement (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 65).  
The multiple conflicts that have ridden Sudan have been triggered by the demands 
for equal citizenship and social justice (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 15). In this 
sense, in the case of Sudan, unless these socio-economic injustices are fully 
addressed and tackled and all Sudanese are guaranteed equal social and economic 
rights, as well as civil and political, the prospects of peace will always be vague and 
limited. 
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 ‘The conflicts in Sudan affect the needy, the greedy and all those who 
seek peace with dignity. The efforts to bring closure to the North-South 
war may be the first to pave the way to guarantee the rule of law in the 
country, but a just peace will never be attained unless there is a public 
acknowledgement of the past injustices and true commitment to a 
future of reconciliation.’ 
 (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 62). 
 
 
 
 
 
When peace comes, the outside world will come and help build roads 
and schools. When peace comes, children will not have to be soldiers 
anymore. When peace comes, refugees will be able to return home.” 
(Testimonies of Sudanese people after the CPA). 
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ANNEX I 
 
MAP OF SUDAN 
 
 
 
Source: WFP Sudan, VAM Unit, December 2004. 
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ANNEX II 
 
136The main actors in the conflict
 
 Leaders 
Omar Hasán Ahmad al- Beshir 
He is the President of the government of Khartoum ever since he took power through 
a military coup supported by Turabi’s National Islamic Front in 1989. Beshir was 
born in the North of Sudan and as a military participated in the campaigns against the 
rebels of the South. Under his government he applied the shari’a in the whole 
country and its privileged relation with Iran provoked an increasing international 
isolation, accused of sponsoring international terrorism. He was declared President 
by the Revolution Command Council in 1993 and later, in 1996 and 2000, re-elected 
in severely criticized elections due to alleged fraud. 
Hasán al Turabi 
Also known as “Sudan’s Machiavelli”, Turabi has been the government’s 
ideologue, Bashir’s mentor and the main promoter of an extremist version of Islam in 
the country. Turabi was behind the government ever since the military coup in 1989 
and was also responsible for the pressure to apply the shari’a. The growing internal 
tensions between Bashir and Turabi ended up with the latter leaving the government 
in 2001. Turabi founded a new political party and is allegedly currently supporting 
the Movement for Justice and Equality in Darfur. 
 
 
                                                 
136 Adaptated from Sosa, Rodrigo (2004) Sudán, un conflict sin fin, in Papeles de Cuestiones 
Internacionales, Nº 86, pp.123-137. 
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John Garang 
Garang was, for decades, the historical Christian leader of the Southern rebel 
forces. He ethnically belongs to the Dinka people which constitute the main basis of 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army. Before de rebellion in 1983, Garang 
integrated Sudan’s Armed Forces and he was trained in the USA. He has also been 
the permanent representative of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in 
the peace negotiations in Kenya. John Garang died in a helicopter accident in 
October 2005 a few months after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement. 
 
Political Parties 
National Congress Party 
It is the government’s party. Although in theory there are other political 
parties in the country, in practice, Khartoum governs under a single-party regime. 
National People’s/Popular Congress 
It is a recently created party, after the National Islamic Front and was created 
by the charismatic leader Hasán al Turabi.  
National Islamic Front 
It is the historic formation of Hasán al Turabi and was the main support of the 
government ever since the military coup in 1989 and also the vehicle to promote the 
application of radical Islam in the country.  
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Armed groups 
 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) 
It is the country’s main rebel group. It was involved in the civil war between 
the North and the South that erupt in 1983. The SPLM/A has claimed a large 
autonomy for the south of Sudan, although it never showed clear intensions of 
independence. Its historic leader, Christian John Garang, signed the peace agreement 
with the government in May 26, 2004, and the CPA in 9 January 2005. 
 
Janjaweed 
These are the Arab militias which have undertaken brutal attacks in the 
Darfur region. The word ‘janjaweed’ has traditionally been used to refer to bandits or 
criminals and are integrated mostly within the nomad Arab groups of Darfur and 
Chad. There have been accusations of being directly connected to the government in 
Khartoum, which is apparently financing and supporting these militia’s attacks. 
 
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) 
This force has been created in Darfur to combat the discriminatory policy of 
the central government. It is basically composed of members of the African ethnic 
groups Fur, Masaaleit and Zaghawa, majority in the region. The group claims a 
serious response to the chronic underdevelopment of the region and the end of the 
attacks of the Arab militias. In the beginning, the SLA was receiving support from 
the SPLM/A, such as training and, most probably, guns. This support appears to have 
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been suspended with the beginning of the peace negotiations. The SLA has been 
particularly active in fighting the militias and governmental forces since 2003. 
 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 
Also created in Darfur in the beginning of 2003, this rebel group includes ex-
members of Turabi’s Islamic National People’s/Popular Congress. In the beginning, 
the differences between Darfur’s rebel forces, JEM and SLA provoked their serious 
opposition and confrontation.  
Regional Actors 
 
Chad 
This neighbouring country is very much connected to the conflict in Darfur 
since it shares a 1350km frontier with this Western region of Sudan which the 
militias and the population cross. Ever since the beginning of the crisis, and despite 
its fragile economic situation, Chad had to receive more than 150000 refugees from 
Sudan, with the subsequent saturation and resource scarcity, namely drinkable water. 
The bordering region of Chad registers an ethnical division similar to that one in 
Darfur, with Arab nomads in the north and Africans in the south, a fact that has 
contributed to a spill-over of the conflict to Chadian territory. 
 
International Community 
United States of America 
Washington has long been a key actor in Sudan. Its pressures on the 
government and the rebel groups have resulted effectively and made possible the 
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recent peace agreement with the south through which Bush Administration is trying 
to improve its reputation internationally. Nevertheless, the situation in Darfur 
managed to limit and cover the success of the diplomatic efforts between the north 
and the south. Bush has agreed with the G8 in the need to pay attention to what is 
happening in Darfur putting pressure in the government in order to put a halt to the 
militia’s attacks. 
 
United Nations 
The rapid evolution of the crisis in Darfur, with all the efforts concentrated in 
the peace process in the South, took the UN by surprise. Some of its agencies, like 
the ACNUR or WFP, started alerting to the situation characterised by a growing 
number of internally displaced persons in the region and refugees in the bordering 
states. The multiple denounces of humanitarian and human rights organisations have 
arrived to the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, who presented a report on Darfur 
at the Security Council. Nevertheless, the UN has not been successful in imposing 
enough and effective pressure on the regime of Khartoum.  
 
China 
China is Sudan’s major external investor and commercial partner, currently holding 
the biggest oil concession in Southern Darfur. It is also an important weapon seller 
and has therefore been opposing to sanctions and action against Sudan within the 
Security Council. 
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ANNEX III 
 
 
 
 
Figure: Illustrative Structure of an MDTF for NG/GoSS 
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Source: Memorandum of the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
and to the Executive Directors on a proposal for the World Bank to administer two Multi-Donor Trust 
Funds for Sudan, March 17, 2005. 
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  274
 Source: Sudan Household Health Survey (SSHS) and Millennium Development Goals (MDG) 
Indicators, Sudan, 2006 (http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/pn/SHHSreport.pdf) 
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ANNEX V 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Food Programme Sudan. Monthly Situation Report, Issue 2007/12: December. 
http://www.unsudanig.org/docs/WFP%20Sudan%20Monthly%20Situation%20Report%2010557.0%2
0-%20December%202007.pdf) 
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Source: World Food Programme Situation Report, Issue 2007/2: February. 
http://www.unsudanig.org/docs/WFP%20Sudan%20EMOP%2010557%20February%202007%20Mo
nthlyReport.pdf 
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ANNEX VI 
 
TABLE: USUAL SOURCES OF DIFFERENTIATION AMONG GROUPS 
 
 
 
CATEGORIES OF 
DIFFERENTIATION 
POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION 
ECONOMIC 
ASSETS 
EMPLOYMENT 
AND INCOMES 
SOCIAL ACCESS 
AND SITUATION 
 
Elements of 
categories 
Political Parties Land Government Education 
 
 Government, 
Ministers, senior 
Human capital Private Health services 
 
 Government, 
Ministers, junior 
Communal 
resources, inc. 
water 
‘Elite’ 
employment 
Safe water 
 
 Army Minerals Rents Housing 
 
 Parliament Privately 
owned 
capital/credit 
Skilled Unemployment 
 
 Local 
Government 
Government 
infrastructure 
Unskilled Poverty 
 
 Respect for 
Human Rights 
Security 
against theft 
Informal sector 
opportunities 
Personal and 
Household 
security  
 
Source: Stewart, Frances (2000) Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities, Working Paper 
Series, No.33, Oxford, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, 8. 
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ANNEX VII 
 
Status of the Millennium Development Goals in 2008 
 
  MDG 1 Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger
 Indicators  Northern Sudan 
2015 
Target
Southern 2015 
Sudan Target 
Estimated poverty incidence (% of total 50% 45% 90% 45% population) * 
Prevalence of child malnutrition 35% 16% 48% 24% (underweight for age; % under 5)* 
Prevalence of acute child malnutrition * 16% 8% 21% 11% (underweight for weight; % under 5)  
 
 
 
 MDG 2 Achieve Universal Primary Education
 Indicators  Northern Sudan 
2015 
Target
Southern 2015 
Sudan Target 
Gross primary enrolment ratio*** 62% 100% 20% 100% 
Percentage of cohort completing primary 21% 100% 2% 100% school*** 
Adult literacy rate ** 60-70% 25%1 (North and South) 
 
 
 
 
 MDG 3 Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women
 Indicators  Northern Sudan 
2015 
Target
Southern 2015 
Sudan Target 
Ratio girls to boys in primary 88% 100% 36% 100% education*** 
Women’s literacy rate 62% - 12% - 
Percentage of women in National 19% - 4% 25% Assembly/Council of States 
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 MDG 4 Reduce Child Mortality
 Indicators  Northern Sudan 
2015 
Target
Southern 2015 
Sudan Target 
Under-5 mortality rate (per 1,000)* 105 35 126 83 
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live 70 - 89 - births)* 
One-year-olds immunized against 78% - 20.2% - measles *** 
 
 
 
  
MDG 5 Improve Maternal Health
Northern 2015 Southern 2015  Indicators  Sudan Target Sudan Target 
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 638 127 2,054 425 live births) 
Birth attended by skilled health staff * 57% 90% 5% 90% 
 
 
 
 
MDG 6 Combat HIV Aids, Malaria and other diseases
Northern 2015 Southern 2015  Indicators  Sudan Target Sudan Target 
Contraceptive prevalence (% of women 7% - < 1% - ages 15-49)*** 
HIV Prevalence (% adults ages 15-49)* 1.6% - 2.3% - 
Incidence of TB (per 100,000 per 90 - 325 - year)*** 
Children under 5 with fever treated with 54.2%* - 36%*** - anti-malarials (%) 
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MDG 7 Integrate the principles of sustainable development into  
country policies and programmes; reverse loss of environmental resources 
 Indicators  Northern Sudan 
2015 
Target
Southern 2015 
Sudan Target 
Access to improved drinking water 58.7% 85% 48.3% 75% source (% of population)* 
Access to improved sanitation (% of 39.9% 67% 6.4% 53% population) * 
 
 
 
 
 MDG 8 Develop a Global Partnership for development
 Progress in Sudan  
• The Darfur crisis is currently preventing progress in global partnership,  
• To achieve the MDGs, Sudan will need to make significant investments to build the 
capacity of human resources, infrastructure and institutions as well as to mobilize 
resources to bridge the financial gap.  
• It is necessary that a continuous and sustained effort by the Sudanese people, its 
governments, and the international community is exerted to achieve MDG8.  
 
 
Source: Adapted from the United Nations Development Programme Sudan, 
http://www.sd.undp.org/mdg_fact.htm#1, [29 August, 2009]. 
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ANNEX VIII 
 
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT (2005) 
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